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Abstract 
 
 
One of the most controversial topics in recent investment literature has been stock return 
momentum. If an investor buys past winners and sells past losers, he will earn positive 
profits in the intermediate-term horizon (3 to 12 months). While behavioral theories seem 
to dominate as an explanation for the momentum phenomenon since momentum has been 
regarded as direct counter evidence for the efficient market hypothesis, Chordia and 
Shivakumar (2002) find that momentum can be explained by a set of macroeconomic 
variables. Chordia and Shivakumar argue that momentum is caused by time-varying 
expected returns that can be predicted by a set of macroeconomic variables, which might 
be associated with time-varying risk.  
 
However, the first essay of my dissertation shows that even if the macroeconomic 
variables are independent of stock returns, they can appear to predict momentum profits 
if they exhibit high persistence and the momentum portfolio period overlaps with the 
parameter estimation period. I am able to produce results similar to those of Chordia and 
Shivakumar with randomly generated variables, while I show that once the parameter 
estimation periods are changed, the predictive power of the macroeconomic variables for 
momentum disappear. My results provide evidence that the predictive power of the 
macroeconomic variables comes from a spurious relation between stock returns during 
the momentum portfolio formation period and predicted returns from the macroeconomic 
variables. My results further suggest that Chordia and Shivakumar’s argument that the 
 v
predictive power of macroeconomic variables for momentum is a challenge to behavioral 
theories is indeed premature.  
 
The second essay shows that the ratio of the 50-day moving average to the 200-day 
moving average has significant predictive power for future returns. Stocks with a high 
moving average ratio tend to outperform stocks with a low moving average ratio for the 
next six months. This predictive power is distinct from that of the nearness of the current 
price to the 52-week high, which was first documented by George and Hwang (2004). 
The moving average ratio, combined with the nearness to the 52-week high, can explain 
most of the intermediate-term momentum profits. This suggests that an anchoring bias in 
which investors use moving averages and the 52-week high as their reference points for 
estimating fundamental values is the main source of momentum effects. Momentum 
profits caused by the anchoring bias do not disappear in the long-run, confirming George 
and Hwang’s argument that intermediate-term momentum and long-term reversals are 
separate phenomena. 
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Part 1.   Dissertation Introduction 
 2
Recent research indicates that past stock returns have predictive power for future returns 
over three investment horizons. First, Lehmann (1990) and Jegadeesh (1990) document 
short-term return reversals. Stocks that have performed well for the past one week (one 
month) tend to perform poorly in the next one week (one month) while stocks that have 
performed poorly for the past one week (one month) tend to perform well in the next 
period. Second, Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) show that intermediate-term momentum 
strategies produce significantly positive profits. An intermediate-term momentum 
strategy buys stocks that have performed well and sells stocks that have performed poorly 
over the previous 3 to 12 months and holds this position for the next 3 to 12 months. 
Finally, DeBondt and Thaler (1985), Lee and Swanminathan (2000), and Jegadeesh and 
Titman (2001) show that there are long-term (3- to 5-years) return reversals.  
 
At first glance, the predictable patterns in stock returns seem to be inconsistent with even 
the weak-form efficient market hypothesis. For example, the CAPM or Fama-French 
three-factor model fails to explain momentum profits. (See Jegadeesh (1990), Fama and 
French (1996) and Grundy and Martin (2001)) This has lead to the recent development of 
behavioral models to explain the momentum phenomenon under which return 
continuation is caused by positive autocorrelation of firm-specific components in returns. 
(See Barberis, Shleifer, and Vishny (BSV, 1998), Daniel, Hirshleifer, and Subrahmanyam 
(DHS, 1998), and Hong and Stein (HS, 1999)) However, Chordia and Shivakumar (2002) 
show that once stock returns are adjusted for their predicted returns from a set of 
macroeconomic variables, there is no momentum and argue that the momentum is caused 
by the predicted portion of returns from the macroeconomic variables. In other words, a 
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momentum strategy tends to buy stocks when their expected returns are high and sell 
when their expected returns are low and the time-varying expected returns can be 
predicted by the macroeconomic variables. They further argue that if the macroeconomic 
variables are associated with time-varying risk of stocks, then momentum can be 
consistent with the efficient market hypothesis, even though the risk factors associated 
with the macroeconomic variables are not yet identified. 
 
However, in Part 2 of this dissertation I show that random variables that have first-order 
autocorrelation similar to the true macroeconomic variables appear to explain momentum 
profits just like Chordia and Shivakumar’s true macroeconomic variables. Also, the 
predictive power of the macroeconomic variables for momentum disappears when the 
parameter estimation periods are modified so that the momentum portfolio formation 
period and parameter estimation period are completely disjoint. I also show analytically 
and through a Monte Carlo simulation method that a hypothetical macroeconomic 
variable that follows a positive autoregressive process should appear to explain the 
momentum profits even if it is independent of stock returns. These empirical results and 
analyses suggest that the predicted power of the macroeconomic variables for momentum 
documented by Chordia and Shivakumar (2002) come from a spurious relation between 
stock returns over the momentum portfolio formation period and the predicted returns 
from the persistent macroeconomic variables.   
 
Part 3 of this dissertation addresses issues among behavioral models for momentum. 
Most behavioral models attribute momentum to investors’ biases in judgment under 
 4
uncertainty, such as conservatism or overconfidence reinforced by self-attribution, or 
market inefficiency caused by slow diffusion of information. However, George and 
Hwang (2004) find that the nearness of the current price to the 52-week high price can 
explain a large portion of the momentum profits and argue that investors use the 52-week 
high as their reference against which they evaluate the potential impact of news. In 
addition to the nearness to the 52-week high, I find a moving average ratio – the ratio of 
50-day moving average price to 200-day moving average price – has significant 
predictive power for future returns and that past returns on which conventional 
momentum strategies are based on have little predictive power for future returns in the 
intermediate horizon once returns are controlled for the returns forecasted by the nearness 
to the 52-week high and the moving average ratio. I interpret this as evidence that 
investors suffer from an anchoring bias in which they use the moving average price as a 
reference point when they estimate a stock’s current fundamental value. 
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Part 2.   Spurious Predictive Power of Persistent Macroeconomic                  
Variables for Momentum 
 6
I. Introduction 
 
Ever since Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) documented profits from intermediate-term 
momentum strategies, the financial literature has struggled to explain the source of the 
profits. One line of research has been to explain momentum as a result of investors’ 
irrationality; a number of models based on investors’ irrationality have been developed 
along this line. (See, Barberis, Shleifer, and Vishny, (1998) Daniel, Hirshleifer, and 
Subrahmanyam, (1998) Hong and Stein, (1999) and Barberis and Shleifer, (2003))1 
Another line of research has suggested that momentum profits can be consistent with the 
efficient market hypothesis. For example, Conrad and Kaul (1998) show that 
intermediate-term momentum profits mainly come from the cross-sectional dispersion of 
unconditional expected returns of stocks, while Jegadeesh and Titman (2001) argue that 
the results in Conrad and Kaul are driven by estimation errors in the estimation of 
unconditional expected returns. Also, Berk, Green, and Naik (1999) develop a theoretical 
model that predicts intermediate term momentum profits. In their model, time-varying 
but persistent systematic risk generates momentum profits.  
 
In line with Berk, Green and Naik (1999), Chordia and Shivakumar (2002) (hereafter CS) 
show that a set of macroeconomic variables that are popular in finance literature can 
explain a six-month/six-month momentum profit. The macroeconomic variables that CS 
use are dividend yield (DIV), default spread (DEF), the yield on three-month T-bills 
(YLD) and the term structure spread (TERM).2 CS show that once adjusted for one-
                                                 
1 Details of the behavioral models are in Part 3 of the dissertation. 
2 Detailed definitions of these variables are in the next section. 
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month-ahead predicted returns from the set of macroeconomic variables, stock returns do 
not exhibit momentum. Even though CS do not show the relationship between the 
macroeconomic variables and systematic risk factors, their results have important 
implications for both behavioral theories and conventional asset pricing theories. Most 
behavioral explanations for momentum focus on the time-series predictability of firm-
specific stock returns that cannot be explained by any common factors. However, CS’s 
findings suggest that momentum profits may not come from firm-specific returns, but 
from different sensitivities of stocks to the time-varying macroeconomic variables. If the 
macroeconomic variables are assumed to be related to systematic risk factors, momentum 
profits can come from time-varying systematic risks among individual stocks, and this 
would be consistent with the efficient market hypothesis. Therefore CS argue the natural 
next study should focus on identifying risk factors that are related to the macroeconomic 
variables.  
 
In this study, I investigate CS’s methodology and conclusions. I argue that the reason that 
the macroeconomic variables appear to explain the six-month/six-month momentum 
profits is because of the spurious relation between these highly persistent macroeconomic 
variables and the already documented return continuations in the intermediate horizon. 
First, I show that even if the macroeconomic variables are independent of stock returns 
for all lags but are highly persistent, stocks that performed well for the previous six 
months would tend to have high one-month-ahead predicted returns based on the 
macroeconomic variables, and stocks that performed poorly for the previous six months 
would tend to have low one-month-ahead predicted returns. Augmented Dickey-Fuller 
 8
tests on each time-series of the four macroeconomic variables show that I may not reject 
the null hypothesis that each of the macroeconomic variables has a unit root. This 
suggests that all of the macroeconomic variables are highly persistent, even if they do not 
follow random walk processes. Second, I show that if momentum portfolio formation 
periods are excluded from the parameter estimation periods, the macroeconomic 
variables do not have any predictive power for momentum. Also, I show that randomly 
generated macroeconomic variables that have similar first-order autoregressive 
coefficients appear to explain the intermediate-term momentum phenomenon as well as 
the true macroeconomic variables do. Finally, I show why a momentum strategy based on 
previous predicted returns from the macroeconomic variables can produce higher profits 
than a traditional momentum strategy based on past raw returns. 
 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The next section reviews the 
literature related to this study including Chordia and Shivakumar (2002). Section III 
describes the macroeconomic variables that I use and discusses the possible effects of 
differences from those that CS used, and in Section IV, I present my methodology and 
empirical findings. Finally, Section V concludes. 
 
II.  Literature Review 
 
II.A. Explanations and theories for intermediate-term momentum 
 
Explanations and theories for intermediate-term momentum based on behavioral 
assumptions well outnumber those based on the rational expectation hypothesis and 
consistent with the efficient market hypothesis. Three of the explanations and theories 
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consistent with the efficient market hypothesis are Conrad and Kaul (1998), Berg, Green, 
and Naik (1999) and Chordia and Shivakumar (2002). However, Jegadeesh and Titman 
(2002) show that Conrad and Kaul’s empirical tests suffer from small sample biases and 
methodological adjustments for the biases reverses the Conrad and Kaul’s findings.  
 
In the theoretical model of Berg et al., the value of a firm is the sum of the value of its 
existing assets and the value of growth options. Under this model, expected stock returns 
are determined jointly by the average systematic risk of the firm’s existing assets, the 
current interest rate, and the relative importance of ongoing projects to growth 
opportunities in the firm’s value. Berg et al. define the systematic risk of a project to be 
negatively proportional to the covariance between the unexpected change in cash flows 
and the unexpected change in the pricing kernel for the project. The pricing kernel for a 
project is positively related to current interest rate, therefore interest rates affect the 
systematic risk of existing projects. Also, in their model, the sensitivity of the value of 
existing projects to a change in interest rates is smaller than the sensitivity of the value of 
the growth options. For this reason, a mature firm may be affected less by interest rate 
changes.  
 
The average systematic risk of a firm’s existing assets is time-varying since the firm may 
undertake new projects and some projects die off, but it is highly persistent, since the 
collection of ongoing projects does not change dramatically over short time periods. This 
may give theoretical foundation to CS’s study. The basic premise of CS is that stock 
returns are related to the one-month lagged macroeconomic variables including interest 
 10
rates, the return on each firm has different sensitivities to the macroeconomic variables, 
and finally the sensitivities of returns the macroeconomic variables are time-varying. The 
macroeconomic variables CS use are dividend yield, default spread, yield on three-month 
T-bills, and term structure spread. The dividend yield (DIV) is defined as the total 
dividend payments accruing to the CRSP value-weighted index over the previous 12 
months divided by the current level of the index; the default spread (DEF) is defined as 
the difference between the average yield on bonds rated BAA by Moodys and the average 
yield of bonds with a Moodys rating of AAA; the term structure spread (TERM) is 
measured as the difference between the average yield of Treasury bonds with more than 
10 years to maturity and the average yield of Treasury bills that mature in three months.  
 
CS include the yield on the three-month T-bill (YLD) since Fama (1981) and Fama and 
Schwert (1977) show that this variable is negatively related to future stock market returns 
and that it serves as a proxy for expectations of future economic activity. The dividend 
yield (DIV) on the market has been shown to be associated with slow mean reversion in 
stock returns across several economic cycles (Keim and Stambaugh, 1986, Campbell and 
Shiller, 1988, and Fama and French, 1988) This variable is included as a proxy for time 
variation in the unobservable risk premium, since a high dividend yield indicates that 
dividends are being discounted at a higher rate. Fama and French (1988) show that 
default premiums (DEF) track long-term business cycle conditions and document the fact 
that this variable is higher during recessions and lower during expansions. Fama and 
French also show that the term spread (TERM) is closely related to the short-term 
business cycles. 
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II.B. Review of Chordia and Shivakumar (2002) 
 
The predicted return is the one-month-ahead forecast from the following business cycle 
model; 
ittitititiiit eDEFcTERMcYLDcDIVccr +++++= −−−− 141312110 , (1)
 
where rit is return on stock i for month t and DIVt-1, YLDt-1, TERMt-1, and DEFt-1 are 
realizations of the macroeconomic variables at the end of month t-1. The parameters of 
the model, cij, are estimated each month, for each stock, using the previous 60 months of 
returns. The parameters of the model are then used to obtain the one-month-ahead 
predicted return for each stock. Using the business cycle model specified in equation (1), 
CS conducted various tests to show that profits to a six-month/six-month momentum 
strategy can be explained by the predicted returns from the four macroeconomic variables 
and payoffs to the momentum strategy disappear once stock returns are adjusted for their 
predictability based on the business cycle model. The summary of procedures and the 
results of the critical tests follow. 
 
II.B.1 Momentum payoffs after adjusting for predicted returns 
 
II.B.1.a) Definitions and methodologies 
 
CS mainly investigate the six-month/six-month momentum strategy. Under this strategy, 
all stocks are sorted in ascending order based on their previous six-month returns at 
month t. Stocks in the top decile are assigned to portfolio P1t, the stocks in the next decile 
are assigned to portfolio P2t, and so on. The momentum strategy invests an equal amount 
of money in the stocks in portfolio P10t and sells short stocks in portfolio P1t at month t. 
If there are N stocks in the market, the weight vector of the momentum portfolio that is 
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constructed at the beginning of month t can be represented as 
[ ] ( )Nww Nttt 101 ⋅′= &L&&w , where ()′ indicates the transpose of a matrix, and where 
1=itw&  if i ∈ P10t, 1−=itw&  if i ∈ P1t and 0=itw&  otherwise. Since the momentum 
strategy holds this position for next six months, the weight vector for the momentum 
strategy at the beginning of month t is the sum of weight vectors of portfolios constructed 
from t – 5 to t divided by six. 
 
Definition 1 “A six-month/six-month momentum strategy (shortly momentum strategy 
throughout this paper)”: Under this trading strategy, the weight vector for the 
momentum portfolio at the beginning of month t, denoted as tw , is defined as 
( )615
0∑ = −= j jtt ww & . 
 
If I denote tr  to be a vector of return realizations for month t, [ ]′= Nttt rr L1r , then 
the month-t raw profit from this momentum strategy, πt, can be written as 
ttt rw′≡π . (2)
 
 
Let’s denote zt to be a vector of realizations of the macroeconomic variables at the end of 
month t, [ ]tttt DEFYLDTERMDIV , and xt to be [ ]tz1 . At the beginning of month 
t, CS regress stock i’s return on the one-month lagged macroeconomic variables as in 
regression equation (1) using data from t-T to t-1 in order to estimate the parameters. 
Let’s denote tcˆ  to be the OLS estimate vector of the parameters at month t so 
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[ ]′= 43210 ˆˆˆˆˆˆ itititititit cccccc . The one-month-predicted return for stock i for month t 
used by CS, denoted by itrˆ , can be written as 
ittitr cx ˆˆ 1−= . (3)
 
Also if trˆ  is defined to be a vector of the one-month-ahead predicted returns of all stocks 
in the market for month t, [ ]′= Nttt rr ˆˆˆ 1 Lr , then the month-t predicted (one-month-
ahead) profit from the six-month/six-month momentum strategy can be defined as 
follows.  
 
Definition 2 “The predicted momentum profit (from the macroeconomic variables) for 
month t”: the predicted momentum profit for month t, denoted  tπˆ , is the one-month-
ahead predicted return on the momentum portfolio defined in Definition 1. So 
ttt rw ˆˆ ′≡π . 
 
Sometimes CS predict stock returns without estimates of intercepts, 0ˆitc , so I define the 
estimate of the coefficient vector without intercept, denoted as oitcˆ , to be 
[ ]′4321 ˆˆˆˆ itititit cccc . The one-month-ahead predicted return without intercept for stock i 
for month t, oitrˆ , is 
oo
ittitr cz ˆˆ 1−= . (4)
 
Notice that 1ˆitc , 
2ˆitc , 
3ˆitc , and 
4ˆitc  in vector oitcˆ  are estimates of the regression coefficients 
for the equation that includes the intercept, i.e. itk ktikiit ezccr ++= ∑ = −4 1 10 , not for the 
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equation that excludes intercept, i.e. itk ktikit ezcr += ∑ = −4 1 1 . CS describe the reason for 
this as follows: “the intercept is excluded from the predicted portion of the model since 
the estimated intercept may capture some of the returns during the formation period and, 
as a result, could lead us to control for cross-sectional differences in average returns that 
are unrelated to the business cycle. In any case, it is worth noting that our results are 
essentially unchanged if the intercept is included in the predicted component of 
returns”.3  
 
Defining otrˆ  to be [ ]′oo L Ntt rr ˆ1ˆ , then the month-t (one-month-ahead) predicted profit 
without intercept from the six-month/six-month momentum strategy can be defined as 
follows. 
 
Definition 2′ “Predicted momentum profit (from the macroeconomic variables) without 
intercepts for month t”: Predicted momentum profit without intercepts for month t, 
denoted  otπˆ , is the one-month-ahead predicted return without intercepts on the 
momentum portfolio defined in Definition 1. So oo ttt rw ˆˆ ′≡π . 
 
Definitions 3 and 3′ follow as: 
 
Definition 3 “Predicted-return-adjusted momentum profit with intercepts for month t”: 
The adjusted momentum profit for predicted returns with intercepts for month t, 
                                                 
3 Page 994 in Chordia and Shivakumar (2002). 
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denoted as atπ , is the difference between the raw momentum profit and the predicted 
momentum profit. So tt
a
t πππ ˆ−≡ , where tπ  is defined in Equation (2) and tπˆ  is 
defined in Definition 2. 
 
Definition 3′ “Predicted-return-adjusted momentum profit without intercepts for 
month t”: The adjusted momentum profit for predicted returns without intercepts for 
month t, denoted at
oπ , is defined to be  oo ttat πππ ˆ−≡ , where tπ  is defined in Equation 
(2) and otπˆ  is defined in Definition 2′. 
 
II.B.1.b) Findings 
 
CS calculate the time-series average of adjusted momentum profits for predicted returns 
without intercepts, at
oπ  in Definition 3′, over the three sample periods, 1/53-12/94, 1/53-
6/63, and 7/63-12/94.4 CS estimate parameters to Equation (1) using the previous 60 
months of observations, so that T = 60. When they calculate one-month-ahead predicted 
return for stock i for month t, first they estimate the parameters in Equation (1) using 
stock i’s return series from t-T to t-1 and the time-series of the macroeconomic variables 
from t-T-1 to t-2. Then the one-month-ahead predicted return for month t is calculated 
based on the macroeconomic variables at t-1 and the estimated parameters. The estimated 
intercept is excluded from the equation for predicted return. The difference between the 
                                                 
4 CS also calculate one-month-ahead predicted returns using Equation (1) including a January dummy. 
Their results with January dummy are essentially same as those without a January dummy. 
 16
actual return and the predicted return on the momentum portfolio is called the predicted-
return-adjusted momentum profit. 
 
The time-series average of the predicted-return-adjusted momentum profits without 
intercepts defined in Definition 3, at
oπ , is -1.94 percent per month (t-statistic is -1.41) 
over the entire sample period, -3.70 percent (t-statistic is -1.62) from 1/53 to 6/63, and     
-1.36 percent (t-statistic is -0.81) from 7/63 to 12/94. All of the adjusted profits are 
negative but statistically insignificant. CS argue that these results suggest that stock 
returns for the previous six months do not predict the portion of future returns that is 
unexplained by the business cycle model, and that the predictive ability of past returns is 
restricted to the portion of returns that is predictable by macroeconomic variables. 
Therefore, momentum can be explained by the macroeconomic variables.  
 
II.B.2 Role of predicted and stock-specific returns in causing momentum 
 
II.B.2.a) Definitions and methodology 
 
CS create two additional six-month/six-month momentum strategies. They are 
momentum strategies based on stock-specific returns and predicted returns. Under these 
two strategies, for each stock i and for each month t, the one-month-ahead predicted 
return without intercept, oitrˆ , is calculated as in Equation (4). The stock-specific return for 
stock i for month t, sitr
o , is defined to be the difference between the realized return and the 
one-month-ahead predicted return without intercept for month t, i.e. oo itit
s
it rrr ˆ−= . Under 
the momentum strategy based on the stock-specific returns, at the beginning of each 
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month t, all stocks are sorted based on their compounded previous six-month stock-
specific returns. The weight vector for this momentum portfolio constructed at time t can 
be written as [ ] ( )Nww sNtstst 101 ⋅′= ooo &L&&w , where 1=sitwo&  if stock i’s compounded six-
month stock-specific return belongs to the top ten percent, 1−=sitwo&  if stock i’s previous 
six-month stock-specific return belongs to the bottom ten percent and 0=sitwo&  otherwise. 
 
In contrast, under the momentum strategy based on predicted returns, at the beginning of 
each month t, all stocks are sorted based on their one-month-ahead predicted returns 
without intercept during the previous six months. The weight vector is written as 
[ ] ( )Nww pNtptpt 101 ⋅′= ooo &L&&w , where 1=pitwo&  if stock i’s six-month one-month-ahead 
predicted return belongs to the top ten percent, 1−=pitwo&  if stock i’s six-month one-
month-ahead predicted return belongs to the bottom ten percent and 0=pitwo&  otherwise.  
 
Definition 4 “A momentum strategy based on the stock-specific returns”: Under this 
trading strategy, the weight vector for the momentum portfolio at beginning of month t, 
denoted as st
ow , is defined to be ( )615
0∑ = −= j s jtst oo &ww . 
 
Therefore, the month-t profit from the momentum strategy based on the stock-specific 
returns, denoted st
oπ , can be written as 
( ) tstst rw ′≡ ooπ . (5)
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Definition 5 “A momentum strategy based on predicted returns”: Under this trading 
strategy, the weight vector for the momentum portfolio at the beginning of month t, 
denoted ptw , is defined to be ( )615 0∑ = −= j pjtpt oo &ww . 
 
In the same manner as before, the month-t profit from the momentum strategy based on 
predicted returns, denoted pt
oπ , can be written as  
( ) tptpt rw ′≡ ooπ . (6)
 
 
II.B.2.b) Findings 
 
CS calculate time-series averages of the momentum strategies based on the stock-specific 
returns and predicted returns that are defined in Definitions 4 and 5. The time-series 
averages of the profits from the momentum strategy based on the stock-specific returns, 
s
t
oπ  defined in Equation (5) are -0.06 percent (t-statistic is -0.44) over the entire sample 
period, 1/53-12/94, -0.35 percent (t-statistic is -1.79) from 1/53 to 6/63, and -0.03 percent 
(t-statistic is 0.18) from 7/63 to 12/94, showing that the profits from the momentum 
strategy based on the stock-specific returns are not significantly different from zero. In 
contrast, the time-series averages of the profits from the momentum strategy based on 
predicted returns, pt
oπ  are 0.48 percent (t-statistic is 2.70) over the entire sample period, 
0.49 percent (t-statistic is 2.01) from 1/53 to 6/63, and 0.48 percent (t-statistic is 2.14) 
from 7/63 to 12/94. This shows that the profits from the predicted-return based 
momentum strategies are significantly positive. Regarding the business cycle model 
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defined in Equation (1) as a multi-factor model similar to the Fama-French three-factor 
model, CS argue that these findings suggest that it is the time-varying expected returns 
and not the firm-specific returns that drive profits to the momentum strategy of buying 
winners and selling losers. This challenges behavioral models for momentum, since most 
behavioral models argue that the idiosyncratic component of returns produces the 
momentum phenomenon. 
 
II.B.3 Predicted versus raw returns 
 
Finally, CS test whether past returns that were predicted by the macroeconomic variables 
or past raw returns have more predictive power for future returns. Jegadeesh and Titman 
(1993) show that raw returns appear to have some predictive power for future returns in 
the intermediate-term horizon. Also, CS show that the macroeconomic variables can 
predict future returns as described in Subsection II.B.2. CS’s findings described in II.B.2 
might arise because the returns predicted by the macroeconomic variables are simply 
capturing the information contained in past returns. In order to show that this is not the 
case, CS do a horse race experiment. 
 
II.B.3.a) Definitions and methodology 
 
CS compare returns on two sets of 25 double-sorted portfolios. Under the first double-
sorting scheme, denoted RP, at the beginning of each month t all stocks are sorted into 
quintiles according to their buy-and-hold raw returns over the prior six months. Stocks in 
each quintile are then assigned to one of five equal-sized portfolios based on their 
previous six-month predicted returns defined in Equation (3). In this test, CS include the 
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intercepts.5 In contrast, under the second double-sorting scheme, denoted PR, all stocks 
are first sorted into quintiles by their previous six-month predicted returns defined in 
Equation (3), then stocks in each quintile are sorted into quintiles based on their previous 
six-month raw returns. All 50 portfolios under RP and PR are held for the next six 
months. Therefore, the month-t return on each portfolio is the arithmetic average of the 
returns on six portfolios constructed from t – 5 to t. CS calculate the time-series averages 
of monthly returns on the 50 equal-weight portfolios over the period from July 1963 to 
December 1994. These tests generate two 5 × 5 matrixes, whose components are the 
time-series averages of monthly returns on these equal-weight double-sorted portfolios. It 
is better to formally define the two resulting matrixes, since I can explain my own results 
in Section IV referring to these definitions. 
 
Definition 6 “Matrix RP”: The resulting matrix from the double-sorting scheme RP. 
RPij, the ( i, j)th component of RP, represents the time-series average return on the 
portfolio constructed in the following manner. All stocks are first sorted into quintiles 
by their buy-and-hold raw returns over the prior six months. Stocks in the jth quintile 
then assigned to one of five equal-sized portfolios based on their (one-month-ahead) 
predicted returns from a business cycle model compounded over the prior six months. 
(the 5th quintile represents the highest previous raw or predicted returns) 
 
                                                 
5 CS do not provide the reason why they exclude the intercept in the previous tests and include the 
intercepts in this test. 
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Definition 7 “Matrix PR”: The resulting matrix from the double-sorting scheme PR. 
PRij, the ( i, j)th element of PR, represents the time-series average return on the  
portfolio constructed in the following manner. All stocks are first sorted into quintiles 
by their (one-month-ahead) predicted returns from the business cycle model 
compounded over the prior six months. Stocks in the jth quintile then assigned to one of 
five equal-sized portfolios based on their buy-and-hold returns over the prior six 
months. 
 
Suppose that RP5j is significantly greater than RP1j. This means that within the jth quintile 
based on previous raw returns, stocks with high predicted returns during the previous six 
months tend to outperform stocks with low past predicted returns. However, this, in itself, 
would not be evidence that past predicted returns have more predictive power for future 
returns than do past raw returns, since finer differentials in past returns within the jth 
quintile may generate differentials in future returns. That’s why CS do the second test. If 
at the same time PRi5 is not significantly greater than PRi1, which means that within the 
ith quintile based on past predicted returns, stocks with high past raw returns tend to have 
performance similar to that of stocks with low past raw returns, then this might be 
evidence that past predicted returns have more predictive power for future returns than do 
past raw returns. Combining the results from two different portfolio formation schemes 
might give some evidence for whether past predicted returns or past raw returns have 
more predictive power for future returns. 
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This test is important since the results might give evidence on which one, predicted 
returns or raw returns, can predict future returns. Both predicted returns from the 
macroeconomic variables and raw returns appear to have predictive power for future 
returns. However, if only raw returns are truly able to predict future returns but the 
predicted returns are somehow correlated to raw returns, then the predicted returns can 
appear to predict future returns.  
 
II.B.3.b) Findings 
 
CS calculate matrices RP and PR defined in Definitions 6 and 7 using the data from 7/63 
to 12/94. CS first show that RP5j is significantly greater than RP1j for all j except for j = 1. 
This suggests that past predicted returns can predict future returns even after controlling 
for momentum based on past returns. However, PRi5 is significantly greater than PRi1 for 
only i = 5. This is interpreted by CS to mean that with the exception of the highest 
predicted return quintile, once controlled for their predicted returns, raw returns do not 
have further predictive power for future returns. Comparing matrixes RP and PR and 
with the findings described in the previous subsection, CS argue that the ability of past 
raw returns to predict future returns is due to information contained in the predicted 
components of returns and that momentum profits are attributable primarily to a common 
set of factors, rather than to firm-specific returns.  
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III. Data 
 
One concern for this study is the dataset of macroeconomic variables. I failed to obtain 
the dataset that CS used in their 2002 paper. I used the dataset used in Pontiff and Schall 
(1998) and provided by Pontiff.6 CS also seem to use the dataset provided by Pontiff, but 
it is not clear whether CS modified the dataset from Pontiff or whether Pontiff provided 
exactly the same dataset to CS and us. Pontiff and Schall (1998) show that all of the 
macroeconomic variables are highly persistent. Estimates of the first-order 
autocorrelations of DIV, TERM, YLD and DEF are 0.97, 0.97, 0.97 and 0.99 over the 
period from January 1926 to August 1994. Panel A of Table 2.1.7 in this paper shows the 
autocorrelation estimates for the macroeconomic variables over the period from January 
1951 to December 1994. All of the first-order autocorrelation coefficient estimates for the 
four macroeconomic variables are greater than 0.95 and they are decreasing very slowly 
as the orders increase. I also conducted augmented Dickey-Fuller tests of all of the 
macroeconomic variable series for the same period. Based on these tests, I may not reject 
the null hypothesis that these series have unit roots. Panel A and the Dickey-Fuller tests 
show that all of the macroeconomic variables are highly persistent. Panel B of Table 2.1 
suggests that all of the macroeconomic variables are contemporaneously correlated to 
each other. For example, the estimate of the contemporaneous correlation coefficient 
between the dividend yield and the term structure spread is -0.21 and p-value under the 
null that the two macroeconomic variables are not correlated is less than 0.01%.  
                                                 
6 I thank Pontiff for kindly providing the dataset. 
7 All tables of this part of the dissertation are in Appendix 1. 
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In order to see whether my programs and dataset are similar to CS’s, I replicated Table 
III of CS’s 2002 paper. Table 2.2 presents CS’s and my raw momentum profits and 
predicted-return-adjusted momentum profits for the sample periods, 1/53-12/94, 1/53-
6/63, and 7/63-12/94. It also reports the momentum profits separately for non-January 
months, Januarys, and overall periods for each sample period for comparison purposes.8 
Momentum portfolios are constructed as in Definition 1, based on the previous six-month 
raw returns using all stocks traded on the NYSE and AMEX from the CRSP data files. 
Panel A presents the time-series average of monthly raw momentum profits, which are 
defined in Equation (2), during the sample periods and Panel B presents the time-series 
average of predicted-return-adjusted momentum profits, which are returns on the 
momentum portfolios adjusted for the predicted returns from the macroeconomic 
variables without intercepts as defined in Definition 3′. In Panel C, predicted returns are 
calculated using itk ktikiit eJandumzccr +⋅++= ∑ = − θ4 1 10 , instead of Equation (1). In 
Panel C, intercepts are also excluded from the predicted returns.  
 
Panel A shows that there is little difference between CS’s raw momentum profits and 
ours. For all months and for the entire sample period, the difference in means of the raw 
momentum profits is 0.02 percent (or 2.90 percent of CS’ raw momentum profit) and the 
difference in t-statistics is 0.09 (or 3.05 percent of CS’ t-statistic). Differences in means 
and t-statistics for the first and second subsamples are similar to those for the entire 
sample period. The small difference may come from differences in treating missing 
                                                 
8 In addition to Table 2.2, I replicate CS’s Table VII with my macroeconomic variables and present the 
results in Table 2.10.  
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observations in momentum portfolio formation and in holding periods. In this particular 
case, predicted returns can be calculated for stocks that have at least 24 observations 
during the previous 60 months. The difference between CS raw momentum profits and 
ours may also come from different treatments of stocks that have enough observations to 
be included in momentum portfolios but insufficient observations for calculating 
predicted returns. Since CS do not describe such details in their paper, it is hard to 
replicate their tests exactly. I include in momentum portfolios all stocks that have six 
months of previous observations and calculate holding period returns using stocks for 
which predicted returns can be calculated, i.e. stocks that have at least 24 observations 
during the previous 60-month period. If some stocks in momentum portfolios do not meet 
the observation requirement for predicted returns, I replace the returns on the stocks with 
the average of the portfolio. My raw profits are similar to those of CS and the small 
differences should not significantly affect my arguments in the rest of this paper. 
 
However, Panels B and C of Table 2.2 show that my results for adjusted momentum 
profits for predicted returns are different from those of CS. For instance, in Panel B 
where predicted returns are calculated without the January dummy, the difference in 
mean predicted-return-adjusted momentum profit is 0.36 percent (or 18.56 percent of 
CS’s predicted-return-adjusted momentum profit) and the difference in t-statistic is 0.28 
(or 19.86 percent of CS’ t-statistic) for all months for the entire sample period. The 
differences in other sample periods are similar to those for the entire sample period and 
these differences seem significant compared to the differences in Panel A. Little 
differences in raw momentum profits between CS’ and ours and large differences in 
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predicted-adjusted momentum profits suggest that the macroeconomic variables that I 
have may be different from those used by CS.9  
 
However, these differences do not affect my tests and arguments in this paper for two 
reasons. First, CS would draw exactly the same conclusions from my results in Table 2.2 
as they draw from their results. All of the predicted-return adjusted momentum profits in 
Panels B and C of Table 2.2 have the same sign and statistical significance as those of CS 
except for one case (fifth row and first column in Panel B). And even in that case, both 
CS’ and my results are not statistically significant. Second and more importantly, as I 
mention in Section I and will describe further in Section IV, even random variables that 
have similar first-order autocorrelation to the macroeconomic variables that I have can 
produce qualitatively the same results as CS.  
 
IV. Methodology and Empirical Findings 
 
IV.A. Predicted momentum profits when the macroeconomic variables are 
independent of stock returns 
 
This subsection shows how spurious correlation between past raw returns and one-
month-ahead predicted returns defined in Equations in (3) and (4)10 can appear to explain 
momentum profits, even if the macroeconomic variables are independent of stock returns. 
Specifically, I show that even if the macroeconomic variables are independent of 
individual stock returns at all lags and individual stock returns follow white noise 
                                                 
9 I tried to replicate Table III of CS (2002) in several different ways, but I failed to further reduce 
differences between CS’ and my results. 
10 In the rest of this paper, (one-month-ahead) predicted return means (one-month-ahead) predicted return 
from the macroeconomic variables as defined in Equations (3) and (4). 
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processes, past six-month returns can still be positively correlated with one-month-ahead 
predicted returns. Therefore, the explanatory power of the macroeconomic variables for 
momentum profits may come from a spurious relation between past six-month returns 
and one-month-ahead predicted returns. 
 
To demonstrate this result, first denote zt to be a vector of realizations of the 
macroeconomic variables used in CS at the end of month t, i.e. 
[ ]ttttt DEFYLDTERMDIV=z , and denote xt to be [ ]tz1 . Also, denote Zt to be a 
T × 4 matrix consisting of the time-series realizations of z over the T-month period, from 
t – T + 1 to t. Let Xt be a T × 5 matrix [ ]tZι , where ι is defined to be a T × 1 vector of 
ones, [ ]′11 L . If I regress stock i’s returns on the one-period lagged realizations of the 
macroeconomic variables using the previous T-period observations as specified in 
regression equation (1), the estimate of the regression coefficients at t is 
12
1
22ˆ −−
−
−−
′

 ′= ittttit rXXXc , where [ ]′= −−− 11 itTitit rr Lr . As in Equation (3), the one-
month-ahead predicted return on stock i for month t, itrˆ , is itt cx ˆ1− . 
 
Now, consider the cross-sectional covariance between these one-month-ahead predicted 
returns and the cumulative returns over the prior m months, defined as 
 
Definition 8: “Cross-sectional covariance between one-month-ahead predicted returns 
and the previous m-month cumulative returns at the beginning of month t”: 
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 where hats above variables indicate predicted returns, bars above variables indicate 
cross-sectional average, the superscript m and subscript t- jointly indicate the sum of 
returns for the m periods prior to month t. Therefore, ∑
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, where itrˆ  is defined in Equation (3) and N is the number of stocks in the 
market.  
 
CS calculate predicted-return-adjusted momentum profits defined in Definition 3 by 
subtracting the predicted returns from the raw returns for stocks in the momentum 
portfolio and show that the predicted-return-adjusted momentum profits are not 
significantly different from zero. If this cross-sectional covariance, ( )mtt rr −,ˆcov , is positive 
at the beginning of month t, I can expect that the one-month-ahead predicted returns on 
winners during the previous m months are higher than those on previous losers, therefore 
the predicted-return-adjusted momentum profits are less than the raw momentum profits 
if I form momentum portfolios based on the previous m-month cumulative returns. 
Notice that I use the past cumulative returns over the momentum portfolio formation 
period as a measure of past performance for analytical convenience, while most 
momentum strategies, including CS’, use the compounded returns. If the cross-sectional 
covariance between predicted returns and lagged returns is positive, part of the 
momentum profits can appear to be explained by the macroeconomic variables, no matter 
 29
what causes the positive cross-sectional covariance. In the rest of this subsection, I will 
show that even if the macroeconomic variables are independent of stock returns at all lags, 
the cross-sectional covariance can be positive given the sample realizations of the 
macroeconomic variables. 
 
In order to analyze the cross-sectional covariance when the macroeconomic variables are 
independent of stocks returns, I assume that monthly stock returns follows white noise 
processes and that they are independent of any of the macroeconomic variables and other 
stocks returns for all lags.  
 
Assumption 1: All stock returns follow white noise processes and the processes are 
independent of any of the macroeconomic variables and other stocks’ returns for all 
lags. So that 
ititr ε= , for i = 1,…,N, 
where N is the number of stocks in the market and where ( ) 0=jtitE εε   for i ≠ j and 
( ) 22 iitE σε =  and ( ) 0=−sjtitE εε  for s ≠ 0. 
 
Assumption 1 precludes momentum profits that are already documented. However, I 
want to show in this subsection that even if the macroeconomic variables are independent 
of stocks returns, predicted momentum profits defined in Definitions 2 and 2′ can be 
positive. This will show adjusted momentum profits for predicted returns can be smaller 
than raw momentum profits. As will be discussed shortly, Assumption 1 is very simple so 
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that I can derive expectations of predicted momentum profits under the independence 
assumption.  
 
Next, let’s consider the expectation of the cross-sectional covariance, defined in 
Definition 8, conditional on realizations of the macroeconomic variables up to month t-1, 
i.e. ( )[ ]1,ˆcov −− Ω tmtt rrE z , where ( )⋅⋅E  means conditional expectation and 1−Ω tz  is the 
information set of realizations of the macroeconomic variables up to month t-1. The 
conditional expectation of the cross-sectional covariance between predicted returns and 
cumulative m-month lagged returns at time t can be written as 
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because I assume that each of macroeconomic variables is independent of stock returns 
for all lags. If I denote *mι  to be the 1×T  vector whose first (T – m) elements are zeros 
and whose remaining elements are ones, so that [ ]′= 1100* LLmι , it can be 
shown that 
( ) 2*1 immitit rE σιr =−− . (7)
 
Therefore, 
( )[ ] ( ) ∑ ∑
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and since 
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it follows that 
( )[ ] Σ=Ω −− ttmtt ArrE 1,ˆcov z , (8)
 
where ( ) *21221 mtttttA ιXXXx −−−−− ′′≡  and ( ) ∑ =−≡Σ Nk kNN 1 221 σ . 
 
Notice that Equations (7) and (8) hold because of Assumption 1. This simplifying 
assumption allows us to easily estimate the sign of unconditional expectation of the 
cross-sectional covariance from the time-series average of the right-hand side of Equation 
(8) without further subjective assumptions regarding stock return processes. Since Σ in 
Equation (8) is positive, the sign of the conditional expectation of the cross-sectional 
covariance between predicted returns and the cumulative m-month lagged returns 
depends on the sign of At in Equation (8).  
 
If the one-month-ahead predicted return excludes the intercept estimate as in Equation (4), 
as CS do in some of their analyses, the expectation of the cross-sectional covariance 
between the one-month-ahead predicted returns, denoted by oitrˆ  in Equation (4), and the 
past cumulative m-month returns, mitr − , conditional on realizations of the macroeconomic 
variables up to month t-1 is 
( )[ ] Σ ′−′  ′−′=Ω −
−
−−−−−
*
2
1
2211,ˆcov mttttt
m
tt TT
rrE ιιιIZZιιIZzz
o ,  
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and can be written as 
( )[ ] Σ=Ω −− ttmtt BrrE 1,ˆcov zo , 
where I define *2
1
221 mttttt TT
B ιιιIZZιιIZz 

 ′−′

 

 ′−′≡ −
−
−−−  and I is a ( )TT ×  identity 
matrix.  
 
Similarly, the conditional expectation of the cross-sectional covariance between intercept 
estimates and past cumulative m-month returns is  
( )[ ] Σ=Ω −− ttmtt CrcE 10 ,ˆcov z , 
where 0cˆ  is the estimated intercept and  
( )[ ] ( )[ ] *21222121222  mtttttttttC ιZZZZIιZZZZIι −−−−−−−−−−− ′′−′′′−′≡ . 
 
Under the momentum strategy used by CS, which is defined in Definition 1, momentum 
profits for month t are the arithmetic average of returns on m momentum portfolios that 
have been constructed based on returns from t-m+1 to t. Then the predicted momentum 
profit for month t, denoted tπˆ  and defined in Definition 2, is also the arithmetic average 
of the predicted profits from m momentum portfolios. Therefore, the expected predicted 
momentum profit for month t conditional on 1−Ω tz , ( )1ˆ −Ω ttE zπ , is proportional to the 
arithmetic average of the conditional expectation of the cross-sectional covariances 
between the one-month-ahead predicted returns at month t and the returns during the 
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formation periods for the m momentum portfolios constructed from t-m+1 to t under 
Assumption 1. In other words,  
[ ] ( )( )[ ]∑−
=
−−−− Ω=Ω
1
0
11 ,ˆcov
1ˆ
m
j
t
m
jtttt rrEm
E zz απ , (9)
 
where α is some positive number and ( ) ∑ = −−−− = ml ljitm jti rr 1 . Therefore, Equation (9) can be 
written as 
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j
j
t
m
j
j
ttt Am
A
m
E Α==Σ=Ω ∑∑ −
=
−
=
− ββαπ
1
0
1
0
1
11ˆ z , (10)
 
where β is some positive number and 
∑−
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≡Α
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, and 
( ) * ,21221 jmttttjtA ιXXXx −−−−− ′′≡ , 
and * , jmι  is defined to be T × 1 vector whose first (T-m-j) elements are zeros, whose next 
m elements are ones and the remaining elements are zeros.  
 
Similarly, if I omit intercepts from the predicted momentum profits, then the conditional 
expectation of the predicted momentum profit, otπˆ , on the realizations of the 
macroeconomic variables up to month t-1 can be written as 
[ ] mtm
j
j
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, and 
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Also, the expectation of the difference between tπˆ  and otπˆ  conditional on the 
macroeconomic variables up to month t-1 can be written as 
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, and 
( )[ ] ( )[ ] * ,21222121222  jmttttttttjtC ιZZZZIιZZZZIι −−−−−−−−−−− ′′−′′′−′≡ . 
Notice that [ ]1ˆˆ −Ω− tttE zoππ  in Equation (12) is proportional to the conditional 
expectation of the cross-sectional covariance between the estimates of intercepts and 
stock returns during the momentum formation periods. In sum, Equations (10) and (11) 
show that under Assumption 1, the expectation of the predicted momentum profits 
conditional on the realizations of the macroeconomic variables up to the previous month 
are proportional to mtΑ  if the intercept is included in predicting returns, and to mtΒ  if the 
intercept is excluded from predicting returns. Equations (10) and (11) suggest that if the 
time-series averages of mtΑ  and mtΒ  during the sample period are positive, then time-
series averages of the predicted momentum profits both with and without intercepts are 
also expected to be positive even if the macroeconomic variables are independent of 
stock returns under Assumption 1. 
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Table 2.3 shows the time-series averages and t-statistics of mtΑ , mtΒ , and mtΧ   for T = 60 
and m = 6 for the periods from 1/53 to 12/94, which is the same period over which CS 
calculate adjusted momentum profits for predicted returns as defined in Definitions 3 and 
3′. Hereafter I drop the superscripts m for mtΑ , mtΒ , and mtΧ  since m is fixed to be 6 for 
the rest of this subsection. Since I use the macroeconomic variables after January 1951 
when T-bills rates start to vary freely as CS do, the values of tΑ , tΒ , and tΧ  are 
calculated with fewer than 60 months of data before January 1956. For example, if t = 
January 1953, then the values are calculated using only the previous 24 months of 
observations. After January 1956, I can calculate the values using the previous 60 months 
of observations. Therefore, I separately report time-series averages and t-statistics for tΑ , 
tΒ , and tΧ  for the period from January 1956 to December 1994.  
 
The first row of Table 2.3 shows that both tΑ  and tΒ  are significantly positive over the 
entire sample period. This suggests that the time-series average of the momentum profits 
predicted by the macroeconomic variables with or without intercepts is expected to be 
positive even if the macroeconomic variables are independent of stock returns. Therefore, 
the time-series averages of the predicted-return-adjusted momentum profits defined in 
Definitions 3 and 3′ are expected to be less than the time-series average of the raw 
momentum profits under Assumption 1. In order to see the point, let’s consider predicted-
return-adjusted momentum profits, atπ . As defined in Definition 3, ttat πππ ˆ−= , where 
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tπ  is raw momentum profit for month t and tπˆ  is predicted momentum profit with 
intercepts. It can be shown that 
( ) ( ) ( )111 ˆ −−− Ω−Ω=Ω tttttat EEE zzz πππ . 
 
Since ( ) tttE Α=Ω − βπ 1ˆ z , where 1−Ω tz  is the realization of the macroeconomic variables 
up to month t-1 and β is some positive number, from Equation (10), and 
( ) ( )ttt EE ππ =Ω −1z  because momentum profits are independent of the macroeconomic 
variables under Assumption 1, and therefore, ( ) ( )tattat EE Α=Ω − ππ 1z , it follows that: 
( ) ( ) tttat EE Α−=Α βππ . 
Taking total expectations on both side of the above equation, it follows that 
( ) ( ) ( )ttat EEE Α−= βππ . (13)
 
Equation (13) and the fact that the time-series average of tΑ  is positive suggest that the 
time-series average of the predicted-return-adjusted momentum profits is expected to be 
less than the time-series average of the raw momentum profits.   
 
Similarly, I can show that  
( ) ( ) ( )ttat EEE Β−= βππ o  
where at
oπ  is predicted-return-adjusted momentum profits without intercept, as defined in 
Definition 3′. The first row of Table 2.3 also shows that  
( ) ( )tt EE Β>Α ˆˆ , 
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where ( )⋅Eˆ  means the time-series average. Therefore it follows that the time-series 
average of the predicted-return-adjusted momentum profits without intercepts is expected 
to be larger than that with intercepts. In other words, based on the fact that 
( ) ( )tt EE Β>Α ˆˆ , I expect that the unconditional expectation of the predicted-return-
adjusted momentum profits without intercepts is greater than the unconditional 
expectation of the predicted-return-adjusted momentum profits with intercepts.  
 
The second row shows that after January 1956 when most companies in the sample start 
to have 60 observations for parameter estimation, the t-statistic for tΑ  is more than 11 
times higher than the t-statistic for tΒ , while the average of tΑ  is only 1.27 times higher 
than that of tΒ . This means that tΒ  has a higher standard error than tΑ  and implies that 
the standard error of conditional expectation of predicted momentum profits without 
intercepts on the lagged realizations of the macroeconomic variables is also higher than 
that with intercepts. This might suggests that the standard error of predicted-return-
adjusted momentum profits without intercepts are higher than that with intercepts, since 
oo
tt
a
t πππ ˆ−=  and ttat πππ ˆ−= . If it is the case, I expect that the absolute value of the t-
statistic for predicted-return-adjusted momentum profits is smaller when I exclude 
intercepts from predicting returns than when I include intercepts, even if the mean 
predicted-return-adjusted momentum profits are the same.   
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Figure 2.111 show the values of tΑ , tΒ , and tΧ  for the period from January 1953 to 
December 1994. After January 1956, when most companies start to have 60 previous 
observations for estimating the parameters in Equation (1), tΒ  is much more volatile than 
tΑ . This implies that under Assumption 1, the predicted momentum profits without 
intercepts, otπˆ , are much more volatile than the predicted momentum profits with 
intercepts, tπˆ . The values of tΑ  are negative in only 18 months out of the 528 months 
over the entire sample period (3.4 percent of the time), and 11 of the negative values 
come from the period before January 1956 until when the number of observation for 
estimating parameters is fewer than 60. In other words, even if stock returns are 
independent of the macroeconomic variables, the predicted momentum profits with 
intercept should be positive 99 percent of the time when I have 60 months of 
observations for estimating parameters of Equation (1). On the other hand, tΒ  is negative 
204 months out of the total 504 months over the entire sample period. Therefore, if I 
define one-month-ahead predicted returns to exclude the intercept estimates, then 
predicted momentum profit should be negative 40 percent of the time.  
 
Based on the findings in Table 2.3 and Figure 2.1, I expect to observe four empirical 
characteristics under Assumption 1, under which stock returns follow white noise 
processes and are independent of the macroeconomic variables and other stock returns for 
all lags. 
 
                                                 
11 All figures of this part of the dissertation are in Appendix 1. 
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Prediction 1: Predicted-return-adjusted momentum profits defined in Definitions 3 and 
3′ will be smaller than raw momentum profits on average. 
  
This means that CS’ findings, which are summarized in my Table 2.2, can be observed 
even when the macroeconomic variables have no predictive power for stock returns. 
 
Prediction 2: Predicted-return-adjusted momentum profits with intercepts defined in 
Definition 3 will be larger than predicted-return-adjusted momentum profits without 
intercepts defined in Definition 3′. 
  
This implies that if predicted-return-adjusted momentum profits with and without 
intercepts are negative on average as CS and I show in Table 2.2, then the average 
predicted-return-adjusted momentum profits without intercepts will be closer to zero than 
that with intercepts. 
 
Prediction 3: Predicted momentum profits are much more volatile and the absolute 
value of the t-statistic for predicted-return-adjusted momentum profits is smaller when 
intercepts are excluded for predicting returns than when intercepts are included for 
prediction. 
  
This is because standard error of tΒ  is much higher than the standard error of tΑ  and the 
sample mean of tΒ  is a little smaller than that of tΑ  as Table 2.3 suggests. This might 
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suggest that mean value of predicted-return-adjusted momentum profits is smaller (in 
absolute value) and the standard error of predicted-return-adjusted momentum profits is 
higher when I exclude intercepts for predicting returns, leading to a smaller t-statistic. 
 
Prediction 4: Predicted momentum profits will be negative about 3.5 percent of the time 
over the entire sample period if I include intercepts in predicting returns and about 40 
percent of the time if I exclude intercepts.  
 
IV.B. Raw and Predicted Momentum Profits 
 
Figure 2.2 presents predicted momentum profits from the macroeconomic variables with 
and without intercepts over the sample period from January 1953 to December 1994. 
Predicted momentum profits are calculated as in Definitions 2 and 2′. At the beginning of 
each month t, momentum portfolios are constructed based on the previous six-month 
returns as in Definition 1. Returns on stocks in momentum portfolios are predicted by 
Equation (1), itttititiiit eDEFYLDcTERMcDIVccr +++++= −−−− 11312110 . Parameters are 
estimated using data from t-60 to t-1. The predicted momentum profit with intercepts, tπˆ , 
for month t is the predicted return on the momentum portfolio for month t. The predicted 
momentum profit without intercepts, otπˆ , is the predicted return on the momentum 
portfolio excluding intercept estimates. 
  
Figure 2.2 shows that predicted momentum profits without intercepts are much more 
volatile than those with intercepts, which is consistent with Prediction 3. Also, visual 
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investigation of Figures 1 and 2 suggests that the shapes of tΑ  and tΒ  are similar to 
those of predicted momentum profits with intercepts, tπˆ , and predicted momentum 
profits without intercepts, otπˆ , especially after January 1956. I will formally test the 
correlations between tΑ  and tπˆ , and between tΒ  and otπˆ  shortly. 
 
Table 2.4 shows information similar to that in Table III in CS, but I add predicted 
momentum profits, tπˆ  and otπˆ , and predicted-return-adjusted momentum profits, atπ  and 
a
t
oπ , both with and without intercepts. Also, I present the average absolute deviation of 
raw momentum profits from predicted momentum profits. Panel A shows that the 
average predicted momentum profit with intercepts is larger (5.51 percent for the entire 
sample period) than that without intercepts (2.27 percent), therefore the average 
predicted-return-adjusted momentum profit with intercepts (-4.81 percent) is smaller than 
that without intercepts (-1.58 percent). This is consistent with Prediction 2 under 
Assumption 1. The average predicted-return-adjusted momentum profits without 
intercepts are -1.58 percent, -2.64 percent, and -1.23 percent per month for 1/53-12/94, 
1/53-6/63, and 7/63-12/94, respectively. These numbers are closer to zero than those with 
intercepts, but still large in absolute terms relative to raw momentum profits, which are 
0.71 percent, 0.89 percent, and 0.64 percent per month. However, none of the predicted-
return-adjusted momentum profits without intercepts is statistically significant, while all 
of the raw momentum profits are statistically significant. This suggests that it is not only 
low sample mean but also large standard errors of the predicted momentum profits 
without intercepts that makes the absolute values of the t-statistics small. This is 
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consistent with Prediction 3. Finally, the predicted momentum profits with intercepts are 
negative in 2.58 percent of the months for the entire sample period, while predicted 
momentum profits without intercepts are negative in 43.25 percent of the months, 
consistent with Prediction 4.  
 
Panel A of Table 2.4 also shows that the average predicted momentum profit with 
intercept is 5.51 percent while the average raw momentum profit is only 0.71 percent, 
which means average predicted momentum profit is almost 8 times higher than average 
raw momentum profit. This suggests that the prediction error of the business cycle model 
used by CS is high on average and that the model may not accurately predict momentum 
profits. This is also true when predicted profits exclude intercepts. Panel B of Table 2.4 
shows more obviously the inaccuracy of the business cycle model in predicting 
momentum profits. The average absolute deviations of raw momentum profits from 
predicted profits are 5.88 percent per month when intercepts are included in predicting 
returns and 23.44 percent per month when intercepts are excluded. This means that the 
average prediction error of the business cycle model without intercept for momentum 
profits is more than 33 times the mean value of the raw momentum profits. According to 
Panel B, the signs of the raw momentum profits and predicted momentum profits with 
intercepts are different in 33.13 percent of the months for the entire sample period, and 
most of the sign differences occur when the raw momentum profits are negative. This and 
the facts in Panel A suggest that predicted momentum profits with intercepts are almost 
always positive and higher than raw momentum profits, therefore, predicted-return-
adjusted momentum profits with intercepts are almost always negative. When I exclude 
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intercepts in predicting momentum returns, the signs of the raw momentum profits and 
predicted momentum profits are different in 46.43 percent of the months for the entire 
sample period. This suggests that the business cycle model without intercepts cannot 
predict even the sign of the momentum profits. 
 
In order to see the relation between raw momentum profits and predicted momentum 
profits, I regress raw momentum profits on predicted momentum profits. In other words, I 
estimate the following two time-series regression equations. 
ttt 111 ˆ ηπβαπ ++= , and (14)
 
ttt 222 ˆ ηπβαπ ++= o , (15)
 
where tπ  is raw momentum profits defined in Equation (2) and tπˆ  and otπˆ  are predicted 
momentum profits with and without intercepts as defined in Definitions 2 and 2′. Panel A 
of Table 2.5 shows that the regression coefficients for Equations (14) and (15) are not 
significant at conventional significance levels. The t-statistics for β1 and β2 are -1.69 and  
-0.05, respectively. Also the R2s are only 0.61 percent for Equation (14) and 0.00 percent 
for Equation (15). These results mean that the predicted momentum profits with or 
without intercepts are not correlated with raw momentum profits, and furthermore the 
macroeconomic variables have no predictive power for the time-series of the true 
momentum profits. 
 
In the previous subsection, I showed that if the macroeconomic variables are independent 
of stock returns and stock returns follow white noise processes under Assumption 1, the 
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expected predicted momentum profit with intercepts for month t conditional on 
realizations of the macroeconomic variables up to month t-1 is proportional to tΑ , as in 
Equation (10), and the expectation of predicted momentum profit without intercepts is 
proportional to tΒ , as in Equation (11). In order to see such correlations, I regress the 
predicted momentum profits with intercepts on tΑ  and the predicted momentum profits 
without intercepts on tΒ , i.e., I estimate the following two time-series regression 
equations, 
ttt 333ˆ ηβαπ +Α+= , and (16)
 
ttt 444ˆ ηβαπ +Β+=o . (17)
 
 
I estimate Equations (16) and (17) for the period from January 1956 to December 1994 
during which I have 60 observations for each parameter estimation for the most of stocks. 
Panel B of Table 2.5 shows that the R2s from regression (16) and (17) are 53 percent and 
60 percent, respectively, and the t-statistics for both regression coefficients are 
significantly positive, 22.89 and 26.48. Therefore, I may conclude that a significant 
portion of predicted momentum profit forecasted by the macroeconomic variables can be 
explained by spurious prediction by the macroeconomic variables under the assumption 
that the macroeconomic variables are independent of stock returns. 
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IV.C. Persistence in Macroeconomic Variables 
 
The results in the previous subsection suggest that the macroeconomic variables appear to 
explain momentum profits even if they are independent of stock returns. In this 
subsection, I investigate why the returns predicted by the four macroeconomic variables 
and lagged returns during momentum portfolio formation period are positively correlated, 
even when the macroeconomic variables are independent of stocks returns. High 
persistence of the macroeconomic variables plays a key role in this phenomenon. In the 
following subsections, I will introduce a simple hypothetical macroeconomic variable 
that is independent of stocks returns, analyze how the macroeconomic variable can 
appear to explain momentum profits and finally, using a Monte Carlo method, estimate 
expected cross-sectional covariance between predicted returns and previous six-month 
returns.  
 
IV.C.1 A hypothetical macroeconomic variable and one-month-ahead predicted 
returns 
 
For simplicity, I consider one hypothetical macroeconomic variable that follows a first 
order autoregressive process.  
 
Assumption 2: A hypothetical macroeconomic variable, z, follows the following first 
order autoregressive process: 
zttt azaz ε++= −10 ,  0 < a < 1, 
where ( ) 0=ztE ε  for all t and ( ) 0=−stztE εε  for 0≠s  and ( ) 22 zztE εσε = . So the  
unconditional expectation of z is ( )aaz += 10µ . 
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Assumption 3: All stock returns, itr , follow white noise processes and the white noise 
processes are independent of the macroeconomic variable, z, and other stocks’ returns 
for all lags.  
ititr ε= , for i = 1, …, N, 
( ) ( ) 0  0 ≠∀== − sEE sjtitit εεε  for i, j = 1,…, N, 
( ) 0=jtitE εε  for i ≠ j, and 
( ) ( ) 2varvar iititr σε == . 
 
Now consider a regression equation 
ittiiit ezccr ++= −10 , (18)
 
which is similar to regression equation (1). Since z is independent of any stock’s return, 
the expected values of the estimate for ci are zero for all i. However, suppose I 
nonetheless estimate c0i and ci at month t for stock i over the period from t – T to t – 1, 
the OLS estimates of the intercept and the regression coefficient at time t for stock i is 
( )( )
( )∑
∑
= −−−
= −−−−−
−
−−= T
j tjt
T
j tjtitjit
it
zz
zzrr
c
1
2
21
1 211ˆ , and 
210 ˆˆ −− −= tititit zcrc , 
where bars above variables mean time-series average so that ∑ −= −= 101 Tj jitit rTr  and 
∑ −= −= 101 Tj jtt zTz . Then the one-month-ahead predicted return with intercept for month t, 
denoted by itrˆ , is  
 47
( )21112120 ˆˆˆˆˆˆ −−−−−−− −+=+−=+= ttitittittitittititit zzcrzczcrzccr , (19)
 
and the one-month-ahead predicted return without intercept at month t, oitrˆ , is  
11 ˆˆˆ −− == tittitt zczcr o . (20)
 
The cross-sectional covariances between the one-month-ahead predicted returns and the 
cumulative returns over m months prior to t, defined in Definition 8 and denoted by 
( )mtt rr −,ˆcov  if intercepts are included in predicting returns and ( )mtt rr −,ˆcov o  if intercepts are 
excluded, are 
( ) ( )( )mtmitN
i
tit
m
tt rrrrN
rr −−
=
− −−= ∑
1
ˆˆ1,ˆcov , and 
( ) ( )( )mtmitN
i
tit
m
tt rrrrN
rr −−
=
− −−= ∑
1
ˆˆ1,ˆcov oo , 
where ∑
=
−− =
m
j
jit
m
it rr
1
, ∑
=
=
N
i
itt rN
r
1
ˆ1ˆ , ∑
=
−− =
N
i
m
it
m
t rN
r
1
1 , and m is the momentum portfolio 
formation period. 
 
Now, let’s consider expectations of the cross-sectional covariances, ( )[ ]mtt rrE −,ˆcov  and 
( )[ ]mtt rrE −,ˆcov o . As in Subsection IV.A, they can be written as 
( )[ ] ( )( ) ( ) ( )∑ ∑∑
= =
−−
=
−−− 

 +−=−−=
N
i
N
k
m
ktkt
m
itit
N
i
m
t
m
ittit
m
tt rrEN
rrE
N
N
N
rrrrE
N
rrE
1 1
2
1
ˆ1ˆ21ˆˆ1,ˆcov . 
Since ( )211 ˆˆ −−− −+= ttititit zzcrr  in Equation (19), the above equation can be written as 
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( )[ ] ( )[ ]{ }
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Also, under Assumption 3,  
( ) ( ) TmrETrrE imj jitmitit 21 21 1 σ== ∑ = −−− . (22)
 
Under Assumptions 2 and 3, the following can be shown 
( )[ ] ( )( )( ) ( )
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If I substitute ( )mitit rrE −−1  and ( )[ ]mitttit rzzcE −−− − 21ˆ  in Equation (21) with Equations (22) 
and (23), Equation (21) can be written as 
( )[ ] ( )[ ] ( )[ ]∑ ∑
= =
− 


 +−=
N
i
N
k
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m
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where  
( )
( ) ( )21
1
2
21
1 21
−−
= −−−
= −−− −−
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∑
ttT
j tjt
m
j tjt
t zz
zz
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T
mC . (24)
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Finally, the expectation of the cross-sectional covariance can be written as 
( )[ ] ( )Σ=− tmtt CErrE ,ˆcov , (25)
 
where ( ) ∑ =−≡Σ Nk kNN 1 221 σ , as in Equation (8). 
 
In a similar manner, the expectation of the cross-sectional covariance between the 
predicted returns without intercepts and the previous cumulative m-month returns, 
( )[ ]mtt rrE −,ˆcov o , is 
( )[ ] ( )Σ=− tmtt DErrE ,ˆcov , (26)
 
where  
( )
( ) 1
1
2
1
1 1
−
= −−
= −−
∑
∑
−
−≡ tT
j tjt
m
j tjt
t z
zz
zz
D . (27)
 
 
IV.C.2 Signs of expectation of the cross-sectional covariance between predicted 
returns and previous m-month returns using hypothetical 
macroeconomic variable 
 
Since Σ is positive, the signs of the expected cross-sectional covariance between 
predicted returns and the cumulative m-month lagged returns in Equations (25) and (26) 
depend on E(Ct) and E(Dt). I will analytically determine the signs of E(Ct) and E(Dt) 
shortly. However, since Ct and Dt do not follow known probability distributions under 
Assumption 2, it is difficult to derive the expected values and variances of Ct and Dt. 
Therefore, I estimate the expected values and standard deviations of Ct and Dt using a 
Monte Carlo method for various a0’s and a’s for m = 6 and T = 60. Before presenting the 
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results from the Monte Carlo experiment, I briefly investigate the signs of the two 
quantities. First, the expected value of Ct is positive if the first order autoregressive 
coefficient for the hypothetical macroeconomic variable is positive and m is sufficiently 
smaller than T. To see the point, I can show that 
( )
( ) ( )



−−
−
−−
= −−−
= −−−
∑
∑
21
1
2
21
1 21
ttT
j tjt
m
j tjt zz
zz
zz
E  
( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )0Pr0 1 211 2121
1
2
21
1 21 >−×








>−−−
−= ∑∑∑
∑
= −−−= −−−−−
= −−−
= −−− m
j tjt
m
j tjtttT
j tjt
m
j tjt zzzzzz
zz
zz
E  
( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )0Pr0 1 211 2121
1
2
21
1 21 <−×








<−−−
−+ ∑∑∑
∑
= −−−= −−−−−
= −−−
= −−− m
j tjt
m
j tjtttT
j tjt
m
j tjt zzzzzz
zz
zz
E . 
( )
( ) ( ) ( ) 001 2121
1
2
21
1 21 >








>−−−
− ∑∑
∑
= −−−−−
= −−−
= −−− m
j tjtttT
j tjt
m
j tjt zzzz
zz
zz
E , and 
( )
( ) ( ) ( ) 001 2121
1
2
21
1 21 >








<−−−
− ∑∑
∑
= −−−−−
= −−−
= −−− m
j tjtttT
j tjt
m
j tjt zzzz
zz
zz
E , if m is sufficiently smaller 
than T and z is positively autocorrelated, so, 
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Therefore, E(Ct) is positive since 
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mC . This means 
that the expectation of the cross-sectional covariance between predicted returns with 
intercepts and the previous m-month returns is positive. 
 
The expected value of Dt is also positive. First, suppose that the unconditional mean of 
the macroeconomic variable is positive, i.e. ( ) 010 >−= aazµ  in Assumption 2. Then, 
the expectation of Dt conditional on that ( ) 01 21 >−∑ = −−−mj tjt zz  is positive. In other words, 
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This can be shown as follows. If recent z values are higher than their average during the 
previous T periods from t – T - 1 to t – 2, i.e., if ( ) 21 211 −= −−− >−∑ tmj tjt zzzm , then zt-1 
tends to be higher than the average value, 2−tz , because I assume that the hypothetical 
macroeconomic variables are positively serially correlated. This implies that zt-1 tends to 
be positive, since unconditional expectation of 2−tz  is positive. Therefore, the above 
equation holds true if µz is positive.  
 
However the sign of the expectation of Dt conditional on ( ) 01 21 <−∑ = −−−mj tjt zz  when 
0>zµ  depends on the magnitude of µz. If µz is high, then the conditional expectation, 
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high and ( ) 0
1 21
<−∑ = −−−mj tjt zz , zt-1 still tends to be positive since the unconditional 
expectation of 2−tz  is high. In this case,  
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as long as µz is positive, where abs() means absolute value. The above inequality implies 
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If µz is low, then the conditional expectation, 
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Second, let’s assume that the long-term mean of the macroeconomic variable is negative. 
Then  
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It follows that 
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Finally, if µz = 0, since 
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From Inequalities (28), (29) and (30),  
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and this implies that the expectation of the cross-sectional covariance between predicted 
returns without intercepts and the previous m-month returns are positive regardless of the 
unconditional expectation of the macroeconomic variables. Analyses in this subsection 
suggest that even one macroeconomic variable can appear to explain momentum profits if 
the macroeconomic variable is sufficiently persistent.  
 
IV.C.3 A Monte Carlo experiment  
 
Table 2.6 shows the results from a Monte Carlo experiment. I assume that the 
hypothetical macroeconomic variable follows a first order autoregressive process as 
specified in Assumption 2, i.e. zttt azaz ε++= −10 , so the unconditional expectation of z, 
µz, is a0/(1-a). For each choice of a and µz, I simulate a time-series of the hypothetical 
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macroeconomic variable, z, from t = -200 to t = 61 with σεz = 0.27, where ( )[ ] 212ztz E εσ ε = . 
I assume that σεz = 0.27 because it is the average standard error of residuals when I 
estimate the four true macroeconomic variables as a first order autoregressive processes. I 
discard the first 201st z values from t = -200 to t = 0 in order to avoid potential bias from 
the initial values of the simulation. Then I calculate C and D using the remaining z values 
for m = 6 and T = 60. I repeat this procedures 10,000 times so I have 10,000 values of C 
and D for each pair of a and µz. Table 2.6 presents simulation means and standard 
deviations of the calculated values of C and D for a = 0.1, …, 0.9 and µz = 0, 1, 3, 5, 7, 
and 9.12  
 
Simulation mean values of C are all positive regardless of a or µz as I showed in the 
previous subsection. Since ( )[ ] ( )Σ=− tmtt CErrE ,ˆcov  in Equation (25), where Σ is positive, 
this implies that ( )[ ] 0,ˆcov >−mtt rrE , where m = 6. Therefore, if the macroeconomic 
variable is positively serially correlated, the expected cross-sectional covariance between 
the past 6-month returns and one-month-ahead predicted returns with intercepts is 
positive. Further, this implies that the expected predicted momentum profit from the 
macroeconomic variable is positive, and finally the expected predicted-return-adjusted 
momentum profits are less than raw momentum profits even if the macroeconomic 
variable is independent of stock returns as long as the macroeconomic variable is 
positively serially correlated. Also, Table 2.6 suggests that the mean value of C is an 
increasing function of a, but independent of µz. Therefore, if I adjust momentum profits 
                                                 
12 The reason that I do not use negative µz is that the probability distributions of C and D are the same if the 
absolute value of µz are the same regardless of whether it is positive or negative. 
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for predicted returns with intercepts, the adjusted momentum profits will be lower if I 
predict the stock returns using a more highly persistent macroeconomic variable. Finally, 
the simulation standard deviations of C appear to be constant across different long-term 
means of the macroeconomic variables.  
 
Also, according to Table 2.6, the simulation mean values of D are mostly positive as 
suggested in the previous subsection. The simulation mean values of D are in general an 
increasing function of a with few exceptions. It is noticeable that the simulation standard 
deviations of D are monotonically increasing with a and µz for the range in Table 2.6, and 
more importantly, higher than the simulation standard deviations of C in general. For 
instance, when a = 0.9 and µz = 7, the standard deviation of simulated D’s is 1.36 while 
the standard deviation of simulated C’s is only 0.12. Except for µ = 0, the standard 
deviation of simulated D is much higher than that of simulated C.  This suggests that if I 
adjusted momentum profits for predicted returns without intercepts, the absolute value of 
the t-value for the predicted-return-adjusted profits without intercepts would be lower 
than that with intercept. Therefore, if I predict returns without intercept, it is more likely 
that I will have insignificant predicted-return-adjusted momentum profits either with 
positive or negative sign, which is consistent with the results in Table 2.4.  
 
These analyses along with the results in Table 2.1 where all of the macroeconomic 
variables are highly persistent suggest that the predictive power of the macroeconomic 
variables for momentum profits can come from a spurious relation between the predicted 
returns and returns during the momentum portfolio formation period. 
 57
IV.D. Adjustments in parameter estimation periods 
 
I have shown that the explanatory power of the macroeconomic variables for momentum 
profits might come from a spurious relation between the one-month-ahead predicted 
returns and the momentum portfolio formation period returns induced when the 
macroeconomic variables are highly persistent and the momentum portfolio period is 
included in the parameter estimation period. However, excluding the momentum 
portfolio formation period from the parameter estimation period may not avoid this 
spurious relation completely because of persistence in the momentum profits in both the 
pre-formation and post-formation periods. CS show that even when momentum profits 
are measured over a six-month period with a six-month gap after the formation period, 
momentum profits are significantly positive. Also, they find that the monthly return 
differentials between winner and loser portfolios are significantly positive when returns 
are measured in a six-month period immediately prior to, or with a six-month gap prior to 
the momentum portfolio formation period. These facts suggest that even if I estimate the 
parameters in Equation (1) during the period before the momentum portfolio formation 
period or six months after formation period, predicted-return-adjusted momentum profits 
can be affected by the spurious relation if the macroeconomic variables are highly 
persistent.  
 
For example, suppose that I construct a momentum portfolio at the beginning of month t 
based on the previous 6-month return over the period from t-6 and t-1 and estimate the 
parameters in Equation (1) over the period from t-66 to t-7. From the findings by CS, the 
winner portfolio constructed at month t tends to have performed better than the loser 
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portfolio in six-month periods both t-12 through t-7 and t-18 through t-13. Therefore, the 
parameter estimation period, t-66 through t-7, includes the period from t-18 to t-7 in 
which the winner portfolio tends to performed better than the loser portfolio. Also, Table 
2.1 shows that the macroeconomic variables are so persistent that the averages of the 
estimates of the autocorrelation coefficients for the four macroeconomic variables at lag 6 
and 12 are 0.81 and 0.67, respectively. These two facts indicate that even though there is 
a 6-month gap between the parameter estimation period and the momentum portfolio 
formation period, the spurious relation between the one-month-ahead-predicted returns 
and stock returns over the period from t-18 to t-7 still can make the macroeconomic 
variables appear to predict the momentum profits. This implies that in order to measure 
the potential explanatory power of the macroeconomic variables for momentum profits in 
a way that is free from the spurious relation effect, I should exclude periods at least 12 
months before and after the momentum portfolio formation period.  
 
Under this adjustment of parameter estimation periods, there is no concern that the 
estimated intercepts may capture some of returns during the formation period, since the 
parameter estimation periods and formation periods are not overlapping any more. 
Therefore, there is no reason to exclude intercepts in predicting returns.13 However, I also 
calculate predicted-return-adjusted momentum profits without intercepts for comparison 
purposes.  
 
                                                 
13 If the difference in unconditional expected returns contributes to momentum profits significantly as 
Conrad and Kaul (1998) argue, there are still some concerns. However, Jegadeesh and Titman (2002) 
repute Conrad and Kaul’s arguments and show that the difference in unconditional expected returns 
contributes little to the momentum profits, if any.  
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IV.D.1 Methodology 
 
In this section, I adjust momentum profits for one-month-ahead predicted returns as CS 
do, but I estimate the parameters in Equation (1) using two different parameter estimation 
periods. For the first estimation period, when I construct momentum portfolio at the 
beginning of month t, I estimate parameters using 60 months of observations from t – 47 
to t – 19 and from t +12 to t + 41, and use the estimated parameters in calculating 
predicted returns during the holding period, which is from t to   t + 5, in order to 
eliminate possible spurious effects between predicted returns and momentum profits. I 
still use one-month lagged realizations of the macroeconomic variables to predict returns. 
Specifically, the weight vector for the momentum portfolio constructed at month t is 
[ ] ( )Nww Nttt 101 ′= &L&&w , where 1=itw&  if i ∈ winner decile, 1−=itw&  if i ∈ loser 
decile and 0=itw&  otherwise. Let’s denote the parameter vector estimated at month t for 
stock t using data from t – 47 to t – 19 and from t + 12 to t + 41 to be 1ˆ itc , so 
[ ]′= 14131211101 ˆˆˆˆˆˆ itititititit cccccc . Since the momentum strategy holds this position for the 
next six months, the weight vector of the momentum strategy at time t is 
∑ = −= 5 061 j jtt ww &  as in Definition 1 and the predicted return on stock i for month t, 
denoted, 1iˆtr , can be written as  
∑
=
−−=
5
1
1
1
1 ˆ
6
1ˆ
j
jittitr cx , (31)
 
where [ ]ttttt DEFYLDTERMDIV1=x . This is because the parameters are 
estimated when the momentum portfolios are formed and fixed throughout the holding 
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period. If I define 1ˆtr  to be a vector of the predicted returns in Equation (31) for month t, 
so [ ]1111 ˆˆˆ Nttt rr L=r , the predicted momentum profit for month t under the first 
estimation period scheme, 1ˆ tπ , can be written as 
11 ˆˆ ttt rw′=π , 
and the predicted-return-adjusted momentum profit for month t, denoted 1atπ , can be 
written as 
( )111 ˆˆ tttttat rrw −′=−= πππ . (32)
 
where tπ  is the raw momentum profit for month t defined in Definition 2. Similarly, I 
can define the predicted-return-adjusted momentum profit without intercept under the 
first parameter estimation period scheme, denoted 1at
oπ , as follows 
( )111 ˆˆ ooo tttttat rrw −′=−= πππ , (33)
 
where predicted returns exclude intercepts. In this case there is a 20.5-month backward 
gap and an 8.5-month forward gap on average between the parameter estimation period 
and the prediction period.  
 
Under the second estimation period scheme, I estimate parameters using observations 
from t – 72 to t – 13 and use the estimated parameters to calculate predicted returns 
during the holding period, which is from t to t + 5. Let’s denote predicted-return-adjusted 
momentum profit with intercepts for month t under the second estimation period scheme 
to be 2atπ , then  
22 ˆ tt
a
t πππ −= , (34)
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where 2ˆ tπ  is the predicted momentum profit with intercepts for month t under the second 
estimation period scheme. Similarly, predicted-return-adjusted momentum profits 
without intercepts for month t, denoted 2at
oπ , can be written as 
22 ˆ oo tt
a
t πππ −= , (35)
where 2ˆ otπ  is predicted momentum profit without intercepts for month t under the second 
estimation period scheme. In this case, there is a 14.5-month backward gap between 
parameter estimation period and the prediction period on average. If the predictive power 
of the macroeconomic variables documented by CS comes from the spurious relation 
between persistent macroeconomic variables and the momentum profits, then this 
methodological adjustment should eliminate the predictive power of the macroeconomic 
variables. However, if this adjustment completely eliminates the explanatory power of 
the macroeconomic variables for momentum, I may conclude either that the coefficients 
of Equation (1) are time-varying and the 9- to 15-month gap between parameter 
estimation period and return prediction prevents us from estimating the true parameters, 
or that the predictive power originally comes from the spurious relation. 
 
IV.D.2 Results 
 
Table 2.7 presents the time-series averages and t-statistics of the predicted-return-
adjusted momentum profits using two different parameter estimation periods introduced 
in the previous subsection. In order to compare with the results of CS in their Table III, I 
include predicted-return-adjusted momentum profits when returns are predicted with 
Equation (1) including the January dummy. Since I include stocks that have at least 24 
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months of observations when estimating the parameters, the sample periods and stocks 
included in the momentum portfolios for each month under the first and second 
estimation period schemes are different. For comparison purposes, I also include raw 
momentum profits for the subsample of stock-months used in each parameter estimation 
scheme. As Panel C shows, the raw momentum profits for these subsamples of stocks and 
months used in the two different parameter estimation period schemes are significantly 
positive for all sample periods. This implies that elimination of stocks that do not meet 
the 24-month observation requirement for estimating parameters does not affect the 
momentum phenomenon.  
 
According to Panels A and B of Table 2.7, the predicted-return-adjusted momentum 
profits with intercepts for both parameter estimation periods are all significantly positive 
and similar to the raw momentum profits regardless of whether I include or exclude the 
January dummy in equation (1) for all sample periods. These suggest that if the parameter 
estimation period is not associated with time horizons during which momentum 
phenomena are documented, predicted returns with intercepts do not have predictive 
power for momentum profits.  
 
However, if I exclude intercepts for predicted returns, I may not draw such a general 
conclusion. For instance, in Panel A and under the first parameter estimation scheme, the 
predicted-return-adjusted momentum profits are significantly negative over the sample 
period from January 1951 to December 1994, while they are significantly positive under 
the second parameter estimation scheme over the period from June 1954 to December 
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1994. Also, under the first parameter estimation scheme, predicted-return-adjusted 
momentum profits are positive but insignificant over the sample period from January 
1951 to June 1963, but they are significantly negative over the sample period from July 
1963 to December 1994. Under the second parameter estimation scheme, the predicted-
return-adjusted momentum profits are significant for both subsamples, 6/54-6/63 and 
7/63-12/94, but have different signs. This inconsistency is the same when I include the 
January dummy in Equation (1). These results suggest that the predicted returns without 
intercept estimates do not predict consistently the momentum profits if the parameter 
estimation periods are not associated with the periods during which the momentum 
phenomena are documented.  
 
From the fact that momentum profits adjusted for predicted returns with intercept are 
significantly positive over the all sample periods with and without January dummy, I may 
conclude either that the parameters in Equation (1) are so time-sensitive that a 9- to 15-
month gap prevents us from estimating the true parameters, or that the predictive power 
of the macroeconomic variables originally came from a spurious relation between the 
one-month-ahead predicted returns and the stock returns during the momentum formation 
period as I showed in previous section. 
 
IV.E. Spurious explanatory power of random macroeconomic variables 
 
If the explanatory power of the macroeconomic variables for momentum profits comes 
from a spurious relation between the persistent macroeconomic variables and stock 
returns during momentum portfolio formation, it naturally follows that any random 
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variables that exhibit similar autocorrelations to the macroeconomic variables should 
appear to explain momentum profits. In this subsection, I generate random 
macroeconomic variables that have similar characteristics to the true macroeconomic 
variables and test whether the random variables appear explain the momentum profits as 
CS show with the true macroeconomic variables.  
 
IV.E.1 Methodology 
 
First, I estimate the following first-order autoregressive equation with time trend for each 
of the macroeconomic variables: 
tt tbaz ν+⋅+= 0 , and 
 
ttt a ενν += −1 . 
(36)
 
Table 2.8 presents maximum likelihood estimators of a0, b, a, and standard deviations of 
residuals for DIV, TERM, YLD, and DEF over the period from January 1951 to December 
1994. Next, I generate four of random variables that follow the estimated autoregressive 
processes for t = -100 through t = 528 and discard the first 101 values in order to avoid 
potential bias for initial values. Then, I calculate momentum profits adjusted for returns 
predicted by these random variables with and without intercepts as in Definitions 3 and 3′. 
I generate ten sets of the random variables and repeat these procedures 10 times.  
 
IV.E.2 Results 
 
Table 2.9 shows time-series averages and t-statistics of momentum profits adjusted for 
each set of the random macroeconomic variables over the three different sample periods. 
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Also the grand average, maximum and minimum values of the monthly predicted-return-
adjusted momentum profits and t-statistics are presented over the 10 simulations. For the 
entire sample period, from January 1953 to December 1994, the grand average of the 
monthly predicted-return-adjusted momentum profits is -4.62 percent (maximum: -4.11 
percent, minimum: -4.94 percent) and average t-statistic is -17.13 (maximum: -15.23, 
minimum: -18.22) when I include intercepts in predicting returns, while the monthly 
momentum profit adjusted for returns predicted by the true macroeconomic variables 
with intercept is -4.81 percent with t-statistic of -16.97 as in Table 2.4. The monthly 
momentum profits controlled by the true macroeconomic variables and their t-statistic are 
very close to the grand average of those from the 10 simulations and none of the 
predicted-return-adjusted momentum profits from the 10 simulations is significantly 
different from those from the true macroeconomic variables. This is true for both 
subsample periods, 1/53-6/63 and 7/63-12/94. These results imply that all of the 10 sets 
of simulated random variables appear to completely explain momentum profits just as do 
the true macroeconomic variables when I include intercepts in predicting returns, which 
is consistent with my argument that explanatory power of the macroeconomic variables 
may comes from spurious relation between the one-month-ahead predicted returns and 
stock returns during momentum portfolio formation period. 
 
Also, when I exclude intercepts for predicting returns, all simulated random 
macroeconomic variables appear to explain momentum profits over the entire sample 
period. The maximum t-value is 1.58 for the 6th simulation, in which I would still 
conclude that adjusted momentum profits are not significantly positive at the 90 percent 
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confidence level.  Other than this case, all of the simulated random macroeconomic 
variables produce significantly or insignificantly negative predicted-return-adjusted 
momentum profits. So, all of the simulated random variables appear to explain 
momentum profits even when I exclude the intercepts for predicted returns. It was well 
expected that the ranges of adjusted momentum profits and t-values are larger in the 
random simulations when I exclude the intercepts than when I include them. For two sub-
sample periods, I have similar results except for two cases. In the first simulation, the 
adjusted momentum profit is 7.16 percent, and it is significantly positive over the 
subsample period from January 1953 to June 1963 and in the 6th simulation, the adjusted 
momentum profit is 2.85 percent and the t-value is 2.57 over the subsample period from 
July 1963 to December 1994. In sum, all of the 10 simulations appear to explain 
momentum profits when I include intercepts in predicting returns over all of the three 
sample periods. If I exclude intercepts in predicting returns, all of the 10 simulations also 
appear to explain momentum profits over the entire sample period, and only one 
simulation fails to explain the momentum profits for each subsample period.   
 
From the findings in this subsection, along with those in Subsection IV. D, I may 
conclude that the seemingly predictive power of the macroeconomic variables for 
momentum profits comes from a spurious relation between the one-month-ahead 
predicted returns and stock returns during momentum portfolio formation period due to 
high persistence in the macroeconomic variables. 
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IV.F. Predicted versus raw returns 
 
As described in Subsection II.B.2, CS show that a six-month/six-month momentum 
strategy based on returns predicted by the macroeconomic variables (in Definition 5) 
produces significantly positive profits. Also, CS find that the past predicted returns have 
additional predictive power for future returns even within quintiles that are first sorted 
based on past raw returns, while raw returns do not have additional predictive power for 
future returns once controlled by the predicted returns as introduced in Subsection II.B.3. 
CS argue that this is sufficient counter evidence to a conjecture that predicted returns are 
simply capturing information contained in past returns and argue that the past raw returns 
are capturing information contained in the predicted returns by the macroeconomic 
variables as “the ability of past raw returns to predict future returns is due to information 
contained in the predicted component of returns.”14 I do not believe this is the only 
interpretation of CS’ findings described in the previous paragraph. I have shown that the 
one-month-ahead predicted returns from the macroeconomic variables are spuriously 
correlated to past six-month raw returns. Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) show that a nine-
month/six-month or twelve-month/six-month momentum strategy produces higher profits 
than a six-month/six-month momentum strategy. Therefore, if the returns predicted by 
the macroeconomic variables are more strongly correlated to longer-period past returns, 
such as previous nine-month or 12-month returns, than the previous six-month returns, 
then sorting stocks by past predicted returns can generate additional return differentials 
even once controlled for the past 6-month returns. In order to show my argument, in 
Subsection IV.F.2, I will show that the returns predicted by the macroeconomic variables 
                                                 
14 Page 1003 in Chordia and Shivakumar (2002). 
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are more strongly correlated to longer-period past raw returns than past six-month raw 
returns under Assumption 1 that all stock returns follow white noise processes and the 
macroeconomic variables are independent of all stock returns for all lags. This correlation 
is spurious since I assumed that the macroeconomic variables are independent of stock 
returns. Also, if the additional predictive power of the past predicted returns within 
quintiles that are sorted based on previous six-month raw returns is due to stronger 
spurious correlation between the predicted returns and longer-period past raw returns 
than six-month past returns, then simply lengthening the portfolio formation period 
should eliminate the additional predictive power of the predicted returns. I will directly 
test this argument in Subsection IV.F.2. Specifically, I find that when I lengthen the 
portfolio formation period to 9 to 12 months, the additional predictive power of the 
predicted returns disappears. 
 
In addition to my spurious correlation argument, Cooper, Gutierrez, and Hameed (2004) 
show that when they exclude stocks priced under $1 from the portfolios or skip the last 
month between the portfolio formation period and the holding period, the additional 
return differentials among portfolios formed based on predicted return disappear. I will 
briefly explain this phenomenon in Subsection IV.F.2. Before presenting my arguments 
and the results from the lengthened formation period, I replicate Table VII of CS with the 
macroeconomic variables that I have in order to see whether my findings are different 
from CS’ simply because the macroeconomic variables that I have are different from CS’.  
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IV.F.1 Replication of CS tests with my macroeconomic variables 
 
Table 2.10 compares CS’ Table VII and my results. In this case, the portfolios are formed 
based on the previous cumulative six-month raw returns or predicted returns and are held 
for the next six months as described in Subsection II.B.3.15 For explanation purposes, I 
denote matrix RP to be a 5 × 5 matrix, whose (i, j)th elements, RPij, represents the time-
series average return on the portfolio that is the ith quintile sorted based on the previous 
6-month predicted returns within the jth quintile that was first sorted based on the 
previous 6-month raw returns, where 5th quintile means the portfolio that has highest 
previous raw or predicted returns. Also, I denote matrix PR to be a 5 × 5 matrix, whose (i, 
j)th elements, PRij, represents the time-series average return on the portfolio that is in the 
jth quintile sorted based on previous 6-month raw returns within the ith quintile that was 
first sorted based on previous cumulative predicted returns.  
 
As shown in Table 2.10, CS find that (RP5j – RP1j) is significantly positive for j = 2, 3, 4, 
and 5. t-statistics are 3.17, 3.57, 3.46, and 3.46 for  j = 2, 3, 4, and 5, respectively. These 
suggest that within the 2nd, 3rd, 4th, and 5th quintiles that are first sorted by previous raw 
returns, the previous six-month predicted returns have additional predictive power for 
future returns. This is the same with my macroeconomic variables. The t-statistics of 
(RP5j – RP1j) from my macroeconomic variables are 3.67, 3.75, 3.69, and 4.20 for  j = 2, 
3, 4, and 5, respectively.16 My macroeconomic variables seem to have higher predictive 
power for future returns than CS’, since all t-statistics are higher than those from CS’ 
                                                 
15 For this test, CS include the intercept estimates for predicting returns. 
16 (RP51 – RP11) is insignificant for both CS’ and my macroeconomic variables. 
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macroeconomic variables. In contrast, CS show that (PRi5 – PRi5) is insignificant for i = 1, 
2, 3, and 4. t-statistics are 0.45, 1.06, 0.71 and 1.44 for i = 1, 2, 3, and 4, respectively. 
These suggest that raw returns do not have additional predictive power for future returns 
within the 1st, 2nd, 3rd, and 4th quintiles that are first sorted by previous predicted returns. 
This is exactly the same case as for my macroeconomic variables. The t-statistics of (PRi5 
– PRi5) are 0.79, 1.06, 0.99, and 1.42 for i = 1, 2, 3, and 4, respectively.17 From the above 
results, CS conclude that the returns predicted by the macroeconomic variables are not 
simply capturing the effect of past returns, but the reverse is true – the ability of past raw 
returns to predict future returns is due to information contained in the predicted 
component of returns. Comparisons of CS’ and my results in Table 2.10 suggest that if 
CS used the macroeconomic variables that I have, they would draw the exactly same 
conclusions. Therefore, if I find different results from lengthening portfolio formation 
period, it is unlikely that the difference comes from difference in macroeconomic 
variables between CS’ and ours. 
 
IV.F.2 Cross-sectional correlation between predicted returns and past raw 
returns 
 
Before presenting the results from lengthening the momentum portfolio formation period 
to 9 months or 12 months, let’s consider the cross-sectional correlation between the one-
month-ahead predicted returns and the previous m-month returns, defined as 
 
                                                 
17 (PR55 – PR15) is significantly positive for both CS’ and my macroeconomic variables. 
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Definition 9: “Cross-sectional correlation coefficient between one-month-ahead 
predicted returns and the previous m-month returns, mρ , (shortly correlation 
coefficient between the predicted returns and the previous m-month returns)”: 
( )[ ]
( )[ ]{ } ( )[ ]{ } 2121 varˆvar ,ˆcov mtt
m
tt
m
rErE
rrE
−
−≡ρ , 
where ( ) ( )( )∑ = −−− −−= Nk mtmkttktmtt rrrrNrr 1 ˆˆ1,ˆcov  as in Definition 8, itrˆ  is defined in 
Equation (3), trˆ , 
m
itr − , and 
m
tr −  are defined in Definition 8, and where 
( ) ( )∑ = −= Nk tktt rrNr 1 2ˆˆ1ˆvar , and ( ) ( )∑ = −−− −= Nk mtmktmt rrNr 1 21var . 
 
The correlation coefficient between the predicted returns and the previous m-month 
returns measures the relative extent to which the predicted returns and previous m-month 
returns are correlated to each other, and is a better measure to compare relative 
associations of different-period lagged returns with the predicted returns than expected 
cross-sectional covariance. Suppose, for instance, that ( )[ ] ( )[ ]69 ,ˆcov,ˆcov −− > tttt rrErrE . This 
means the cross-sectional covariance between the predicted returns and the previous 
nine-month returns is larger than the covariance between the predicted returns and 
previous six-month returns on average. However, because the cumulative nine-month 
returns have higher variance than the cumulative six-month returns in general, 
( )[ ] ( )[ ]69 ,ˆcov,ˆcov −− > tttt rrErrE  does not tell whether it is because the association between 
the predicted returns and nine-month lagged returns is stronger than that between the 
predicted returns and six-month lagged returns or because the expected cross-sectional 
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variance of nine-month lagged returns is higher than that of six-month lagged returns. 
However, if 69 ρρ > , then I can tell that the predicted returns are more strongly 
associated with nine-month lagged returns than six-month lagged returns.  
 
Now, suppose again that stock returns follow white noise processes and are independent 
of the macroeconomic variables as in Assumption 1. Then  
( )[ ] ( ) ( ) ( )∑∑
=
−−−−
=
−−− 
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 +−=−=
N
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So, 
( )[ ] Σ=− mrE mtvar , (37)
 
where ( ) ∑ =−≡Σ Nk kNN 1 221 σ  as in Equation (8). From Equation (8), it can be shown 
that 
( )[ ] ( )[ ]Σ=− mAErrE tmtt ,ˆcov , (38)
 
where  
( ) ( ) *21221 mttttt mA ιXXXx −−−−− ′′≡ , 
where 1−tx , 2−tX , and 
*
mι  are defined in Subsection IV. A. Using Equations (37) and (38) 
( )[ ]
( )[ ]{ } 2121
21
ˆvar t
t
m
rEm
mAE Σ=ρ . 
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Finally if I assume that ( )mAt  is a covariance stationary process for all m < 60 and that 
the unconditional expectation of ( )trˆvar  exists and denote Γ  to be ( )[ ]{ } 2121 ˆvar trEΣ , 
then 
( )[ ]Γ= 21m
mAE
mρ , (39)
 
where Γ is a positive number that is independent of m. 
 
Table 2.11 presents the time-series average of ( ) 21mmAt  for the range of m from 3 to 16 
months using the macroeconomic variables. Under the assumption that At(m) is a 
covariance stationary process, the time-series average of ( ) 21mmAt  is an unbiased 
estimator of ( )[ ] 21mmAE  and under Assumption 1, the cross-sectional correlation 
coefficient between the one-month-ahead predicted return from the macroeconomic 
variables and previous m-month returns, defined in Definition 9, is proportional to 
( )[ ] 21mmAE . According to Table 2.11, the cross-sectional correlation coefficient is 
strongest when m = 9. Therefore, momentum portfolios based on past cumulative 
predicted returns over the past 6-months are more strongly correlated with longer-period 
returns than just past 6-month returns. This fact along with findings of Jegadeesh and 
Titman (1993) may explain CS’ findings in two-way sorted portfolios that predicted 
returns appear to have additional predictive power for future returns even once stocks are 
controlled for their past raw return. Since predicted returns are more strongly correlated 
with longer-period lagged returns than six months and a nine-month/six-month or twelve-
month/six-month momentum strategy produces more profits than the six-month/six-
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month momentum strategy, RP5j – RP1j can be positive in CS’ tests even if the predictive 
power of the predicted returns originally comes from a spurious relation between the 
persistent macroeconomic variables and stock returns during the momentum portfolio 
formation period. This argument suggests that if I lengthen the portfolio formation period 
to nine or twelve months, RP5j – RP1j in Subsection IV.F.1 should not be significantly 
positive. In next section, I replicate CS’ test introduced in IV.F.1 except for portfolio 
formation period.  
 
Before, presenting the results, let’s investigate why skipping the last month between the 
portfolio formation period and the holding period or $1 price screening eliminates the 
additional predictive power of the predicted return as shown by Cooper, Gutierrez, and 
Hameed (2004). Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) show that the momentum strategies that 
have a one-week lag between the formation period and the holding period generate higher 
profits than those without a one-week lag. Jegadeesh (1990) also shows that one-month 
stock returns exhibit strong reversals, which might be due to market microstructure 
effects or investors’ overreaction in short-term horizons. No matter what are the reasons 
for the short-term return reversals, these findings suggest that momentum strategies with 
a one-month lag between the formation period and holding period might have smaller 
short-term reversal effects. Momentum strategies based on the predicted returns does 
effectively exclude raw returns from the last month of the formation period.  
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In order to see the point, let’s consider the six-month/six-month momentum strategy 
based on predicted returns defined in Definition 5. I defined the weight vector of the 
momentum portfolio at month t as follows 


= ∑
=
− 6
15
0j
p
jt
p
t ww & , (40)
 
where ptw&  is a weight vector of the momentum portfolio constructed at month t, so  
[ ]( )Nww pNtptpt 101 &L&& =w , where 1=pitw&  if stock i’s cumulative six-month one-month-
ahead predicted return belongs to the top ten percent, 1−=pitw&  if stock i’s cumulative six-
month predicted return belongs to the bottom ten percent and 0=pitw&  otherwise. The 
weight vector of the momentum portfolio held at the beginning of month t, ptw , in 
Equation (40) does not reflect stock returns for month t – 1. Even for j = 0 in Equation 
(40), ptw&  reflects 1ˆ −itr , 2ˆ −itr , …, 6ˆ −itr , for i = 1, …, N, where itrˆ  is the one-month-ahead 
predicted return from the Equation (1). Also, the parameters in Equation (1) are estimated 
with the realizations of the macroeconomic variables from t – 62 to t – 3 and realizations 
of stock i’s returns from t – 61 to t – 2 and 1ˆ −itr  is calculated with the realizations of the 
macroeconomic variables at month t – 2 and the estimated parameters. So, even the most 
recently constructed momentum portfolio does not reflect realizations of stock returns for 
month t – 1. Since ptw  does not reflect the last month’s stock returns, the momentum 
strategy based on predicted returns effectively skips the last month between the formation 
period and holding period. If there is a one-month gap between the formation period and 
holding periods as in Cooper, Gutierrez, and Hameed’s (2004) counter test, portfolios 
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formed at month t based on predicted returns do not reflect stock returns for month t – 1 
and t – 2, while portfolios based on raw returns do not reflect stock returns for only 
month t – 1. Also stocks priced under $1 are known to be subject to short-term return 
reversals probably because they tend to be highly illiquid. Therefore, when Cooper, 
Gutierrez, and Hameed (2004) exclude stocks priced under $1, the ability of portfolios 
formed based on the predicted returns within quintiles that are first classified by the past 
raw returns to produce additional return differentials can be significantly reduced. These 
might explain the appearance of the additional predictive power of the predicted returns 
from macroeconomic variables shown by CS and the disappearance of such additional 
predictive power when Cooper, Gutierrez, and Hameed (2004) skip one-month between 
the formation period and the holding period or exclude penny stocks from the portfolios. 
This explanation is still consistent with my argument that the predicted power of the 
macroeconomic variables comes from a spurious relation. 
 
IV.F.3 12-month portfolio formation period 
 
In Tables 2.12 and 2.13, I replicate Table 2.10 except for the portfolio formation periods. 
In Table 2.12, portfolios are formed based on the previous 12-month cumulative raw 
returns and predicted returns, and in Table 2.13, the portfolio formation period is 9 
months. In both cases, the portfolio holding periods are 6 months as in Table 2.10. I do 
not skip one month between the formation period and holding period or exclude penny 
stocks from the portfolios. If the predicted returns from the macroeconomic variables 
contain real information for future stock returns and raw returns just capture the 
information contained in the predicted returns as CS argue, these methodological 
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adjustments shouldn’t affect the results in Table 2.10. However, if the appearance of the 
additional predictive power of the predicted returns due to spurious correlation between 
the predicted returns and longer-period past raw returns than six months as I argue, then 
lengthening the portfolio formation periods to 9 to 12 months should eliminate the 
additional differentials in returns among portfolios constructed based on the past 
predicted returns.  
 
In contrast to the results in Table 2.10, (RP5j – RP1j) is insignificant for all j’s in Panel A 
Table 2.12 and (RP5j – RP1j) is significantly positive only for j = 2 in Panel A of Table 
2.13. These suggest that the past cumulative 12-month (and 9-month) predicted returns 
do not have additional predictive power for future returns once controlled by past 12-
month (and 9-month) raw returns. However, in Panel B of Table 2.12, where stocks are 
first sorted by their past 12-month cumulative predicted returns and then sorted by past 
12-month raw returns, (PRi5 – PRi5) is significantly positive for all i’s.18 Also, in Panel B 
of Table 2.13, (PRi5 – PRi5) is significantly positive at the 95 percent confidence level for 
all i’s. These suggest that past 12-month (9-month) raw returns have additional predictive 
power even after controlled by past 12-month (9-month) predicted returns. Findings in 
Tables 2.12 and 2.13 suggest that past 12-month (9-month) raw returns have higher 
predictive power for future returns than past 12-month (9-month) predicted returns from 
the macroeconomic variables. These findings are consistent with my argument that the 
                                                 
18 (PRi5 – PRi5) is significantly positive at 95 percent confidence level for i = 2, 3, 4, and 5, and 
significantly positive at 90 percent confidence level for i = 1. 
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predicted returns are more strongly correlated to longer-period past returns than six-
month returns. 
 
V. Conclusions and Implications for Future Research 
 
Since Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) first document that the intermediate-term momentum 
strategies produce positive profits, a number of researchers have tried to identify risk 
factors associated with the trading strategies. For an intermediate-horizon, there might be 
enough time for the systematic risk of stocks and, therefore, expected returns to change. 
Such time-varying expected returns can be reflected in the realizations during the 
immediate previous period, therefore momentum trading strategies can consistently 
produce positive profits. Even though this scenario is very plausible in theory, it is not 
easy to identify the time-varying systematic risk factors. I conclude that the appearance of 
business cycle model suggested by Chordia and Shivakumar (2002) to explain the 
momentum profits is likely to come from spurious relation between the highly persistent 
macroeconomic variables and already documented return continuation of stocks.  
 
However, I do not know the degree to which Chordia and Shivakumar (2002)’s results 
suffer from the spurious relation. It might be true that all of the predictive power of the 
macroeconomic variables for momentum comes from the spurious relation, but it might 
be also true that half of the predictive power comes from the spurious relation. One 
potential extension of this study can be to estimate the residual predictive power after 
controlling for the spurious relation.  
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Appendix 1 
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Table 2.1 Summary Statistics of the Macroeconomic Variables 
 
Means, standard deviations and estimates of autocorrelation coefficients of the four macroeconomic 
variables over the period from January 1951 to December 1994 are reported in Panel A. DIV is the total 
dividend payments according to the CRSP value-weighted index over the previous twelve months divided 
by the current level of the index. TERM is the average yield of Treasury bonds with greater than 10 years to 
maturity minus the yield of T-bills that mature in 3 months. YLS is the yield of a T-bill that matures in 3 
months. DEF is the average yield of bonds rated by Moody’s Baa minus the average yield of bonds rated 
by Moody’s Aaa.  
 
Panel B presents estimates of contemporaneous correlations between the macroeconomic variables. 
Numbers in parentheses represent p values under the null that two macroeconomic variables are not 
correlated. 
 
Panel A: Autocorrelations 
  Mean Std. Dev. 1 2 3 4 5 6 12 24 36 48 60 
DIV 3.74 0.88 0.97 0.95 0.92 0.89 0.86 0.83 0.67 0.49 0.37 0.28 0.15 
TERM 1.09 1.29 0.96 0.90 0.84 0.79 0.75 0.71 0.55 0.22 0.02 0.09 0.14 
YLD 5.13 2.84 0.99 0.96 0.94 0.93 0.91 0.89 0.81 0.63 0.52 0.45 0.41 
DEF 0.88 0.39 0.97 0.93 0.90 0.87 0.85 0.81 0.66 0.46 0.32 0.37 0.37 
 
 
Panel B: Contemporaneous correlations 
 TERM YLD DEF 
DIV -0.21 
(< 0.01%) 
0.14 
(0.11%) 
0.22 
(< 0.01%) 
TERM  -0.36 
(< 0.01%) 
0.09 
(3.66%) 
YLD   0.65 
(< 0.01%) 
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Table 2.2 Momentum Strategy Profits Adjusted for Predicted Returns from the 
Macroeconomic Variables (Comparison with CS) 
 
Momentum portfolios are constructed as in Definition 1 (based previous six-month cumulative raw returns) 
for all Panels A, B, and C using all NYSE-AMEX stocks on the monthly CRSP table. Panel B shows the 
strategy’s holding period monthly profits after adjusting for returns predicted by the business cycle model 
(Equation 1), defined by Definition 3′. Panel C shows the strategy’s holding period monthly profits after 
adjusting for returns predicted by the business cycle model including January dummy. In other words, in 
Panel C, itk ktikiit eJandumzccr +⋅++= ∑ = − θ4 1 10  is used to predict returns instead of Equation (1). For both 
Panels B and C, adjusted returns are measured as the intercept estimates plus residuals. The model 
parameters are estimated using data from time t-1 through t-60. A minimum of two years data is required 
for estimating the parameters. Panel A of this table presents the raw profits defined in Equation (2) from the 
momentum strategy for the subsample of stock-months used in Panels B and C. t-statistics are reported in 
parentheses. Numbers without parentheses are in percentage terms. The column titled “CS” gives the 
results in Table III of Chordia and Shivakumar (2002) and the column titled “Park” presents the my results 
using dataset provided by Pontiff. 
 
 Non-Jan  Jan  Overall 
 P10 – P1  P10 – P1  P10 – P1 
 CS Park  CS Park  CS Park 
Panel A: Raw Profits 
1/53-12/94 1.39 1.43  -7.27 -7.19  0.69 0.71 
 (7.60) (7.94)  (-4.83) (-4.74)  (2.95) (3.04) 
1/53-6/63 1.39 1.42  -4.83 -4.43  0.90 0.91 
 (5.86) (5.97)  (-3.36) (-3.30)  (3.11) (3.19) 
7/63-12/94 1.39 1.43  -8.06 -8.17  0.62 0.64 
 (6.03) (6.32)  (-4.18) (-4.12)  (2.10) (2.17) 
Panel B: Adjusted Profits-Business Cycle Model Excludes January Dummy 
1/53-12/94 -0.67 -0.27  -16.30 -16.01  -1.94 -1.58 
 (-0.47) (-0.19)  (-3.46) (-3.40)  (-1.41) (-1.13) 
1/53-6/63 -2.65 -1.62  -15.76 -13.32  -3.70 -2.64 
 (-1.13) (-0.65)  (-1.80) (-1.56)  (-1.62) (-1.1) 
7/63-12/94 -0.01 0.17  -16.47 -16.96  -1.36 -1.23 
 (-0.01) (0.10)  (-2.29) (-2.99)  (-0.81) (-0.73) 
Panel C: Adjusted Profits-Business Cycle Model Includes January Dummy 
1/53-12/94 -1.01 -0.52  -13.31 -12.70  -2.02 -1.54 
 (-0.71) (-0.36)  (-2.95) (-2.81)  (-1.47) (-1.11) 
1/53-6/63 -1.76 -0.70  -12.61 -9.78  -2.62 -1.49 
 (-0.79) (-0.3)  (-1.56) (-1.22)  (-1.23) (-0.66) 
7/63-12/94 -0.77 -0.46  -13.53 -13.73  -1.81 -1.55 
 (-0.44) (-0.26)  (-2.49) (-2.50)  (-1.08) (-0.92) 
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Table 2.3 Time-series Averages and t-statistics of tΑ , tΒ , and tΧ  
 
For each month t, I calculate tΑ , tΒ , and tΧ  over the sample period from 1/53 to 12/94. 
( )[ ]∑ = ∗−−−−− ′′≡Α 5 0 ,62122161 j jttttt ιXXXx , where xt is a vector of [ ]tttt DEFYLDTERMDIV1 , Xt is a 60 
× 5 matrix consisting the time-series of xt from t-59 to t, and ∗ j,6ι  is a 60 × 1 vector whose first (54-j) 
elements are zero, whose next m elements are ones and whose remaining elements are zeros. I show that 
conditional expectation of predicted momentum profit with intercept (defined in Definition 2) for month t 
on the realizations of the macroeconomic variables up to month t-1 is proportional to tΑ  under 
Assumption 1 in Equation (9) ∑ = −
−
−−− 

 ′−′

 

 ′−′≡Β 5
0
*
,62
1
22161 j jttttt TT
ιιιIZZιιIZz , where zt is a vector of 
[ ]tttt DEFYLDTERMDIV , Zt is a 60 × 4 matrix consisting the time-series of zt from t-59 to t. I show 
that conditional expectation of predicted momentum profit without intercept (defined in Definition 2′) for 
month t on the realizations of the macroeconomic variables up to month t-1 is proportional to tΒ . Finally, 
( )[ ] ( )[ ] ttj jttttttttt Β−Α=′′−′′′−′=Χ ∑ = −−−−−−−−−−−5 0 *,62122212122261 ιZZZZIιZZZZIι . I also show that conditional 
expectation of the difference between predicted momentum profits with and without intercepts is 
proportional to tΧ . First row presents the time-series averages and t-statistics of tΑ , tΒ , and tΧ  over the 
entire sample period. I also report the time-series averages and t-statistics in the second row over the period 
from January 1956 to December 1994, since each company has fewer than 60 observations for estimating 
parameters in Equation (1) to obtain one-month-ahead predicted returns before January 1956. 
 
 tΑ   tΒ   tΧ  
 average t-stat  average t-stat  average t-stat 
1/53 – 12/94 0.39 11.28  0.31 4.49  0.08 1.10 
1/56 – 12/94 0.38 46.06  0.30 4.04  0.08 1.13 
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Figure 2.1 tΑ , tΒ , and tΧ  
 
For each month t, I calculate tΑ , tΒ , and tΧ  as described in Table 2. Under Assumption 1, i.e. the 
macroeconomic variables are independent of stocks returns and stock returns follow white noise processes, 
predicted momentum profit by the macroeconomic variables with intercepts for month t, tπˆ , is proportional 
to tΑ , and predicted momentum profit without intercepts, otπˆ , is proportional to tΒ . Since ttt Β−Α=Χ , 
predicted momentum profit due to intercepts is proportional to tΧ .  
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Figure 2.2 Predicted Momentum Profits by the Macroeconomic Variables 
 
For each month t, I calculate predicted momentum profit by the macroeconomic variables with intercepts, 
tπˆ , and predicted momentum profit without intercepts, otπˆ . tπˆ  and otπˆ  are defined in Definitions 2 and 2′. 
Momentum portfolios are constructed based on previous six-month cumulative raw returns as in Definition 
1. Returns on stocks in momentum portfolios are predicted by itk ktikiit ezccr ++= ∑ = −4 1 10 , where zt a 1 × 4 
vector of realizations of the macroeconomic variables at the end of time t. Parameters are estimated using 
data from t-60 to t-1. Predicted momentum profits with intercepts for month t are predicted returns on the 
momentum portfolio for month t. Predicted momentum profits without intercepts for month t is predicted 
returns on momentum portfolio excluding intercept estimates. 
 
 
tπˆ otπˆ
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Table 2.4 Raw, Predicted, and Predicted-Return-Adjusted Momentum Profits 
 
Momentum portfolios are constructed in the manner described in Table 1. Raw momentum profits ( tπ ) are 
returns on the momentum portfolios. Predicted profits with intercepts ( tπˆ ) and without intercepts ( otπˆ ) are 
calculated in the same manner as in Figure 2 and defined in Definitions 2 and 2′. Finally, adjusted profits 
with intercepts and without intercepts are predicted-return-adjusted momentum profits with ( atπ ) and 
without ( at
oπ ) intercepts defined in Definitions 3 and 3′. So ttat πππ ˆ−=  and oo ttat πππ ˆ−= . In panel A, 
the column titled “P10-P1” gives time-series averages of tπ , tπˆ , otπˆ , atπ , and atoπ  and t-statistics of them 
in parentheses. On the column titled “#<0”, the numbers of months when the momentum profits are 
negative out of total months in the sample periods and the percentages (in parentheses) that momentum 
profits are negative are presented. In panel B, the column titled “Ave. Dev.” gives average absolute 
deviations between raw momentum profits and predicted momentum profits with or without intercepts. On 
the column titled “# diff”, the numbers of months when raw momentum profits and predicted momentum 
profits have different signs and the percentages (in parentheses) are presented. 
 
  1/53 - 12/94   1/53 - 6/63   7/63 - 12/94 
Panel A: Momentum Profits 
 P10 - P1 #<0   P10 - P1 #<0   P10 - P1 #<0  
 (t) (%<0)  (t) (%<0)  (t) (%<0) 
         
Raw Momentum Profits ( tπ ) 0.71 160/504  0.89 40/126  0.64 120/378 
 (3.03) (31.75)  (3.11) (31.75)  (2.18) (31.75) 
Predicted Profits w. int. ( tπˆ ) 5.51 13/504  4.02 2/126  5.60 11/378 
 (38.38) (2.58)  (21.30) (1.59)  (34.60) (2.91) 
Predicted Profits w.o. int. ( otπˆ ) 2.27 218/504  3.41 51/126  1.90 167/378 
 (1.67) (43.25)  (1.45) (40.48)  (1.16) (44.18) 
Adjusted Profits w. int. ( atπ ) -4.81 426/504  -3.16 101/126  -5.36 325/378 
 (-16.97) (84.52)  (-8.66) (80.16)  (-15.16) (85.98) 
Adjusted Profits w.o. int. ( at
oπ ) -1.58 279/504  -2.64 74/126  -1.23 205/378 
 (-1.13) (55.36)  (-1.10) (58.73)  (-0.73) (54.23) 
         
Panel B: Difference Between Raw Momentum Profits and Predicted Momentum Profits  
 # diff  # diff  # diff 
 
Ave. Dev. 
(% diff)  
Ave. Dev. 
(% diff)  
Ave. Dev. 
(% diff) 
         
Predicted Profits w. int. 5.88 167/504  3.92 42/126  6.33 125/378 
  (33.13)   (33.33)   (33.07) 
Predicted Profits w.o. int. 23.44 234/504  21.83 59/126  23.84 175/378 
    (46.43)     (46.83)     (46.30) 
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Table 2.5 Regressions of Raw Momentum Profits on Predicted Profits and Predicted 
Momentum Profits on tΑ  and tΒ . 
 
For each month t, raw momentum profits, predicted momentum profits with and without intercepts are 
calculated in the manners described in Table 1 and Figure 2. tΑ  and tΒ  are calculated as in Table 2. In 
Panel A, I regress raw momentum profits on predicted momentum profits with intercepts in the first row 
( ttt 111 ˆ ηπβαπ ++= ) and on predicted momentum profits without intercepts in the second row 
( ttt 222 ˆ ηπβαπ ++= o ) over the period from January 1953 to December 1994. In panel B, predicted 
momentum profits with intercepts are regressed on tΑ  ( 1333ˆ ηβαπ +Α+= tt ), and predicted momentum 
profits without intercepts are regressed on tΒ  ( 4344ˆ ηβαπ +Α+= tt ) over the period from January 1956 to 
December 1994. Under the assumption that the macroeconomic variables are independent of stocks returns 
and stock returns follow white noise processes (Assumption 1), expectation of predicted momentum profits 
for month t conditional on the realizations of the macroeconomic variable up to month t-1 are proportional 
to tΑ , if intercepts are included in predicting momentum profits, and tΒ , if intercepts are excluded. 
 
Panel A: Raw Momentum Profits Regressed on Predicted Momentum Profits 
    
 α β R2 (%) 
0.0072 -0.0026 0.61 Predicted Profits w. int. ( tπˆ ) (1.26) (-1.69)  
    
0.0077 -0.0007 0.00 Predicted Profits w.o. int. ( otπˆ ) (3.06) (-0.05)  
    
Panel B: Predicted Momentum Profits Regressed on tΑ  and tΒ  
    
 α β R2 (%) 
0.0074 0.1281 52.87 Predicted Profits w. int. ( tπˆ ) on tΑ  (3.12) (22.89)  
    
-0.0202 0.1501 60.03 Predicted Profits w.o. int. ( otπˆ ) on tΒ  (-2.20) (26.48)  
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Table 2.6 Cross-Sectional Covariance between Previous Six-Month Returns and 
Predicted Returns from Simulated Macroeconomic Variable 
 
Under Assumption 2, the z follows a first-order autoregressive process, zttt azaz ε++= −10 , where 0 < a < 
1 and its unconditional expectation is denoted to be µz, so µz = a0/(1+a). Under Assumptions 3 stock returns 
follow white noise processes and independent of the hypothetical macroeconomic variable. Under 
Assumptions 2 and 3, I showed that ( )[ ] ( )Σ=− tmtt CErrE ,ˆcov , where ( ) ∑ =−≡Σ Nk kNN 1 221 σ  and 
( ) ( ) ( )∑∑ = −−−= −−−−− −−−+≡ Tj tjtmj tjtttt zzzzzzTmC 1 2211 2121 , and that ( )[ ] ( )Σ=− tmtt DErrE ,ˆcov o , where 
( ) ( )∑∑ = −−= −−− −−≡ Tj tjtmj tjttt zzzzzD 1 211 11 . For each choice of a and µz, I simulate a time-series of 
hypothetical macroeconomic variable, z, following Assumption 2 from t = -200 to t = 61 with σεz  = 0.27. I 
discard first 201 z values from t = -200 to t = 0. Then I calculate C and D using remaining values. I repeat 
this procedures 10,000 times so I have 10,000 values of C and D for each pair of a and µz. Sample averages 
and standard deviations of the values of C and D are reported. 
 
    a = 0.1   a = 0.3  a = 0.5  a = 0.7   a = 0.9 
  C D  C D  C D  C D  C D 
mu = 0               
 mean 0.1019 0.0018  0.1063 0.0063  0.1158 0.0153  0.1347 0.0332  0.1808 0.0722
 std 0.0443 0.0438  0.0518 0.0514  0.0623 0.0621  0.0830 0.0823  0.1187 0.1208
                
mu = 1               
 mean 0.1017 0.0036  0.1074 0.0100  0.1151 0.0182  0.1342 0.0294  0.1812 0.0667
 std 0.0436 0.1665  0.0520 0.1906  0.0630 0.2115  0.0837 0.2195  0.1203 0.2229
                
mu = 3               
 mean 0.1014 -0.0053  0.1067 0.0056  0.1151 0.0033  0.1343 0.0180  0.1824 0.0630
 std 0.0433 0.4773  0.0522 0.5461  0.0619 0.5988  0.0828 0.6199  0.1208 0.5860
                
mu = 5               
 mean 0.1020 0.0086  0.1067 0.0178  0.1163 0.0163  0.1343 0.0298  0.1802 0.0715
 std 0.0448 0.8052  0.0515 0.9063  0.0636 1.0077  0.0829 1.0402  0.1184 0.9546
                
mu = 7               
 mean 0.1016 -0.0127  0.1070 0.0064  0.1154 0.0262  0.1338 0.0336  0.1810 0.0712
  std 0.0439 1.1139   0.0524 1.2711  0.0620 1.3891  0.0810 1.4408   0.1201 1.3570
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Table 2.7 Predicted-Return-Adjusted Momentum Profits with Different Parameter 
Estimation Periods  
 
I estimate the parameters in Equation (1) using two different estimation periods. In Panel A and under the 
first estimation period scheme, if a momentum portfolio is formed at the beginning of month t, parameters 
are estimated using 60-month observations from t-47 to t-19 and t+12 to t+41, and the estimated parameters 
are used in calculating predicted returns during the holding period. If 1ˆ itc  is denoted to be vector of 
parameters estimated at month t for stock i, predicted return for month t for stock i is ∑ = −−5 0 11ˆ61 j jitt cx , 
where xt-1 = [1 DIVt-1 TERMt-1 YLDt-1 DEFt-1]. Predicted-return-adjusted momentum profit is momentum 
profit minus predicted return on the momentum portfolio (predicted momentum profit). I also report 
predicted-return-adjusted momentum profit without intercept as CS do in their Table III. For this, predicted 
momentum profits are calculated without intercepts. Under the second estimation period scheme, all 
procedures are the same as the first one except that parameters are estimated using 60-month observations 
from t-72 to t-13 when a momentum portfolio is formed at the beginning of month t.  
In Panel B, all procedures are same as in Panel A except that predicted returns are estimated with Equation 
(1) plus January dummy as described in Table 1. In order to be included in momentum portfolios, the 
stocks have at least 24-month observations for estimating parameters when the momentum portfolios are 
formed. Under the first estimation period scheme, time-series averages and t-statistics (in parentheses) of 
the predicted-return-adjusted momentum profits are reported over the periods, 1/51-12/94, 1/51-6/63, and 
6/63-12/94. Under the second estimation period, sample periods are 6/54-12/94, 6/54-6/63, and 7/63-12/94. 
The differences in sample periods are due to the 24-month observation requirement. 
Finally, Panel C presents raw momentum profits for the subsample of stock-months used in each parameter 
estimation scheme. 
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Table 2.7 Continued  
 
 Estimation Period 1   Estimation Period 2 
 P10-P1 
w. int. 
 P10-P1 
w.o. int. 
  P10-P1 
w. int. 
 P10-P1 
w.o. int. 
         
Panel A: Adjusted Profits-Business Cycle Model Excludes January Dummy 
         
1/51-12/94 0.64  -1.44  6/54 -12/94 0.71  2.14 
 (2.77)  (-2.42)   (2.80)  (3.05) 
1/51-6/63 0.71  0.59  6/54 -6/63 0.79  -4.00 
 (2.42)  (0.41)   (2.20)  (-3.67) 
7/63-12/94 0.61  -2.25  7/63 - 12/94 0.69  3.90 
 (2.03)  (-3.74)   (2.22)  (4.74) 
         
Panel B: Adjusted Profits-Business Cycle Model Includes January Dummy 
         
1/51-12/94 0.77  -0.64  6/54 -12/94 0.79  1.81 
 (3.59)  (-1.18)   (3.19)  (2.61) 
1/51-6/63 0.64  1.99  6/54 -6/63 0.86  -3.29 
 (2.26)  (1.48)   (2.47)  (-3.24) 
7/63-12/94 0.82  -1.69  7/63 - 12/94 0.78  3.28 
 (2.95)  (-3.16)   (2.55)  (3.96) 
         
Panel C: Raw Profits 
         
1/51-12/94 0.68  6/54 -12/94 0.62 
 (3.09)   (2.58) 
1/51-6/63 0.81  6/54 -6/63 0.82 
 (3.23)   (2.70) 
7/63-12/94 0.63  7/63 - 12/94 0.56 
 (2.15)   (1.89) 
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Table 2.8 Estimation of First-Order Autoregressive Equation for the 
Macroeconomic Variables  
 
I estimate tt tbaz ν+⋅+= 0 , where ttt a ενν +⋅= −1 , for z = DIV, TERM, YLD, and DEF over the period 
from January 1951 to December 1994 with maximum likelihood method. Maximum likelihood estimators 
and t-statistics (in parentheses) for a0, b, and a. Also, maximum likelihood estimator of standard deviation 
of residuals is presented. 
 
 a0  b  a  σε 
        
DIV 4.89  -0.0037  0.98  0.17 
 (7.14)  (-1.75)  (127.49)   
TERM 0.31  0.0032  0.9523  0.36 
 (0.51)  (1.62)  (72.44)   
YLD 2.28  0.0097  0.98  0.45 
 (1.42)  (1.91)  (114.02)   
DEF 0.60  0.0010  0.96  0.09 
 (3.03)  (1.54)  (80.84)   
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Table 2.9 Momentum Profits Adjusted for Returns Predicted by Random 
Macroeconomic Variables  
 
I generate four sets of random variables that follow the autoregressive processes estimated in Table 8 for t 
= -100, …, 528. After discarding first 101 values, I calculate momentum profits adjusted for returns 
predicted by these random variables with and without intercepts in the manner described in Table (1), over 
the sample periods 1/53-12/94, 1/53-6/63, and 7/63-12/94. t-statistics are reported in parentheses.  
 
  1/53 - 12/94  1/53 - 6/63  7/63 - 12/94 
 w. intercept  w.o. intercept w. intercept w.o. intercept w. intercept  w.o. intercept
            
-4.38  -0.89 -3.36 7.16 -4.72  -3.57 1 
(-16.51)  (-1.01) (-10.28) (6.2) (-14.09)  (-3.33) 
            
-4.58  0.42 -3.24 -4.01 -5.03  1.89 2 
(-16.78)  (0.52) (-8.77) (-3.3) (-14.8)  (1.92) 
            
-4.11  -2.73 -2.93 -7.03 -4.50  -1.30 3 
(-15.23)  (-2.72) (-8.7) (-6.4) (-13.26)  (-1.01) 
            
-4.64  -8.31 -3.16 -8.58 -5.14  -8.21 4 
(-16.71)  (-9.45) (-9.12) (-5.93) (-14.74)  (-7.68) 
            
-4.62  -0.47 -2.37 -1.07 -5.37  -0.27 5 
(-17.3)  (-0.61) (-7.67) (-0.82) (-16.16)  (-0.29) 
            
-4.79  1.38 -3.42 -3.04 -5.24  2.85 6 
(-18.11)  (1.58) (-10.16) (-3.11) (-15.84)  (2.57) 
            
-4.94  -2.53 -3.39 -5.69 -5.46  -1.47 7 
(-17.92)  (-3.17) (-10.18) (-6.71) (-15.74)  (-1.45) 
            
-4.61  -2.83 -3.38 0.24 -5.02  -3.86 8 
(-17.12)  (-3.60) (-9.65) (0.22) (-14.90)  (-3.95) 
            
-4.59  -3.29 -3.57 -0.83 -4.93  -4.11 9 
(-17.4)  (-4.04) (-11.54) (-0.65) (-14.73)  (-4.12) 
            
-4.92  -2.11 -3.17 0.29 -5.50  -2.91 10 
(-18.22)  (-3.24) (-9.57) (0.33) (-16.3)  (-3.58) 
            
Average -4.62  -2.14  -3.20 -2.25  -5.09  -2.10 
 (-17.13)  (-2.57)  (-9.56) (-2.02)  (-15.06)  (-2.09) 
            
Maximum -4.11  1.38  -2.37 7.16  -4.50  2.85 
 (-15.23)  (1.58)  (-7.67) (6.2)  (-13.26)  (2.57) 
            
Minimum -4.94  -8.31  -3.57 -8.58  -5.50  -8.21 
  (-18.22)   (-9.45)  (-11.54)  (-6.71)  (-16.3)   (-7.68) 
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Table 2.10 Holding Period Returns for Two-Way Sorted Portfolios  
 
This table compares CS’ Table VII and replicating results with the macroeconomic variables that I have. In 
Panel A, at the beginning of each month t, all stocks are first sorted into quintiles by their past six-month 
cumulative raw returns. Stocks in each quintile are then assigned to one of five equal-sized portfolios based 
on their predicted returns from a business cycle model as in Equation (1) compounded over the prior six 
months. In panel B, stocks are first sorted by predicted returns and then by raw returns. The predicted 
return is given by the fitted values from the following regression: itk tkiiit ezccr ++= ∑ = −4 1 10 , where zkt is the 
realization of the kth macroeconomic variable at month t. This regression is run using returns in the prior 60 
months. A minimum of 12 months of data is required. The two-way sorts result in 25 portfolios. All stocks 
are equally weighted in a portfolio. For each portfolio, the table shows the average monthly buy-and-hold 
return for the first six months in the postformation period. The sample period is July 1963 through 
December 1994. t-statistics are reported only for differences. The column titled “CS” presents CS’ results 
in their Table VII and the column titled “P” reports my results. 
 
 Raw Returns     
 (low)       (high)     
 1 2 3 4 5 (5)-(1) t-stat 
 CS P CS P CS P CS P CS P CS P CS P 
Panel A: Sorted First by Past Raw Returns and Then by Predicted Returns 
1(low) 1.08 0.92 1.08 1.03 1.15 1.10 1.16 1.11 1.28 1.25 0.20 0.33 0.61 1.04 
2 0.94 0.92 1.14 1.10 1.18 1.12 1.25 1.21 1.37 1.33 0.43 0.41 1.66 1.64 
3 1.13 1.05 1.27 1.23 1.31 1.24 1.30 1.29 1.55 1.56 0.42 0.50 1.87 2.22 
4 1.18 1.13 1.35 1.35 1.42 1.36 1.45 1.43 1.71 1.70 0.53 0.56 2.31 2.50 
5(high) 1.30 1.27 1.44 1.42 1.53 1.47 1.55 1.50 1.72 1.77 0.44 0.51 1.97 2.35 
(5)-(1) 0.22 0.35 0.36 0.38 0.39 0.38 0.40 0.39 0.46 0.53     
t-stat  0.86 1.48 3.17 3.67 3.57 3.75 3.46 3.69 3.46 4.20     
Panel B: Sorted First by Predicted Returns and Then by Past Raw Returns 
1(low) 1.04 0.87 1.02 0.98 1.08 1.05 1.12 1.07 1.18 1.12 0.14 0.25 0.45 0.79 
2 1.10 1.04 1.21 1.15 1.14 1.10 1.16 1.15 1.30 1.23 0.19 0.20 1.06 1.06 
3 1.20 1.14 1.28 1.24 1.28 1.24 1.27 1.23 1.33 1.32 0.13 0.17 0.71 0.99 
4 1.35 1.32 1.44 1.41 1.46 1.44 1.44 1.43 1.61 1.58 0.26 0.26 1.44 1.42 
5(high) 1.38 1.32 1.51 1.45 1.54 1.53 1.67 1.65 1.78 1.82 0.40 0.50 1.99 2.46 
(5)-(1) 0.34 0.45 0.29 0.47 0.46 0.48 0.55 0.58 0.60 0.70     
t-stat  1.12 1.60 2.59 2.59 2.76 2.93 3.36 3.70 3.82 4.63     
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Table 2.11 Cross-Sectional Correlation Coefficient between Predicted Returns and 
m-Month Lagged Returns 
 
Time-series average of ( ) 21mmAt  for various m is reported. ( ) ( ) ∗−−−−− ′′≡ mttttt mA ιXXXx 21221  over the 
period from January 1953 to December 1994. I showed that the cross-sectional correlation coefficient 
between the one-month-ahead predicted returns from the macroeconomic variables and previous m-month 
returns, mρ , is proportional to ( )[ ] 21mmAE .  
 
m 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
( )[ ] 21mmAE  0.2078 0.2193 0.2261 0.2297 0.2316 0.2326 0.2341 
m 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 
( )[ ] 21mmAE  0.2340 0.2337 0.2324 0.2299 0.2258 0.2208 0.2106 
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Table 2.12 Holding Period Returns for Two-Way Sorted Portfolios with 12-Month 
Portfolio Formation Period 
 
This table constructed in the same manner as Table 10 except for portfolio formation period. Stocks are 
sorted by their previous 12-month cumulative raw returns and predicted returns while stocks are sorted by 
their previous 6-month cumulative raw returns and predicted returns in Table 10 and the portfolios are held 
for the next six months in both Table 2.10 and this table. All predicted returns are calculated with my 
macroeconomic variables. 
 
 Raw Returns   
 (low)    (high) Difference t-statistic 
Predicted Returns 1 2 3 4 5 (5) - (1) (5) - (1) 
Panel A: Sorted First by Past Raw Returns and Then by Predicted Returns 
1(low) 1.00 1.19 1.29 1.40 1.69 0.69 2.05 
2 0.93 1.07 1.18 1.40 1.56 0.63 2.18 
3 0.87 1.13 1.19 1.37 1.70 0.83 3.36 
4 1.10 1.23 1.31 1.39 1.67 0.57 2.38 
5(high) 0.98 1.15 1.30 1.41 1.59 0.61 2.54 
Difference (5)-(1) -0.02 -0.04 0.01 0.01 -0.09   
t-stat, (5) - (1) -0.07 -0.35 0.09 0.05 -0.73   
 
Panel B: Sorted First by Predicted Returns and Then by Past Raw Returns 
1(low) 0.87 1.01 1.11 1.31 1.53 0.66 1.85 
2 0.94 1.09 1.11 1.25 1.50 0.56 2.81 
3 1.07 1.22 1.22 1.32 1.51 0.45 2.39 
4 1.14 1.32 1.35 1.43 1.70 0.56 2.80 
5(high) 1.06 1.28 1.44 1.54 1.74 0.67 2.87 
Difference (5)-(1) 0.20 0.27 0.33 0.22 0.21   
t-stat, (5) - (1) 0.63 1.33 1.86 1.36 1.31   
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Table 2.13 Holding Period Returns for Two-Way Sorted Portfolios with 9-Month 
Portfolio Formation Period 
 
This table constructed in the same manner as Table 12 except for portfolio formation period. Stocks are 
sorted by their previous 9-month cumulative raw returns and predicted returns. The portfolios are held for 
the next six months.  
 
 Raw Returns   
 (low)    (high) Difference t-statistic 
Predicted Returns 1 2 3 4 5 (5) - (1) (5) - (1) 
Panel A: Sorted First by Past Raw Returns and Then by Predicted Returns 
1(low) 0.90 1.05 1.20 1.34 1.57 0.67 2.11 
2 0.85 1.07 1.16 1.30 1.52 2.59 0.67 
3 0.90 1.12 1.20 1.36 1.71 3.42 0.81 
4 1.06 1.24 1.30 1.47 1.73 2.93 0.67 
5(high) 1.04 1.29 1.35 1.47 1.79 3.29 0.74 
Difference (5)-(1) 0.14 0.24 0.15 0.13 0.22   
t-stat, (5) - (1) 0.59 2.13 1.53 1.27 1.71   
 
Panel B: Sorted First by Predicted Returns and Then by Past Raw Returns 
1(low) 0.77 0.95 1.09 1.29 1.44 0.47 2.01 
2 0.93 1.09 1.14 1.17 1.41 0.48 2.60 
3 1.07 1.22 1.22 1.30 1.46 0.39 2.14 
4 1.16 1.34 1.37 1.49 1.70 0.54 2.85 
5(high) 1.16 1.35 1.47 1.64 1.86 0.70 3.23 
Difference (5)-(1) 0.39 0.40 0.39 0.44 0.42   
t-stat, (5) - (1) 1.29 2.15 2.24 2.65 2.67   
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Part 3.   Moving Average Ratio and Momentum 
 99
I. Introduction 
 
One of the most puzzling phenomena in financial market is intermediate-term momentum 
in stock prices documented by Jegadeesh and Titman (1993). Jegadeesh and Titman show 
that the self-financing strategy that buys winners and sells losers based on the previous 3- 
to 12-month returns and holds the position for the following 3 to 12 months generates 
positive profits. Rouwenhorst (1998) finds momentum phenomena are not restricted to 
the US market and prevail in 12 other countries. Also, Jegadeesh and Titman (2001) 
show that momentum strategies continue to be profitable in 1990s. These results suggest 
that the profitability of momentum strategies is not the result of data snooping. In 
addition to intermediate-term momentum, DeBondt and Thaler (1985), Lee and 
Swaminathan (2000), and Jegadeesh and Titman (2001) document long-term reversals in 
stock returns. For instance, Jegadeesh and Titman (2001) show that profits from a 
momentum strategy with 6 months of formation period over a 48-month period starting 
on the 13th month after the momentum portfolio formation period are significantly 
negative while momentum profits over a 12-month period immediately after the 
formation period are significantly positive for the sample period from 1965 to 1997.  
 
Some explanations for intermediate-term momentum in stock prices are consistent with 
the efficient market hypothesis. For instance, Berk, Green, and Naik (1999) develop a 
theoretical model that predicts intermediate-term momentum profits. In their model, time-
varying but persistent systematic risk generates momentum profits. Conrad and Kaul 
(1998) show that intermediate-term momentum profits mainly come from the cross-
sectional dispersion of unconditional expected returns, while Jegadeesh and Titman 
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(2001) argue that the results in Conrad and Kaul are driven by estimation errors in the 
estimation of unconditional expected returns. Finally, Chordia and Shivakumar (2002) 
argue that a set of macroeconomic variables may predict expected stock returns. However, 
the second part of this dissertation shows that a spurious relation between persistent 
macroeconomic variables and predicted returns from the macroeconomic variables 
falsely appears to explain the momentum.  
 
Barberis, Shleifer, and Vishny (BSV, 1998), Daniel, Hirshleifer, and Subrahmanyam 
(DHS, 1998), and Hong and Stein (HS, 1999) present behavioral models that attempt to 
explain the coexistence of intermediate-term momentum and long-term reversals in stock 
returns. In sum, under BSV, and HS, investors tend to underreact to new information 
resulting in intermediate-term momentum, but they overcorrect for previous mispricing 
leading to long-term reversals. Under DHS, momentum occurs because investors tend to 
overreact to prior information and reversals occur when they correct the mispricing. BSV 
and DHS attribute psychological biases such as conservatism and representativeness 
heuristics or overconfidence to the mispricing that leads to momentum or reversals, while 
HS emphasize the slow diffusion of information to explain momentum.  
 
In addition to the above formal behavioral theories, George and Hwang (GH, 2004) find 
that the nearness to the 52-week high price can explain a large portion of the profits from 
momentum strategies. Specifically, GH show that the investment strategy that buys 
stocks with a high ratio of the current price to the 52-week high and sells stocks with low 
a ratio produces significantly positive profits. More importantly, the profits from 
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Jegadeesh and Titman’s style momentum strategy are significantly reduced once stock 
returns are controlled for returns forecasted by the nearness to the 52-week high. GH 
suggest that investors are subject to an anchoring bias where they use the 52-week high 
as a reference point against which they evaluate the potential impact of news. When good 
news has pushed a stock’s price near or to a new 52-week high, investors are reluctant to 
bid the price of the stock higher even if the information warrants it. On the other hand, 
when bad news pushes a stock’s price far from its 52-week high, investors are initially 
unwilling to sell the stock at prices that are as low as the information implies. The 
subsequent corrections of these mispricings generate momentum profits.  
 
GH find, however, that the nearness to the 52-week high fails to explain negative profits 
from Jegadeesh and Titman’s momentum strategy over the post-holding periods. This 
combined with results described in the previous paragraph suggests that a large portion of 
intermediate-term momentum is caused by investors’ anchoring bias on the 52-week high 
for estimating the current fundamental value, but the anchoring bias has nothing to do 
with long-term reversals in stock returns. Therefore, GH conclude that intermediate-term 
momentum and long-term reversals are separate phenomena as opposed to BSV, DHS, or 
HS. 
 
As main contributions to the momentum literature, I find that the ratio of two variables 
that are commonly used in technical analysis-the 50-day moving average price and 200-
day moving average price-has significant predictive power for future returns and this 
predictive power is distinct from the predictive power of either past returns or the 
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nearness to the 52-week high. An investment strategy that ranks all stocks based on the 
ratio of the 50-day moving average to the 200-day moving average and buys equally the 
top 10% or 30% of stocks and sells the bottom 10% or 30% of stocks produces 
significant profits for the next 6-month holding period for the sample period from 
January 1964 to December 2004. Further, I show that the predictive power of stock 
returns in the previous 6 to 12 months becomes insignificant once future returns are 
controlled for the future returns forecasted by the ratio of the moving averages and the 
nearness to the 52-week.  
 
One of the trading rules used in technical analyses suggests that investors buy stocks 
when the 50-day moving average line crosses the 200-day moving average line from 
below and sell stocks when the 50-day MA line crosses the 200-day MA line from above. 
However, it also suggests that if the 50-day MA is much higher than the 200-day MA 
(which happens with a fast run up in price), a technician might consider this an indication 
that the stock is temporarily overbought (therefore, overvalued) which is bearish for the 
short-run. Similarly, if the 50-day MA is much lower than the 200-day MA, it might be 
considered a signal of an oversold (undervalued) stock, which is bullish for the short-
run.19 I do not test the usefulness of the buy or sell signal when the 50-day and 200-day 
MA lines cross each other. Instead, I test whether the difference between the 50-day and 
200-day MA lines has predictive power for future returns as the technical trading rule 
suggests. My results are opposite what the technical trading rule suggests; stocks whose 
                                                 
19 Reilly and Norton (2003) pp 601-602. 
 103
50-day MA is much higher than the 200-day MA tend to perform better than stocks 
whose 50-day MA is much lower than the 200-day MA for the following 6-month period. 
  
These findings, as well as those of George and Hwang, can be explained by investors’ 
anchoring bias as summarized by Kahneman, Slovic, and Tversky (1982). Investors may 
use the long-term moving average (200-day MA) as a reference point for a long-term 
fundamental value. Next, they may use a shorter-term moving average (50-day MA) as a 
reference point for a current price level in order to eliminate noise potentially included in 
the current price. Investors anchor on the long-term moving average when they evaluate 
the appropriateness of the current price level. This anchoring on past moving averages is 
a bias since if the fundamental value follows a random walk process, as most financial 
theories assume, time-series averages do not have any predictive power for future values. 
When recent good news has boosted the 50-day MA high above the 200-day moving MA, 
demand for the stocks would be less than the information warrants because investors 
falsely believe that the current price level is too high given their anchor, the 200-day MA. 
This reduction of demand results in underreaction to the information. However, the 
information eventually prevails and the mispricing is corrected in the subsequent period, 
resulting in momentum profits. The underreaction is most significant when the difference 
between the 50-day and 200-day MAs is largest. Similarly, when recent bad news has 
pushed down the 50-day MA low below the 200-day MA, demand on the stock would be 
higher than the information indicates because investors falsely believe that the current 
price level is too low given their anchor, leading to underreaction and momentum. If 
some investors regard the 52-week high price as their reference point for estimating the 
 104
fundamental value as George and Hwang (2004)20 argue, it can be also true that the same 
investors or other investors use moving averages as their reference points.  
 
Finally, like future returns forecast based on the nearness to the 52-week high in George 
and Hwang, future returns forecast based on the moving-average ratio do not reverse in 
the long run, while there are long-term reversals when past performance is measured by 
the returns in the previous 12 months. This confirms George and Hwang’s argument that 
intermediate-term momentum and long-term reversals are not likely to be components of 
the same phenomenon as modeled by BSV, DHS and HS.  
 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section II, I review the related 
literature. Section III contains methodology and data. In Section IV, I present results of 
the paper and Section V concludes. 
 
II. Literature Review 
II.A. Intermediate-Term Momentum and Long-Term Reversals 
II.A.1. Intermediate-term (3- to 12-month) momentum 
II.A.1.a) Trading strategy 
First let’s define the momentum strategy first developed by Jegadeesh and Titman (1993); 
I will use this definition throughout this part of the dissertation. 
 
 
                                                 
20 I review George and Hwan (2004) in the next section in detail. 
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Definition 1: JT momentum strategy, JT(p,J,D,K)  
At the beginning of month t, JT (p, J, D, K) sorts all stocks in the sample based on the 
buy-and-hold returns for the J months from t – D – J to t – D – 1, buys an equally 
weighted portfolio of the top p% of stocks (winners) and sells an equally weighted 
portfolio of the bottom p% of stocks (losers), and holds this position for the next K 
months. In other words, the momentum portfolio formation period is J months, and the 
holding period is K months, and there is a D-month gap between the formation and 
holding periods. To increase the power of their tests, JT include portfolios with 
overlapping holding periods. Therefore, the strategy holds K different momentum 
portfolios at month t. Momentum profit at month t from the JT momentum strategy is 
defined to be the average of the returns on the K momentum portfolios at month t. 
 
II.A.1.b) Profits 
JT use different combinations of Js and Ks: J = 3, 6, 9, and 12 and K = 3, 6, 9, and 12 for 
p = 10% and D = 0 or 1 week. Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) document the profits from 
the 32 different momentum strategies defined above over the period from1965 to 1989 
using stocks traded on the NYSE and AMEX from the CRSP daily returns file. The 
profits of all the momentum strategies are positive. All these profits are statistically 
significant except for the JT(10,3,0,3).  
 
The most successful zero-cost strategy selects stocks based on their returns over the 
previous 12 months and then holds the portfolio for 3 months: JT(10,12,D,3). This 
strategy yields 1.31% per month when there is no time lag between the portfolio 
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formation period and the holding period, i.e., D = 0, and it yields 1.49% per month when 
there is a 1-week lag between the formation period and the holding period, , i.e., D = 1 
week. The 6-month formation period produces profits of about 1% per month regardless 
of the holding period. These profits are slightly higher when there is a 1-week lag 
between the formation period and the holding period than when the formation and 
holding periods are contiguous.  
 
II.A.1.c) Robustness of momentum 
Since Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) first documented intermediate-term momentum in 
stock returns, two important pieces of evidence have been documented suggesting that 
the positive profits from the Jegadeesh and Titman momentum strategy are not the result 
of data snooping. Rouwenhorst (1998) finds that momentum phenomena are not 
restricted to the US market and prevail in 12 other countries. Also Jegadeesh and Titman 
(2001) show that momentum strategies continue to be profitable in the 1990s. 
 
II.A.1.d) Industry momentum 
Using the CRSP and COMPUSTAT data files, Moskowitz and Grinblatt (MG, 1999) 
form 20 value-weighted industry portfolios for every month from July 1963 to July 1995. 
Two-digit SIC codes are used to form industry portfolios. MG implement a 6-month/6-
month industry momentum strategy; by sorting the industries from highest and lowest 
based on their past six-month returns, and investing equally in the top three industries 
while shorting equally the bottom three industries. This position is held for six months 
from July 1963 to July 1995. 
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For comparison purposes, MG also calculate the profits from a 6-month/6-month 
individual stock momentum strategy similar to Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) except that 
MG’s strategy takes a value-weighted long position in the highest 30 percent of stocks 
based on the past 6-month returns and a value-weighted short position in the bottom 30 
percent of stocks based on the past 6-month returns. (JT’s strategy invests equally in the 
top 10 percent of stocks and shorts the bottom 10 percent of stocks based on the past 6-
month returns.) 
 
MG document that the monthly profit from the 6-month/6-month industry momentum 
strategy and the 6-month/6-month individual stock momentum strategy described in the 
previous subsection are the same, 0.43 percent per month. They also provide the 
following evidence: 
• Industry portfolios exhibit significant momentum, even after controlling for size, 
book-to-market equity and individual stock momentum. 
• Once returns are adjusted for industry effects, momentum profits from individual 
equities are significantly weaker and, for the most part, are statistically insignificant.  
 
II.A.2. Long-term (3- to 5-year) reversals 
In addition to intermediate-term momentum in stock returns, DeBondt and Thaler (1985) 
document profits from a long-term contrarian strategy. The authors construct a winner 
portfolio that consists of the 35 stocks (or 50 stocks) that performed best over the past 
three years, and a loser portfolio that consists of the 35 stocks (or 50 stocks) that 
performed worst over the past three years. Loser portfolios significantly outperform the 
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market over the three years after portfolio formation, and winner portfolios earn 
significantly less than the market three years after portfolio formation. Also, Lee and 
Swaminathan (2000) show that if there is 2- to 4-year gap between formation period and 
holding period, the JT momentum strategies yield negative profits using stocks traded on 
NYSE and AMEX for the sample period from 1965 to 1995. Specifically, They find that 
JT(10,J,D,12) generates significant losses for J = 6 to 12 and D = 36 or 48. Combined 
with Jegadeesh and Titman’s findings, this suggests that winner portfolios based on the 
previous 6- to 12-month returns initially outperform the loser portfolios but the 
performance of winner and loser portfolios is eventually reversed.   
 
Finally, Jegadeesh and Titman (2001) investigate long-term reversals in stock prices for 
the sample period from 1965 to 1998. Unlike some of previous momentum literature, 
they include NASDAQ stocks but exclude all stocks priced below $5 at the beginning of 
the holding period and all stocks with market capitalizations that would place them in the 
smallest NYSE decile. They exclude these stocks to ensure that the results are not driven 
primarily by small and illiquid stocks. For the sample of stocks and period, they report 
that JT(10,6,D,12) yields significantly negative profits for D = 12, 24, 36, and 48. 
 
II.B. Theories and Explanations 
While most researchers agree on the existence of intermediate-term momentum and long-
term reversals in stock returns, their source has been the subject of controversy. 
Traditional asset pricing models seem to fail to explain the intermediate-term momentum 
phenomena. For instance, Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) show that changes in market beta 
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cannot be the source of the intermediate-term momentum and Fama and French (1996) 
show that the Fama-French three factor model cannot explain the intermediate-term price 
momentum. Also, the long-term reversals described in the previous subsection persist 
even after controlling for the Fama-French three-factor risk (Lee and Swaminathan, 2000, 
and Jegadeesh and Titman, 2001).  
 
Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) initially conjectured that intermediate-term momentum 
might be driven by investor underreaction to firm-specific information. Since then, many 
theories to explain intermediate-term momentum and long-term reversals in stock returns 
based on behavioral models have been suggested. See Barberis, Shleifer, and Vishny 
(BSV, 1998), Daniel, Hirshleifer, and Subrahmanyam (DHS, 1998), Hong and Stein (HS, 
1999) and Barberis and Shleifer (2003). BSV and DHS attribute momentum to investor 
cognitive biases while HS argue that momentum is due to slow diffusion of firm-specific 
information to the public. Finally, BS attribute momentum profits to investors’ style 
investing behavior (details in next subsection). 
 
Some explanations for momentum are consistent with the efficient markets hypothesis. 
There are two classes of such explanations. One argues that momentum strategies 
systematically buy high-risk stocks and sell low-risk stocks. (See Conrad and Kaul, 1998) 
The other suggests that momentum strategies tend to buy stocks when the expected 
returns of the stocks is high and sell stocks when the expected returns of the stocks is low. 
(See Berk, Green, and Naik, 1999, and Chordia and Shivakumar, 2002) Conrad and Kaul 
(1998) argue that stocks with high realized returns will be those that have high expected 
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returns, suggesting that the momentum strategy’s profitability is a result of cross-
sectional variability in expected returns. However, Grundy and Martin (2001) show that 
the profitability cannot be explained as a reward for bearing risk as measured by the three 
factors of the Fama-French (1996) model, nor by cross-sectional variability in stocks’ 
average returns. Jegadeesh and Titman (2001) argue that reversals in the post-holding 
period reject the claim of Conrad and Kaul that momentum profits are generated by 
dispersion in unconditional expected returns. Furthermore, Jegadeesh and Titman argue 
that the results in Conrad and Kaul are driven by estimation errors in the estimation of 
expected return variance. 
 
It is plausible that intermediate-term momentum profits are due to time-varying risk and 
hence, due to systematic changes in expected returns. Chordia and Shivakumar (2002) 
show that the expected returns of momentum portfolios can be predicted by four 
macroeconomic variables and argue that the macroeconomic variables might be related to 
risk factors that are not yet identified. However, Part 2 of this dissertation shows that that 
a spurious relation between persistent macroeconomic variables and predicted returns 
from the macroeconomic variables falsely appears to explain the momentum. 
 
Behavioral Models for the Intermediate-Term Momentum and Long-Term Reversals 
Barberis, Shleifer, and Vishny (BSV, 1998), Daniel, Hirshleifer, and Subrahmanyam 
(DHS, 1998), and Hong and Stein (HS, 1999) present theoretical models that attempt to 
explain the coexistence of intermediate-term momentum and long-term reversals in stock 
returns. In sum, under BSV and HS, momentum occurs because traders underreact when 
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new information arrives and long-term reversals occur because they overcorrect previous 
mispricing. In DHS, momentum occurs because traders overreact to prior information 
and the subsequent correction of this overreaction results in long-term reversals. 
 
Barberis, Shleifer and Vishny (BSV, 1998)  
BSV explain intermediate-term price momentum and long-term price reversal using a 
parsimonious model of investor sentiment. Their behavioral model is based on two 
psychological constructs: conservatism and the representativeness heuristic. 
Conservatism states that individuals are slow to change their beliefs in the face of new 
evidence. Individuals subject to conservatism might disregard the full information 
content of an earnings announcement, perhaps because they believe that it contains a 
large temporary component, and still cling, at least partially, to their prior estimates of 
earnings. As a consequence, they might underreact to new information when evaluating 
stocks.  
 
The second relevant phenomenon is the representativeness heuristic documented by 
Tversky and Kahneman (1974): “A person who follows this heuristic evaluates the 
probability of an uncertain event according to the degree to which it is (i) similar in its 
essential properties to the parent population, and (ii) reflects the salient features of the 
process by which is generated”.21 When a stock experiences a series of good (poor) 
performance in the previous period caused by investors’ conservatism, thus underreaction, 
investors falsely conclude that the past history is representative of future returns. As a  
                                                 
21 Tversky and Kahneman (1974), p. 33. 
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Formation Period 
(Month -11 to month 0) 
Momentum Strategy Holding Period  
(Month 1 to month 12) 
Post-Holding Period 
(Month 13 to month 60) 
Underreaction 
 
Correction of previous 
underreaction 
Overreaction Correction of previous overreaction 
Conservatism heuristic 
bias - 
Representativeness 
heuristic bias - 
 
Figure 3.1 Summary of BSV’s Model 
 
consequence, investors using the representative heuristic might overreact to the history of 
high (low) returns that is unlikely to repeat itself in evaluating stocks. In summary, they 
regard the intermediate-term momentum as results of underreaction and the long-term 
reversals as results of overreaction of the investors. 
 
The empirical findings of intermediate-term momentum and long-term reversals can be 
explained by BSV in the Figure 3.1, where the holding period starts at month 1. 
 
Daniel, Hirshleifer, and Subrahmanyam (DHS, 1998)  
DHS suggest a model that is based on investors’ overconfidence and variations in 
confidence arising from biased self-attribution. If an investor overestimates his ability to 
judge information, or to identify the significance of existing data that others neglect, he 
will underestimate his forecast errors. If he is more overconfident about signals or 
assessments with which he has greater personal involvement, he will tend to be 
overconfident about the information he has generated but not about public signals. 
Therefore, stock prices overreact to private information signals and underreact to public 
signals. They show that this overreaction-correction pattern is consistent with long-run 
negative autocorrelation in stock returns. 
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According to attribution theory (Bem, 1965), individuals too strongly attribute events that 
confirm the validity of their judgment to their own high ability, and events that conflict 
with their judgment to external noise or sabotage. According to the attribution theory, if 
an investor receives confirming public information, his confidence rises, but conflicting 
information causes his confidence to fall only modestly, if at all. Therefore, even if an 
individual begins with unbiased beliefs about his ability, new public signals on average 
are viewed as confirming the validity of his private signal. This suggests that public 
information can trigger further overreaction to a preceding private signal. They show that 
such continuing overreaction causes momentum in security prices, but that such 
momentum is eventually reversed as further public information gradually draws the price 
back toward fundamentals. Thus, biased self-attribution implies that intermediate-term 
momentum and long-term reversals would be observed. In sum, the authors think of 
intermediate-term momentum as result of overreaction, and long-term reversals as result 
of corrections of previous mispricings. Again the empirical findings of intermediate-term 
momentum and long-term reversals as explained by DHS can be illustrated in Figure 3.2, 
where the holding period starts at month 1. 
 
Formation Period 
(Month -11 to month 0) 
 
Momentum Strategy Holding Period  
(Month 1 to month 12) 
Post-Holding Period 
(Month 13 to month 60) 
- 
 
Overreaction 
Correction of previous 
overreaction 
- Overconfidence reinforced  by self-attribution bias - 
 
Figure 3.2 Summary of DHS’s Model 
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Hong and Stein (HS, 1999)  
Alternatively, HS (1999) develop a model that focuses on the interaction between 
heterogeneous representative agents rather than the psychology of the agents. In other 
words, less of the action in their model comes from particular cognitive biases, and more 
of it comes from the way these traders interact with one another. Their model employs 
two types of investors: newswatchers and momentum traders. The newswatchers rely 
exclusively on their private information; momentum traders rely exclusively on the 
information in past price changes. The additional assumption that private information 
diffuses only gradually through the marketplace leads to an initial underreaction to news. 
The underreaction and subsequent positive serial correlation in returns attracts the 
attention of the momentum traders whose trading activity results in an eventual 
overreaction to news. Prices revert to their fundamental levels in the long run. In Hong 
and Stein (1999), initial momentum comes from underreaction by the news watchers. 
Later momentum is the result of overreaction by the momentum traders, and the long-
term reversal comes from prices reverting to their fundamental values. In their model, HS 
restrict momentum traders to have simple strategies, that is, momentum traders at time t 
base their trades only on the price change over limited prior intervals, so they do not 
know whether prices of stocks are still undervalued or have already overshot their long-
run equilibrium values. Therefore, momentum traders sometimes gain from their trades, 
but sometimes lose. The empirical findings for intermediate-term momentum and long-
term reversals can be explained by HS in Figure 3.3, where the holding period starts at 
month 1. 
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(Month -11 to month 0) 
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Figure 3.3 Summary of HS’s Model 
 
II.C. George and Hwang (2004) and Fama-MacBeth Style Cross-Sectional 
Regression 
 
II.C.1. 52-week high strategy 
George and Hwang (2004, hereafter GH) find that the nearness of the current price to the 
52-week high price as measured by the ratio of the current price to the 52-week high 
explains a large portion of the profits from the JT momentum strategy. GH define the 52-
week high strategy as follows 
 
Definition 2: GH 52-week high strategy, GH 52HI(p,D,K)  
52HI (p, D, K) is same as the JT (p, J, D, K) except that stocks are ranked based on the 
ratio of the price at the end of month t – D – 1 to the highest daily stock  price during the 
12-month period from t – D – 12 to t – D – 1, 1,1, −−−− DtiDti highP , where Pi,t-D-1 is the price 
of stock i at the end of month t – D – 1 and high i,t-D-1 is the highest price of stock i during 
the 12-month period that ends on the last day of month t – D – 1. This strategy buys the 
top p% of stocks that have the highest 1,1, −−−− DtiDti highP  ratio and sells bottom p% of 
stocks and holds this position for the next K months. In other words, there is a D-month 
gap between the measurement period of the ratio (or formation period) and the holding 
period. All prices are adjusted for dividends and stock splits when calculating the price 
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ratio. Monthly profits from this strategy are simply called “52-week high profits” 
throughout this part of the dissertation. 
  
II.C.2. Fama-MacBeth Cross-sectional regression 
 
Let’s consider the following cross-sectional regression model for period t; 
ititttit sR εγγ ~~~~ 110 ++= − , (1)
 
where itR
~  is stock i’s return for period t and sit-1 is the natural logarithm of stock i’s 
market capitalization at the end of period t – 1. I adopt “~” for the stochastic variables 
following Fama MacBeth (1973) to emphasize that the regression coefficients, t0γ  and 
t1γ , are allowed to vary stochastically from period to period. Also, t0~γ  and t1~γ  are 
assumed to be temporally identically and independently distributed. 
 
The implication of the CAPM is that ( ) 0~1 =tE γ . Implementation of the Fama-MacBeth 
approach to test this implication of the CAPM involves two steps. First, given T periods 
of data, Equation (1) is estimated using OLS for each t, t = 1, …, T, giving the T 
estimates of t1
~γ , denoted as t1γˆ . Then in the second step, the time series of t1γˆ ’s is 
analyzed. Under the assumption that ( )2,0~~ εσε Nit  and cst =2σ , where 2stσ  is the cross-
section variance of the natural logarithm of the market capitalization at period t and c is 
some constant, 1γˆ  follows identical and independent normal distributions . Hence, given 
time-series of the estimated regression coefficients, t1γˆ , for t = 1,…, T, we can test the 
null that ( ) 0~1 =tE γ  using the usual t-test. GH use a similar methodology testing 
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predictive power of the ratio of the current price to the 52-week high for future returns 
after controlling for the firm size, one-month lagged returns and the past returns as 
described in the next subsection. I also follow this methodology when testing the 
predictive power of the moving-average ratio for the future returns. 
 
II.C.3. Comparisons of JT momentum, MG industry momentum, and GH 52-
week high strategies 
 
George and Hwang compare profitability from JT momentum, Moskowitz and Grinblatt 
(1999) industry momentum, and GH 52-week high strategies using a Fama-MacBeth 
style cross-sectional regression analysis. Before describing the cross-sectional regression 
analysis for momentum, I will define the MG industry momentum strategy used by 
George and Hwang since MG industry momentum strategy used by GH is slightly 
different from what is done in Moskowitz and Grinblatt (1999). 
 
Definition 3: MG industry momentum strategy, MG (p,J,D,K)  
Under MG (p,J,D,K), at the beginning of each month t, the value-weighted industry 
returns over the past J months, from t – D – J to t – 1 are measured and stocks are 
ranked according to their industries’ past performance. Stocks ranked in the top p% of 
industries are assigned to the winner portfolio and stocks in bottom p% are assigned to 
the loser portfolio. These portfolios are equally weighted. This strategy buys the winner 
portfolio and sells loser portfolio and holds this position for following K months. The 
remaining procedures are exactly same as JT (p,J,D,K) and 52HI (J,D,K). 
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II.C.3.a) Fama-MacBeth style cross-sectional regression analysis 
GH compares the contributions of the portfolios from the three investment strategies on 
profits from JT momentum strategy, JT (30,6,D,K), MG (30,6,D,K), and 52HI (30,D,K) 
for D = 1 and K = 6 or 12. In other words, the strategies buy (sell) an equal-weighted 
portfolio of the 30% of stocks based on the appropriate ranking scheme and hold the 
positions for the next K months from one month after the formation period (a one-month 
gap between the formation and holding periods). Their sample includes all stocks traded 
on NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ and the sample period is from July 1963 to December 
2001. The functional form of the month t cross-sectional regression that GH analyze is  
itkDitktkDitktkDitkt
kDitktkDitktkDitktitktitktktit
eFHLbFHHbMLb
MHbJLbJHbsizebRbbR
++++
+++++=
−−−−−−
−−−−−−−−
876
54312110 , (2)
 
for k = 1,…, K, where Rit and Rit-1 are stock i’s returns for month t and month t -1, sizeit-1 
is market capitalization of stock i at the end of month t – 1, JHit-k equals one if stock i’s 
past performance over the 6-month period (t-D-k-5, t-D-k-1) is in the top 30% when 
measured by JT momentum strategy performance criterion., and is zero otherwise; JLit-k 
equals one if stock i’s past performance over the period (t-D-k-5, t-D-k-1) is in the bottom 
30% when measured by JT momentum strategy performance criterion, and is zero 
otherwise. The variables MH and ML (FHH and FHL) are defined similarly for MG 
industry momentum strategy (GH 52-week high strategy). Since the returns to JT 
(30,6,D,K), MG (30,6,D,K), and 52HI (30,D,K) involve portfolios formed over K of the 
prior K+D months, the marginal return in month t of the winner and loser portfolios, 
tb3 , …, tb8 , can be expressed as averages, ∑ =Kk ktbK 1 31 , …, ∑ =Kk ktbK 1 81 , where the 
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individual coefficients, ktb3 , …, ktb8 , are computed from separate cross-sectional 
regressions for each k = 1, …, K. In other words, ∑ == Kk ktt bKb 1 33 1 , …, 
∑ == Kk ktt bKb 1 88 1 . The time-series averages of the month-by-month estimates of these 
averages and associated t-statistics are used to test the predictability of each variable on 
future returns. 
 
The analysis of regression equation (2) has several advantages. First, it can assess the 
simultaneous effects of different trading strategies even after controlling for market 
microstructure effects and size effects. Second, from the difference in estimated 
coefficients between winner or loser dummies, we can estimate the marginal profitability 
of an investment strategy in economically meaningful terms. For instance, b3 – b4 
represents the expected monthly profit of a pure JT (30,6,D,K) strategy. The pure JT 
momentum strategy would be a JT momentum strategy that includes only pairs of stocks, 
one of which belongs to the JT winner portfolio and the other of which belongs to the JT 
loser portfolio and both of which are identical in one-month lagged return, size, and 
membership in any other investment strategies. Finally, we can measure the contributions 
to the profits from winner and loser portfolios separately. For example, if b3 > 0 and b4 = 
0, we can say that JT momentum profits completely come from the winner portfolio. 
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II.C.3.b) Results 
In sum, GH report that the time-series averages of 43 ˆˆ bb − , 65 ˆˆ bb − , and 87 ˆˆ bb −  are 
significantly positive and the average of 87 ˆˆ bb −  is greater than that of 43 ˆˆ bb −  or 65 ˆˆ bb −  
in magnitude and statistical significance for both K = 6 and 12. Results are similar when 
GH returns are controlled for Fama-French three factors. From these results, GH 
conclude that the 52-week high strategy dominates the JT momentum and MG industry 
momentum strategies and conjecture that a large portion of the predictive power of past 
returns in individual stock level or industry level is in fact due to the predictive power of 
the nearness of the current price to the 52-week high. 
 
II.C.3.c) Explanations and implications for previous behavioral theories 
GH explain these findings as follows. “Traders use the 52-week high as a reference point 
against which they evaluate the potential impact of news. When good news has pushed a 
stock’s price near or to a new 52-week high, traders are reluctant to bid the price of the 
stock higher even if the information warrants it. The information eventually prevails and 
the price moves up, resulting in a continuation.” In other words, as the price approaches 
the reference point, underreaction occurs and the subsequent correction of this 
underreaction results in momentum profits. A similar underreaction to information occurs 
when the price moves down far below the reference point. GH further argue that price 
levels are more important determinants of momentum effects than past price changes. 
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GH further argue that a theory in which price level relative to an anchor plays a role 
(anchor-and-adjust bias) may be more descriptive of the data than existing theories based 
on overconfidence, conservatism, or slow diffusion of information that lead to 
continuations of past returns.    
 
II.C.4. Long-term reversals 
 
GH estimate the regression equation (2) for D = 12, 24, 36, and 48 and K = 12. In other 
words, they compare the marginal profitability of the three investment strategies when 
there are 12-, 24-, 36-, and 48-months gap between the formation and the holding periods 
in order to see whether the intermediate-term profit from each investment strategy 
persists, reverses, or disappears in the long horizon. GH use risk-adjusted returns for 
Fama-French risk factors on winner or loser portfolios from the investment strategies for 
these analyses and they footnote that the results using raw returns are similar. GH find 
that when the holding periods include all months, the time-series average of 43 ˆˆ bb −  (the 
pure JT momentum risk-adjusted profits) are significantly negative for D = 12 and 48. 
When Januarys are excluded, the pure JT momentum risk-adjusted profits are 
significantly negative for D = 12, 36, and 48. The average of 65 ˆˆ bb −  (the pure MG 
industry momentum risk-adjusted profit) is significantly negative for D = 48 when 
Januarys are included in the holding periods, and significantly negative for D = 12 when 
Januarys are excluded from the holding periods. However, the average of 87 ˆˆ bb −  (the 
pure GH 52-week high risk-adjusted profit) is not significantly negative at any gap and is 
significantly positive for D = 12 when Januarys are excluded from the holding periods. 
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These results suggest that returns predicted by the past returns tend to be reversed 12 
months after the portfolio formation period while returns predicted by the 52-week high 
are permanent.  
 
The results described in Subsection II.C. and the previous paragraph, indicate that 
intermediate-term return continuations are most strongly related to the nearness to 52-
week high price, but long-term reversals are unrelated to the primary driver of 
intermediate-term return continuation. GH argue that if intermediate-term return 
continuations and long-term reversals were linked as existing theories of momentum 
described in Subsection II.B as BSV, DHS, and HS suggest, then reversals should be 
strongest for stocks exhibiting the strongest bias, i.e., 52-week winners and losers, rather 
than stocks identified as winners and losers by the JT or MG momentum strategy. Instead, 
the opposite occurs. GH conclude that the explanation for long-term reversals appears to 
lie elsewhere, presenting a new challenge for theories.  
 
II.D. Anchoring bias 
Tversky and Kahneman (1974) argue that when forming estimates, people often start 
with some initial, possibly arbitrary value, and then adjust away from it. Experimental 
evidence shows that the adjustment is often insufficient. In one experiment, subjects were 
asked to estimate the percentage of United Nations’ countries that are African. More 
specifically, before giving a percentage, they were asked whether their guess was higher 
or lower than a randomly generated number between 0 and 100. Their subsequent 
estimates were significantly affected by the initial random number. Those who were 
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asked to compare their estimate to 10, subsequently estimated 25%, while those who 
compared to 60, estimated 45%. GH argue this anchoring bias to the initial value in the 
above experiment is analogous to underreaction of stock prices when current prices are 
extremely close to or extremely far from the 52-week high. When investors are 
estimating the current fundamental value of a stock, they anchor too much on the 
arbitrary reference value such as the 52-week high price. If fundamental value follows a 
random walk, the 52-week high price is in fact an arbitrary value.   
 
II.E. Moving averages  
In this part of the dissertation, I introduce two variables that have been widely used in 
technical analysis; the 50-day moving average and 200-day moving average. An 
undergraduate textbook introduces a popular technical trading rule as follows. 
“When the 50- and 200-day MA lines cross, it signals a change in the overall trend. If the 
50-day MA line crosses the 200-day MA from below on good volume, this would be a 
bullish indicator (buy signal). …. In contrast, when the 50-day line crosses the 200-day 
line from above, it signals a change to a negative trend and would be a sell signal. …. If 
this positive gap (difference between the 50- and 200-MA lines) gets too large, a 
technician might consider this an indication that the stock is temporarily overbought. …. 
If the gap was large on the downside, it might be considered a signal of an oversold stock, 
which is bullish for the short-term.” 22 
 
                                                 
22 Reilly and Norton (2003) pp 601-602. 
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Financial researchers are generally skeptical about the usefulness of technical analysis as 
summarized by Jegadeesh (2002), concluding that technical analysis is a method built on 
weak foundations and that there is no plausible explanation why technical patterns in 
asset prices should be expected to repeat themselves. In fact, a technical trading rule that 
works for some time period often does not work for another time period. For instance, 
Brook, Lakoishok, and LeBaron (1992) find that trading rules based on moving averages 
and trading range breaks (support and resistance levels) significantly outperform a cash 
benchmark by utilizing the Dow Jones Index from 1987 to 1986. However, LeBaron 
(1999) finds that when 10 more years (1988 – 1999) were added to the original Brook et 
al. sample, what was once the consistently best performing trading rule failed badly in the 
most recent decade. Prior tests of the usefulness of technical trading rules based on 
moving averages used as an indicator variable the time at which a shorter MA line 
crosses a longer MA line (see Fong and Yong for summary), but as far as I know none of 
them test for the notion that the large positive (negative) gap between a shorter MA line 
and a longer MA line indicates a sell (buy) signal. Therefore, this part of the dissertation 
appears to be the first use of the ratio of a shorter MA to a longer MA in predicting future 
returns in the academic literature. 
 
III. Methodology and Data 
III.A. Investment Strategies 
Throughout this part of the dissertation, I compare the profitability of three different 
trading strategies; JT (p, J, D, K) and GH 52HI (p, D, K), defined in Definitions 1 and 2, 
and MAR (p, D, K), which is defined as follows.   
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Definition 4: Moving-Average Ratio strategy, MAR (p, D, K)  
At the beginning of each month t, MAR (p, D, K) calculates the average price during 50- 
and 200-day period ending on the last trading day of month t – D – 1, and the ratio of 
this 50-day average to the 200-day average (MAR). The method for constructing the 
investment portfolio and its returns based on MAR, for MAR (p, D, K), is the same as GH 
52HI (p, D, K) except that stocks are ranked based on the moving average ratio instead 
of distance from the 52-week high. This strategy buys equally the top p% of stocks that 
have highest MAR and sells equally the bottom p% of stocks and holds this position for 
the next K months. There is a D-month gap between the measurement period of the ratio 
(or portfolio formation period) and the holding period. As with GH 52HI (p, D, K), all 
prices are adjusted for dividends and stock splits when calculating the price ratio. 
Monthly profits from this strategy are simply called “MAR strategy profits” throughout 
this part of the dissertation.  
 
III.B. Data 
I use the CRSP monthly and daily files from July 1962 through December 2004. I use 
two different data samples. The first sample includes all stocks traded on the NYSE, 
AMEX, and NASDAQ but excludes all stocks priced below $5 at the end of the 
formation period and all stocks with market capitalizations that would place them in the 
smallest NYSE decile. These screening criteria are the same as those used by Jegadeesh 
and Titman (2001). The second sample is the same as the first one except that the price or 
size screening is not applied. This sample is the same as the one in George and Hwang 
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(2004) except for the sample period. I use these two samples in order to see how small 
and illiquid stocks affect profits from the investment strategies. 
 
When constructing winner or loser portfolios for the three investment strategies at the 
beginning of month t, I exclude stocks according to following observation criteria; stocks 
that are missing any monthly returns for the previous J-month period (t-J, t-1); stocks that 
have fewer than 200 daily observations for the previous one-year period (t-12, t-1); stocks 
that have fewer than 160 daily observations for the previous 200-day period ending on 
the last trading day of month t-1; and stocks that have fewer than 40 daily observations 
for the previous 50-day period ending on the last trading day of month t–1. If a stock is 
excluded from the formation of a JT momentum strategy, it is also excluded from the 
other investment strategies even if it meets the observation requirement for the other 
strategies. If a stock is included in the winner or loser portfolios but is deslisted or has 
missing observations during the holding period, I assume that its return is the same as the 
average return on the portfolio. I failed to find how other researchers handled missing 
observations during the portfolio holding period. However, since I use monthly returns 
for calculating holding period returns, there are few firms with missing returns for an 
entire month, so my treatment for missing observations in the holding period does not 
affect the results too much. 
 
III.C. Fama-MacBeth (1973) Regressions 
In order to simultaneously compare the profitability from the three strategies JT (p, J, D, 
K), GH 52HI (p, D, K), and MAR (p, D, K) after controlling for potential market 
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microstructure and size effects, I implement Fama-MacBeth (1973) style cross-sectional 
regressions in a manner similar to George and Hwang (2004). In order to compare JT (p, 
J, D, K), 52HI (p, D, K), and MAR (p, D, K), where D > 0, at each month t, I implement K 
cross-sectional regressions as follows; 
( )
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for k = 1, …, K, where Rit, Rit-1, JHit-k, JLit-k, FHHit-k and FHLit-k are defined as in 
Equation (2) and MAHit-k equals one if stock i’s moving average ratio at the end of month 
t – D – k – 1 is in the top p% and zero otherwise; MALit-k equals one if stock i’s moving 
average ratio at the end of month t – D – k – 1 is in the bottom p% and zero otherwise. I 
use the natural logarithm of the market capitalization to measure size effects while 
George and Hwang use the market capitalization itself.23  
 
Once the coefficients, blkt for l = 0, …, 8, are estimated for k = 1, …, K, I calculate the 
averages of the estimated coefficients for each l, so ∑ == Kk jktlt bTb 1 ˆ1ˆ  for l = 0, …, 8. 
Also, I calculate tt bb 43 ˆˆ − , tt bb 65 ˆˆ − , and tt bb 87 ˆˆ −  to calculate month-t profits from the 
pure JT momentum, GH 52-week high and MAR strategies. Finally the time-series 
averages of ltbˆ ’s and tt bb 43 ˆˆ − , tt bb 65 ˆˆ − , and tt bb 87 ˆˆ − , and associated t-statistics are used 
to test for the profitability of the three investment strategies and market microstructure 
and size effects. 
 
                                                 
23 GH do not provide the reason that they use the market capitalization while most researchers use natural 
logarithm of the market capitalization to measure size effects. 
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IV. Results 
IV.A. Summary statistics 
Panel A of Table 3.1of this paper presents the time-series averages of the cross-sectional 
means and standard deviations of the returns over the past six and 12 months, the ratio of 
the current price to the 52-week high, and the moving average ratio over the period from 
January 1964 to December 2004.24 I exclude all stocks that are priced below $5 and all 
stocks with market capitalizations that would place them in the smallest NYSE decile. 
Panel B of Table 3.1 reports the time-series averages of the estimates of the pair-wise 
correlation coefficients among the four variables. It is not surprising that the four 
variables are strongly correlated to each other. All of the time-series averages of the 
correlation coefficient estimates are above 0.5. 
 
IV.B. Profits from the Three Investment Strategies 
Table 3.2 presents the average monthly returns of winners, losers, and the winner minus 
loser portfolios from the three investment strategies, JT (p, J, D, K), 52HI (p, D, K), and 
MAR (p, D, K) for P = 10% or 30%, J = 6 or 12 months, D = 0, and K = 6 for the 41-year 
period from 1964 to 2004. All stocks on the NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ are included 
except for stocks that are priced less than $5 or would be in the smallest NYSE decile at 
the end of formation period. The 2nd through 5th columns show average monthly returns 
when p = 10% and the 6th through 9th columns show average monthly returns when p = 
30%. In panel A, I calculate average monthly returns and associated t-statistics for all 
months and in panels B and C, I separately show the average monthly returns for non-
                                                 
24 All tables of this part of the dissertation are in Appendix 2. 
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January months and for only Januarys because previous literature indicates momentum 
profits are significantly different in non-January months and Januarys. Also, in order to 
see if profits from the investment strategies are dependent on the sample periods, separate 
average monthly returns for the two subsample periods, January 1964 – December 1983 
and January 1984 – December 2004, are reported. 
 
Panel A shows that profits from both JT momentum strategies are economically and 
statistically significant. For instance, the average monthly profit from JT(10,6,0,6) is 
1.23% for the entire sample, which is exactly same as Jegadeesh and Titman (2001) 
report for the sample period from 1965 to 1998 using the same screening criteria. This 
profit is more economically and statistically significant than what Jegadeesh and Titman 
(1993) originally report excluding NASDAQ stocks for the sample period from 1965 to 
1989 but without price or size screening. This might be because small or illiquid stocks 
are more subject to short-term (weekly or monthly) reversals possibly caused by market 
microstructure effects such as bid-ask bounce and liquidity effects and excluding small 
stocks in my sample reduces the market microstructure effects. For the entire sample 
period and for all months, the 6-month holding period returns is slightly higher when the 
formation period is 6 months than when the formation period is 12 months for p = 10%, 
while the JT momentum strategy with a 12-month formation period is more profitable 
than that with a 6-month formation period for p = 30%. Monthly profits from JT 
momentum strategies for both subsample periods are similar in magnitude and statistical 
significance. This suggests that intermediate-term momentum is not the result of data 
snooping as Jegadeesh and Titman (2001) argue and that arbitrageurs do not exploit this 
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predictable price behavior once they come to know the arbitrage opportunities as argued 
by Shleifer and Vishny (1997).   
 
Panel A shows that two other investment strategies, GH 52HI (p, 0, 6) and MAR ((p, 0, 6), 
produce economically and statistically significant profits for p = 10% and 30% while the 
moving-average ratio strategy is most profitable and statistically significant for all 
subsample periods. For example, when p = 10%, monthly profits from MAR (10, 0, 6) is 
1.45% with t-statistic of 6.02. The next most profitable strategy is JT (10, 6, 0, 6), which 
produces 1.23% per month with t-statistic of 5.16. The third strategy is JT (10,12, 0, 6) 
(1.21% per month and t-statistic of 4.94) and GH 52HI (10, 0, 6) is least profitable 
(1.15% per month and t-statistic of 4.49). When p = 30%, the order of profitability is the 
same as when p = 10% except that JT (30,12, 0, 6) is more profitable than JT (30, 6, 0, 6). 
Since monthly profits from the GH 52-week high and moving-average strategies are 
similar for both subsample periods, I may conclude that the success of the 52-week high 
and moving-average strategies are not restricted to a specific sample period. 
 
Panels B and C contain the same information as Panel A, but Panel B presents average 
monthly profits from the investment strategies for only Januarys and Panel C reports 
average monthly profits when Januarys are excluded from the holding periods. Results in 
Panel B show that profits from the three investment strategies exhibit significant 
seasonality; profits are all negative in Januarys, which can be explained by investors’ tax-
loss selling or window dressing behavior. Under the tax-loss selling argument, at the end 
of the year investors who become more concerned about their income taxes tend to sell 
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stocks on which they have unrealized capital losses more than they would if there were 
no tax motivation. Therefore, the prices of stocks that have depreciated during the year 
tend to be below fundamental values at the end of the year because of temporary selling 
pressure. In early January, the selling pressure for such stocks ceases to exist and their 
prices return to fundamental values resulting in the positive returns on stocks that have 
been excessively sold at the end of the previous year. (See Grinblatt and Moskowitz 
(2004) for summary) Under the window dressing argument, investment companies such 
as mutual funds may want to purchase (sell) stocks that have performed extremely well 
(poorly) just before the reporting date to make the portfolio composition look as if the 
manager chose successful stocks, which is called a window dressing. It seems reasonable 
to assume that the most important reporting period is the calendar year. This window 
dressing might make the demand for such stocks temporarily deviate from those in 
equilibrium. This temporary deviation of demands from those in equilibrium would be 
released at the beginning of the next year, leading to return reversals in Januarys. Panel B 
indicates that the GH 52-week strategy is most subject to January return reversals for all 
sample periods while the MAR strategy is least subject to January return reversals. When 
Januarys are excluded from the holding periods in Panel C, GH 52-week high strategies 
are slightly more profitable than JT momentum strategies, while the MAR strategies are 
still the most profitable. 
 
Table 3.3 presents pair-wise comparisons of profitability from the three investment 
strategies, MAR (p,0,6), 52HI (p,0,6) and JT (p,12,0,6) for p = 10% and 30%. The MAR 
strategy is significantly more profitable than the JT momentum strategy when p = 10%. 
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The difference is 0.24% per month with t-statistic of 2.45. This difference comes from 
both winner and loser portfolios. The return on the MAR winner portfolio is higher by 
0.13% (t-statistic is 2.55) on average than the return on the JT winner portfolio and the 
return on the MAR loser portfolio is lower by 0.11 (t-statistic is -2.02) on average than 
the return on the JT loser portfolio. Also, the MAR winner portfolio tends to realize 
significantly higher return than the 52-week high winners, while the difference in returns 
between the MAR loser and the 52-week high loser portfolios is not significant. Finally, 
the 52-week high losers have significantly lower returns than the JT loser portfolios but 
the difference in returns between the 52-week high winners and the JT winners is not 
significant. However, when p = 30%, difference in winner/loser returns or momentum 
profits between any pair of investment strategies is not statistically significant.  
 
IV.C. Comparisons of Profitability from the Three Investment Strategies – Results 
of Fama-MacBeth Style Regressions 
 
Although Table 3.2 shows that the winners from the three strategies significantly 
outperform losers for the next 6 months after the portfolios are formed, it cannot 
distinguish among the underlying forces driving the return continuation. It is obvious that 
stocks that outperformed other stocks for the previous 6 or 12 months tend to be priced 
close to the 52-week high and also have a higher ratio of 50-day moving average price to 
200-day moving average price. In order to see the marginal effect of belonging to the 
winner or loser portfolio under an investment strategy while controlling for the effect of 
being in a winner or loser portfolio under other investment strategies, I implement a 
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Fama-MacBeth style cross-sectional regression analysis described in Equation (3) in 
Subsection III.C.  
 
In Tables 3.3 and 3.4, I compare JT (30, 12, 1, 6), 52HI (30, 1, 6), and MAR (30, 1, 6). 
Here, the JT momentum strategy has a 12-month formation period and, the holding 
periods for all strategies are 6 months, and there is a one-month gap between the 
formation period and the holding period. I use the JT momentum strategy with a 12-
month formation period rather than a 6-month formation period, because the GH 52-week 
high and MAR strategies use much more than 6 months of historical price information 
when forming the portfolios. However, when I repeat this analysis with JT (30,6,1,6) to 
check for the robustness, I obtained the same results as presented here. Table 3.4 presents 
the time-series averages of the estimated coefficient of regression equation (3) and the 
differences of estimated coefficients on winner and loser dummies from the investment 
strategies and associated t-statistics as described in Subsection III.C. The second and 
third columns include only JT winner and JT loser dummy variables and the fourth 
through ninth columns include winner and loser dummies for only two of the three 
investment strategies. Finally, the last two columns include winner and loser dummies of 
all of the three investment strategies. In addition to the winner and loser dummy variables, 
I include one-month lagged returns and the natural logarithm of the market capitalization 
in order to control for the market microstructure effects and size effect. In addition, I 
separately present time-series averages and t-statistics of the coefficient estimates for all 
months and for non-Januarys (Panel A) and for only Januarys (Panel B). The sample 
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period is from 1964 to 2004. In Table 3.4, price and size screening are applied, while in 
Table 3.5 all stocks are included. 
 
The second and third columns of Panel A of Table 3.4 show that JT winner and loser 
dummies are significant when GH 52-week high or MAR strategies are not controlled for 
regardless of whether or not I include Januarys in the holding periods. When Januarys are 
included in the holding periods, the estimate of the JT winner dummy is 0.27% per month 
(t-statistic of 2.46) and that of the JT loser dummy is -0.32% per month (t-statistic of -
3.42). This means that if a stock belongs to the JT winner portfolio, the stock’s return for 
the 6-month holding period starting one month after the portfolio is formed is on average 
0.27% higher than those of stocks that would belong to the middle portfolio if firm sizes 
and one-month lagged returns are identical. Similarly, stocks that are in the JT loser 
portfolio underperform by 0.32% per month compared to average stocks that are in 
middle portfolio for the holding period. The difference between the coefficients of JT 
winner and loser dummies is 0.60% per month with a t-statistic of 4.09. This means that 
JT (30,12,1,6) would produce 0.60% of monthly profits on average if stocks in the winner 
and loser portfolios had identical one-month lagged returns and sizes. The magnitude and 
statistical significance of the JT momentum profits increase when Januarys are excluded 
from the holding period. These results are not surprising given results of Table 3.2.  
 
In the fourth and fifth columns, GH 52-week high winner and loser dummies are included 
in addition to JT momentum winner and loser dummies. The bottom part of the fourth 
and fifth columns shows that even though the difference in coefficient estimates between 
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JT winner and loser dummy is still significantly positive for all months and non-Januarys, 
the magnitude and statistical significance are reduced from those in the second and third 
columns. Monthly profit from the pure JT momentum strategy is 0.32% (t-statistic is 2.14) 
when January is included in the holding period and 0.39% (t-statistic is 2.53) for non-
Januarys while monthly profits from a pure 52-week high strategy is 0.55% (t-statistic is 
3.54) for all months and 0.72% (t-statistic is 4.69) for non-Januarys. The pure JT 
momentum strategy in the fourth and fifth columns would be a JT momentum strategy 
that includes only pairs of stocks, one of which belongs to the JT winner portfolio and the 
other of which belongs to the JT loser portfolio and both of which are identical in one-
month lagged return, size, and membership in any other investment strategies. The 
dominance of the pure 52-week high strategy against the pure JT momentum strategy is 
consistent with the findings of George and Hwang (2004).  
 
Reduction in profitability of the JT momentum strategy mainly comes from the decrease 
in magnitude of the coefficient estimate of the JT momentum loser dummy. For example, 
the coefficient estimate of the JT loser dummy becomes an insignificant -0.06% (t-
statistic of -1.13) for all months while the coefficient estimate of the JT winner dummy is 
slightly lower (2.25% with t-statistic of 2.29) than that in the second column. This 
implies that if a stock belongs to the JT loser portfolio, the stock underperforms by only 
0.06% per month for the holding period compared to stocks that are belong to the JT 
middle portfolio and that are identical in one-month lagged return, size, and membership 
in the GH 52-week high strategy. When Januarys are excluded, the coefficient of the JT 
loser dummy is still significantly negative, but the magnitude is significantly reduced 
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from that in the third column (-0.12% with t-statistic of -2.05). This implies that a large 
portion of the poor performance of JT loser portfolio can be attributed to the fact that the 
JT loser portfolio includes many stocks that belong to the GH 52-week high loser 
portfolio. The coefficient estimates for the 52-week high loser dummy are significantly 
negative for all months and non-Januarys. However, either for all months and non-
Januarys, the coefficient estimates of the JT winner dummy do not decrease significantly 
from those in the second and third columns. This implies that the performance of JT 
winner portfolio cannot be explained by the fact that the JT winner portfolio includes 
many stocks that also belong to 52-week high winner portfolio. The coefficient estimates 
of the 52-week high winner dummy are 0.06% (t-statistic is 1.04) and 0.11% (t-statistic is 
2.07) for all months and non-Januarys, respectively. These results along with a significant 
negative coefficient on the 52-week high loser dummy suggest that profits from the pure 
52-week high strategy are asymmetric; more profits come from poor performance of the 
loser portfolios. 
  
The new findings of this paper are in the sixth through 11th columns where the winner 
and loser dummies of the moving-average ratio (MAR) strategy play significant roles 
even after controlling for the JT momentum and GH 52-week high strategies. 
Furthermore, profits from the pure MAR strategy are more statistically significant than 
those from the pure JT momentum or the pure GH 52-week high strategies. In the sixth 
and seventh columns where the regression equation includes winner and loser dummies 
from the JT momentum and MAR strategies, monthly profit from the pure MAR strategy 
is 0.58% (t-statistic is 6.23) for all months and 0.65% (t-statistic is 7.03) for non-Januarys 
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and profit from the pure JT momentum strategy are reduced significantly from those in 
the second and fourth columns. However, the monthly profit from the pure JT momentum 
strategy is still significantly positive; 0.23% (t-statistic is 2.01) for all months and 0.36% 
(t-statistic is 3.04) for non-Januarys. These, along with results in third and fourth columns, 
suggest that neither the nearness to 52-week high price nor the ratio of the 50-day MA to 
the 200-day moving MA can completely explain the JT momentum profits.  
 
Unlike the fourth and fifth columns, the reduction in the profits of the JT momentum 
strategy comes from decreases in the magnitude of the coefficient estimates of both 
winner and loser dummies for the JT momentum strategy. The coefficient estimates for 
the JT winner dummy decrease to 0.10% (t-statistic is 1.17) and 0.13% (t-statistic is 1.43) 
from 0.27% and 0.30% for all months and non-Januarys, when the winner and loser 
dummies from the MAR strategy are included in regression equation. Also, the 
coefficient estimates of the JT loser dummies decrease in magnitude to -0.13% (t-statistic 
is -1.84) and -0.23% (t-statistic is -3.17) from -0.32% and -0.45%. In the eighth and ninth 
columns, I compare the profitability of the 52-week high and MAR strategies. Neither the 
52-week high nor MAR strategy dominates the other, and profits from both strategies are 
similar; 0.47% (t-statistic is 3.01) and 0.48% (t-statistic is 3.65) for all months and 0.68% 
(4.41) and 0.50 (3.62) for non-Januarys for the pure GH 52-week high and pure MAR 
strategies.  
 
Finally, the tenth and 11th columns include winner and loser dummies from all three of 
the investment strategies. In this case, the pure JT momentum strategy does not produce 
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statistically significant profits when Januarys are included in the holding periods at 
conventional significance levels (90% significance level); the monthly profit is only 
0.13% with a t-statistic of 1.12. When Januarys are excluded, the monthly profit is 
marginally significant at the 90% significance level; monthly profit is 0.21 with t-statistic 
of 1.75. This suggests that a large portion of the predictive power of past returns for 
future returns comes from either nearness to the 52-week high price or the moving 
average ratio. These results confirm George and Hwang’s (2004) argument that a theory 
in which price level relative to an anchor plays a role is more descriptive of the data than 
existing theories that focus on price changes based on overconfidence, conservatism, or 
slow diffusion of information. The tenth and 11th columns also show that the pure GH 
52-week high and MAR strategies generate statistically significant profits at 99% 
significance level whether or not Januarys are included in the holding period. This 
suggests that the predictive power of nearness to the 52-week high price and the moving 
average ratio for future returns are distinct and that investors regard the moving averages 
as their anchor as well as the 52-week high. 
 
Panel B of Table 3.4 presents the same information as Panel A except that holding 
periods are restricted to only Januarys in Panel B. The sixth column shows that the pure 
52-week high strategy contributes most to the return reversals in Januarys (-1.42% with t-
statistic of -2.28) and the pure MAR strategy negatively contributes to the return reversals 
in Januarys (0.47% with t-statistic of 1.42) even though the profits are not statistically 
significant. Average monthly profit from the pure JT momentum strategy is negative and 
marginally significant at 90% significance level; -0.75% with t-statistic of -1.71. The 
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negative profit from the pure JT momentum strategy is asymmetric as consistent with the 
tax-loss selling argument. Only the coefficient estimate on the JT loser dummy is 
statistically significant (0.59 with t-statistic of 3.16), while the coefficient estimate on the 
JT winner dummy is insignificant (-0.16 with t-statistic of -0.52). The positive coefficient 
on the JT loser dummy in January is consistent with a tax-loss selling argument where 
investors tend to sell stocks with high unrealized losses at the end of year more than they 
would sell without tax motivation and in early January, prices of such stocks return to the 
fundamental values resulting in abnormal returns on the stocks. However, a more 
significant loss in January from the pure 52-week high strategy cannot be explained by 
the tax-loss selling argument. The negative profit from the pure 52-week high strategy is 
symmetric. These results can be explained by the window dressing argument. At the end 
of the calendar year, which seems to precede an important reporting date, managers in 
investment companies may want to include more stocks whose current prices are close to 
the 52-week high and less stocks whose current prices are far below the 52-week high in 
order to simply make their portfolios look attractive to investors. Reduction of such 
temporary buying or selling pressure in the beginning of the subsequent year may lead to 
return reversals in Januarys.   
 
Coefficient estimates of the one-month lagged returns in Panels A show that the monthly 
return reversals are significant for both Januarys and non-Januarys even when I exclude 
from the sample all stocks that are priced less than $5 and all stocks with market 
capitalizations that would place them in the smallest NYSE decile. The time-series 
averages of the coefficient estimates of Rit-1 are significantly negative. This suggests that 
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the price and size screening cannot eliminate the market microstructure effects such as 
bid-ask bounce or thin-trading or the possibility that the short-term return reversals may 
come from other sources than the market microstructure effects. Comparison of 
coefficient estimates of size variables from Panels A and B also confirms previous 
literature in which the size effects are most significant in Januarys. Without Januarys, all 
size coefficients are statistically insignificant. This means that there is no size effect in 
non-Januarys among stocks that are priced above $5 and whose market capitalizations are 
above NYSE smallest decile cutoff.  
 
In order to see whether the results in Table 3.4 are primarily driven by the fact that I 
exclude small and low priced stocks, I repeat the same analyses as in Table 3.4 without 
price or size screening. Table 3.5 shows the results of the regression analyses when I 
include all NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ stocks in the sample. The results are 
qualitatively the same as Table 3.4. The fifth column of Table 3.5 shows that the average 
monthly profit from the pure JT momentum is even lower (0.04% with t-statistic of 0.34) 
than the corresponding profit in Table 3.4 while the average monthly profits from the 
pure 52-week high and the MAR strategy are higher than in Table 3.4. This suggests that 
even when I include small and low priced stocks, the past returns do not explain return 
continuation if I include Januarys in the holding period. As in Table 3.4, when I exclude 
Januarys from the holding period, the average month profit from the pure JT momentum 
strategy is marginally significant at 90% significant level while the average monthly 
profits from the pure 52-week high and MAR strategies are significantly positive. 
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Relative to the results in Table 3.4, the coefficients of one-month lagged returns and size 
are much larger in magnitude in Table 3.5. For example, for all months the coefficient 
estimate on Rit-1 is -6.29 (t-statistic is -15.81) when I include all stocks in the sample, 
while it is -3.79 (t-statistic is -8.69) when I exclude small or low priced stocks from the 
sample. This suggests that small or illiquid stocks are more subject to short-term (one-
month) return reversals consistent with the argument that the short-term return reversals 
are caused by market microstructure effects such as bid-ask bounce or liquidity effects. 
Also, coefficients on the natural logarithm of market capitalization are negative and 
statistically significant regardless of whether I include Januarys in the holding period in 
Table 3.5. These along with the results in Table 3.4 suggest that the size effect in non-
Januarys comes from only small or low priced stocks. 
 
IV.D. Long-Term Reversals 
 
As introduced in Section II, George and Hwang (2004) argue that intermediate-term 
momentum and long-term reversals are largely separate phenomena since the 
intermediate-term momentum mainly comes from an anchoring bias in which investors 
regard the 52-week high price as their reference for estimating the current stock price, but 
the long-term reversals are not related to the 52-week high price. George and Hwang also 
argue that these findings present a challenge to existing behavioral theories that model 
the intermediate-term momentum and long-term reversals as integrated components of 
the market’s responses to news. Tables 3.5 and 3.6 confirm George and Hwang’s 
argument. In Table 3.6, I estimate regression Equation (3) in the same way as Table 3.4 
except that there is 12-, 24-, 36-, or 48-month gap between portfolio formation periods 
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and holding periods in Table 3.6. If intermediate-term return continuation and long-term 
return reversals are linked to each other as suggested by BSV, DHS, and HS, the 
investment strategy that contributes most to the intermediate-term return continuation 
should contribute most to the long-term return reversals. Given the results in Tables 3.3 
and 3.4, where the pure 52-week high and pure MAR strategies contribute most and the 
pure JT momentum strategy contribute least to the intermediate-term momentum, the 
long-term return reversals should mainly come from the pure 52-week high or pure MAR 
strategy if the intermediate-term return continuation is linked to long-term return 
reversals. 
 
However, Table 3.6 shows that long-term reversals mainly come from the pure JT 
momentum strategy. When there is a 12- or 24-month gap between the portfolio 
formation period and holding period, the average monthly profit from the pure JT 
momentum strategy is significantly negative regardless of whether Januarys are included 
in the holding periods. Also, when I allow a 48-month gap between the formation period 
and the holding period, the average monthly profit from the pure JT momentum strategy 
is significantly negative when I exclude Januarys from the holding periods. In any case, 
neither the 52-week high nor the MAR strategy produces significantly negative profits. 
Coupled with the results in Tables 3.3 and 3.4, this suggests that intermediate-term 
momentum profits mainly come from an anchoring bias where investors regard 52-week 
high price and moving averages as their reference for estimating current prices, but the 
anchoring bias is not related to long-term reversals. I repeat the analyses in Table 3.7 
without price or size screening. Table 3.7 shows that return reversals from JT momentum 
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strategy is more significant, but 52-week high or MAR strategy does not contribute on 
long-term return reversals even when I include all stocks in the sample. The results in 
Tables 3.5 and 3.6 confirm George and Hwang that intermediate-term momentum and 
long-term reversals are separate phenomena. 
 
V. Conclusions and Implications for Future Research  
The ratio of the 50-day moving average to the 200-day moving average seems to explain 
most of the intermediate-term momentum first documented by Jegadeesh and Titman 
(1993) together with the ratio of the current price to the 52-week high. This suggests that 
an anchoring bias to the 52-week high or moving averages in estimating the current stock 
price is more likely to be the driving force of the intermediate-term momentum than 
investors’ conservatism (Barberis, Shleifer and Vishny, 1998) or overconfidence (Daniel, 
Hirshleifer, and Subrahmanyam, 1998) or slow diffusion of information (Hong and Stein, 
1999). Also the predictive ability of the moving average ratio for future returns is distinct 
from and as significant as the ratio of current price to the 52-week high. This suggests 
that investors regard moving average prices as their reference prices as well as the 52-
week high, while it is unclear whether there are some irrational investors who regard the 
moving averages and the 52-week high as their reference prices or there are two separate 
groups of investors where one group regards the moving averages and the other group 
regards the 52-week high as their reference prices. Finally, I show that neither the pure 
52-week high nor the MAR strategy produces significantly negative profits when there is 
a more than 12-month gap between the portfolio formation period and the holding period, 
while there are long-term return reversals from the pure JT momentum strategy. This 
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suggests that intermediate-term return continuation and long-term return reversals are 
separate phenomena and that separate theories for long-term reversals should be 
developed.  
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Table 3.1 Summary Statistics 
 
At the beginning of each month, returns over the past six and twelve months, the ratios of the current price 
to the 52-week high (52-week high ratio), and the ratios of the 50-day moving average to the 200-day 
moving average (MAR) are calculated for all stocks traded on the NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ over the 
period from January 1964 to December 2004. Panel A presents the time-series averages of the cross-
sectional averages and standard deviations of the returns and ratios. In Panel B, time-series averages of the 
estimates of the pair-wise correlation coefficients between two variables are reported.  
 
I exclude stocks priced below $5 and stocks with market capitalizations that would place them in the 
smallest NYSE decile. 
 
Panel A: Mean and Standard Deviation 
 6-month return 12-month return 52-week high ratio MAR 
Mean 6.64% 12.92% 0.82 1.03 
Standard Deviation 24.34% 35.01% 0.14 0.13 
 
Panel B: Correlation Coefficient 
 12-month return 52-week high ratio MAR 
6-month return 0.72 0.65 0.89 
12-month return  0.62 0.78 
52-week high ratio   0.59 
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Table 3.2 Profits from Three Investment Strategies 
 
Average monthly returns on winner and loser portfolios and average monthly profits (with associated t-statistics) from three investment strategies are presented. 
The three investment strategies, JT(p, J, D, K), 52HI(p, D, K), and MAR(p, D, K) are defined in Definitions 1, 2, and 4, respectively. For example, at the 
beginning of each month t, JT(p, J, D, K) sorts all stocks in the sample based on the buy-and-hold returns for the J months from t-D-J to t-D-1, buys equally the 
top p% of stocks (winners) and sells equally the bottom p% of stocks (losers), and holds this position for the next K months. This strategy is the same as in 
Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) where there is a D-month gap between formation and holding period. 52HI(p, D, K) is defined similarly to JT(p, J, D, K) except 
that stocks are sorted by the ratio of current price to the 52-week high price instead of past returns.  MAR(p, D, K) is the same as 52HI(p, D, K) except that stocks 
are sorted by the ratio of the 50-day moving average to the 200-day moving average. I include all stocks traded on the NYSE, AMEX and NASDAQ, but exclude 
all stocks priced below $5 at the end of the formation period and all stocks with market capitalizations that would place them in the smallest NYSE decile. The 
sample period is from January 1964 to December 2004.  
 
Panel A presents the results when I include Januarys in the holding period, Panel B shows the results for only Januarys and Panel C contains results for only non-
Januarys.  
 
Panel A: All Months 
  P = 10%  P = 30% 
  JT(10,12,0,6) JT(10,6,0,6) 52HI(10,0,6) MAR(10,0,6)  JT(30,12,0,6) JT(30,6,0,6) 52HI(30,0,6) MAR(30,0,6) 
1/64 – 12/04          
 Winner 1.68 1.72 1.43 1.81  1.51 1.48 1.39 1.54 
 Loser 0.47 0.49 0.28 0.36  0.79 0.82 0.73 0.75 
 Winner – Loser 1.21 1.23 1.15 1.45  0.72 0.66 0.66 0.80 
 (4.94) (5.16) (4.39) (6.02)  (4.34) (4.27) (3.79) (5.03) 
1/64 – 12/83          
 Winner 1.78 1.72 1.43 1.81  1.56 1.50 1.37 1.55 
 Loser 0.55 0.62 0.43 0.48  0.84 0.90 0.87 0.82 
 Winner – Loser 1.23 1.10 1.00 1.33  0.72 0.60 0.50 0.73 
 (3.83) (3.82) (3.37) (4.46)  (3.21) (2.98) (2.44) (3.44) 
1/84 – 12/04          
 Winner 1.59 1.72 1.43 1.82  1.47 1.47 1.42 1.54 
 Loser 0.39 0.36 0.14 0.25  0.74 0.74 0.60 0.67 
 Winner – Loser 1.20 1.35 1.29 1.57  0.73 0.72 0.81 0.87 
  (3.23) (3.60) (3.03) (4.17)  (2.96) (3.08) (2.92) (3.68) 
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Table 3.2 Continued 
Panel B: January Only 
  P = 10%  P = 30% 
  JT(10,12,0,6) JT(10,6,0,6) 52HI(10,0,6) MAR(10,0,6)  JT(30,12,0,6) JT(30,6,0,6) 52HI(30,0,6) MAR(30,0,6) 
1/64 – 12/04          
 Winner 3.42 3.53 2.13 3.60  3.23 3.23 2.48 3.26 
 Loser 5.57 5.33 5.97 5.32  4.64 4.61 5.15 4.60 
 Winner – Loser -2.15 -1.80 -3.84 -1.72  -1.42 -1.38 -2.67 -1.34 
 (-2.07) (-1.42) (-2.68) (-1.40)  (-2.04) (-1.78) (-2.99) (-1.73) 
1/64 – 12/83          
 Winner 3.53 3.64 2.49 3.70  3.66 3.69 2.94 3.65 
 Loser 6.14 5.77 6.39 5.65  5.37 5.28 5.95 5.26 
 Winner – Loser -2.61 -2.13 -3.89 -1.95  -1.70 -1.59 -3.00 -1.61 
 (-1.65) (-1.41) (-2.27) (-1.31)  (-1.52) (-1.52) (-2.56) (-1.52) 
1/84 – 12/04          
 Winner 3.32 3.43 1.79 3.50  2.81 2.79 2.05 2.89 
 Loser 5.03 4.92 5.57 5.00  3.95 3.97 4.39 3.97 
 Winner – Loser -1.71 -1.49 -3.79 -1.49  -1.14 -1.19 -2.34 -1.07 
  (-1.24) (-0.73) (-1.63) (-0.76)  (-1.33) (-1.01) (-1.72) (-0.94) 
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Table 3.2 Continued 
Panel C: January Excluded 
  P = 10%  P = 30% 
  JT(10,12,0,6) JT(10,6,0,6) 52HI(10,0,6) MAR(10,0,6)  JT(30,12,0,6) JT(30,6,0,6) 52HI(30,0,6) MAR(30,0,6) 
1/64 – 12/04          
 Winner 1.52 1.55 1.37 1.65  1.35 1.32 1.29 1.39 
 Loser 0.01 0.05 -0.23 -0.09  0.44 0.48 0.33 0.39 
 Winner – Loser 1.52 1.50 1.60 1.74  0.92 0.85 0.97 0.99 
 (6.17) (6.57) (6.57) (7.43)  (5.47) (5.61) (5.82) (6.38) 
1/64 – 12/83          
 Winner 1.62 1.55 1.34 1.64  1.37 1.30 1.23 1.36 
 Loser 0.04 0.15 -0.11 0.01  0.42 0.50 0.40 0.42 
 Winner – Loser 1.58 1.39 1.44 1.63  0.94 0.80 0.82 0.94 
 (5.10) (5.05) (5.43) (5.64)  (4.31) (4.12) (4.45) (4.58) 
1/84 – 12/04          
 Winner 1.43 1.56 1.40 1.67  1.34 1.35 1.36 1.41 
 Loser -0.03 -0.05 -0.35 -0.18  0.45 0.45 0.26 0.37 
 Winner – Loser 1.46 1.61 1.75 1.85  0.89 0.90 1.10 1.04 
  (3.84) (4.45) (4.34) (5.04)  (3.53) (3.88) (4.05) (4.48) 
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Table 3.3 Pair-Wise Comparisons of Profitability from Three Investment Strategies 
 
This table presents pair-wise comparisons of profitability from the three investment strategies, MAR (p,0,6), 
JT (p,12,0,6) and 52HI (p,0,6). For each month t, I calculate returns on winner and loser portfolios and 
momentum profits from the three investment strategies for p = 10% and 30%. Then, the differences in 
returns of winner and loser portfolios and momentum profits from each pair of investment strategies are 
obtained. This table presents the time-series averages and t-statistics (in parentheses) of the differences. I 
include all stocks traded on the NYSE, AMEX and NASDAQ, but exclude all stocks priced below $5 at the 
end of the formation period and all stocks with market capitalizations that would place them in the smallest 
NYSE decile. The sample period is from January 1964 to December 2004. The numbers in bold font mean 
that statistical significance in 90% significance level. 
 
  MAR  – JT MAR – 52HI 52HI – JT  
Winner 0.13 
(2.55) 
0.38 
(2.57) 
-0.25 
(-1.48) 
Loser -0.11 
(-2.02) 
0.08 
(1.23) 
-0.19 
(-2.24) P = 10% 
Winner-loser 0.24 
(2.45) 
0.30 
(1.49) 
-0.06 
(-0.26) 
     
Winner 0.03 
(0.97) 
0.15 
(1.77) 
-0.12 
(-1.20) 
Loser -0.04 
(-1.25) 
0.01 
(0.25) 
-0.06 
(-0.82) P = 30% 
Winner-loser 0.07 
(1.14) 
0.14 
(0.97) 
-0.06 
(-0.37) 
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Table 3.4 Comparisons of JT, 52-Week High, and Moving-Average-Ratio (with Price and Size Screening) 
 
The basic functional form of the regression equation is  ( ) itkDitktkDitktkDitktkDitktkDitktkDitktitktitktktit eMALbMAHbFHLbFHHbJLbJHbsizebRbbR +++++++++= −−−−−−−−−−−−−− 87654312110 ln , 
for k = 1, …, 6, and D=1, where Rit and Rit-1 are stock i’s returns for month t and t-1, ln(sizeit-1) is the natural logarithm of stock i’s market capitalization at the 
end of month t-1, JHit-k is a dummy variable that equals one if stock i’s past performance over the 12-month period (t-D-k-11, t-D-k-1) is in the top 30% when 
measured by the JT momentum strategy performance criterion, and is zero otherwise; JLit-k equals one if stock i’s past performance over the same period is in the 
bottom 30% as measured by the JT momentum strategy performance criterion, and is zero otherwise. The dummy variables, FHHit-k, FHLit-k, MAHit-k, and MALit-k 
are similarly defined except that FHHit-k and FHLit-k use the GH 52-week high strategy criterion and MAHit-k and MALit-k use the moving-average ratio strategy 
criterion. 
 
For each month, I estimate the regression equations for k=1,…, 6, and calculate the averages of the coefficient estimates. This table presents time-series averages 
and associated t-statistics of the averages. Also, in the bottom part of each panel, the time-series averages of differences in the coefficient estimates between 
winner and loser dummies from the investment strategies are presented. For example, the numbers in the row titled “JT winner dummy – JT loser dummy” means 
time-series average of the difference between the coefficient estimates on the JT winner and loser dummies.  
 
Panel A presents results when Januarys are included in the holding period and when Januarys are excluded from the holding period. In Panel B, results are 
presented for only Januarys. Columns under the title “JT’ include only JT momentum strategy dummies, columns under the title “JT-52HI” include only JT 
momentum and GH 52-week high strategy dummies, and so on. The same price and size screening as in Table 1 is applied to the sample data and the sample 
period is same as in Table 1. Numbers in bold font mean statistical significance at 90% significance level. 
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Table 3.4 Continued 
Panel A: All months or January Excluded 
 JT JT–52HI JT-MAR 52HI-MAR JT-52HI-MAR 
 All 
Months 
Jan. 
Excluded 
All 
Months 
Jan. 
Excluded 
All 
Months 
Jan. 
Excluded 
All 
Months 
Jan. 
Excluded 
All 
Months 
Jan. 
Excluded 
Intercept 1.79 
(3.40) 
0.55 
(1.13) 
2.08 
(4.19) 
0.91 
(1.97) 
1.87 
(3.67) 
0.66 
(1.40) 
2.07 
(4.17) 
0.91 
(1.96) 
2.05 
(4.19) 
0.89 
(1.96) 
Rit-1 -3.47 
(-7.46) 
-2.80 
(-6.03) 
-3.69 
(-8.32) 
-3.02 
(-6.82) 
-3.62 
(-8.04) 
-2.95 
(-6.56) 
-3.66 
(-8.15) 
-2.99 
(-6.66) 
-3.79 
(-8.69) 
-3.11 
(-7.17) 
ln(size) -0.05 
(-1.46) 
0.03 
(1.11) 
-0.07 
(-2.12) 
0.01 
(0.33) 
-0.05 
(-1.64) 
0.03 
(0.91) 
-0.07 
(-2.11) 
0.01 
(0.34) 
-0.07 
(-2.10) 
0.01 
(0.37) 
JT winner dummy 0.27 
(2.46) 
0.30 
(2.61) 
0.25 
(2.29) 
0.27 
(2.34) 
0.10 
(1.17) 
0.13 
(1.43) 
  0.12 
(1.47) 
0.15 
(1.72) 
JT loser dummy -0.32 
(-3.42) 
-0.45 
(-4.81) 
-0.06 
(-1.13) 
-0.12 
(-2.05) 
-0.13 
(-1.84) 
-0.23 
(-3.17) 
  -0.01 
(-0.18) 
-0.06 
(-1.21) 
52-week high winner dummy   0.06 
(1.04) 
0.11 
(2.07) 
  0.05 
(1.01) 
0.12 
(2.40) 
0.03 
(0.49) 
0.08 
(1.46) 
52-week high loser dummy   -0.49 
(-4.55) 
-0.61 
(-5.67) 
  -0.42 
(-3.73) 
-0.56 
(-5.00) 
-0.40 
(-3.91) 
-0.52 
(-4.97) 
MV ratio winner dummy     0.26 
(4.04) 
0.25 
(3.81) 
0.30 
(2.97) 
0.30 
(2.78) 
0.25 
(3.74) 
0.23 
(3.34) 
MV ratio loser dummy     -0.33 
(-4.73) 
-0.39 
(-5.87) 
-0.18 
(-3.84) 
-0.20 
(-4.26) 
-0.17 
(-4.19) 
-0.18 
(-4.41) 
           
JT winner dummy – 
JT loser dummy 
0.60 
(4.09) 
0.76 
(5.10) 
0.32 
(2.14) 
0.39 
(2.53) 
0.23 
(2.01) 
0.36 
(3.04) 
  0.13 
(1.12) 
0.21 
(1.75) 
52-week high winner dummy – 
52-week high loser dummy 
  0.55 
(3.54) 
0.72 
(4.69) 
  0.47 
(3.01) 
0.68 
(4.41) 
0.43 
(2.86) 
0.60 
(3.94) 
MV ratio winner dummy – 
MV ratio loser dummy 
    0.58 
(6.23) 
0.65 
(7.03) 
0.48 
(3.65) 
0.50 
(3.62) 
0.41 
(4.68) 
0.41 
(4.45) 
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Table 3.4 Continued 
Panel A: January Only 
 JT JT–52HI JT-MAR 52HI-MAR JT-52HI-MAR 
Intercept 15.47 
(6.21) 
14.90 
(6.50) 
15.14 
(6.33) 
14.87 
(6.46) 
14.78 
(6.47) 
Rit-1 -10.86 
(-5.66) 
-11.08 
(-6.16) 
-10.99 
(-5.98) 
-11.04 
(-6.08) 
-11.22 
(-6.33) 
ln(size) -0.98 
(-5.99) 
-0.93 
(-6.17) 
-0.96 
(-6.07) 
-0.93 
(-6.13) 
-0.92 
(-6.12) 
JT winner dummy -0.05 
(-0.14) 
0.05 
(0.14) 
-0.19 
(-0.54) 
 -0.16 
(-0.52) 
JT loser dummy 1.11 
(2.79) 
0.53 
(2.63) 
0.96 
(3.48) 
 0.59 
(3.16) 
52-week high winner dummy  -0.55 
(-2.21) 
 -0.71 
(-2.80) 
-0.56 
(-2.33) 
52-week high loser dummy  0.84 
(1.77) 
 1.16 
(2.48) 
0.86 
(2.07) 
MV ratio winner dummy   0.30 
(1.33) 
0.35 
(1.07) 
0.41 
(1.91) 
MV ratio loser dummy   0.38 
(1.03) 
0.08 
(0.42) 
-0.05 
(-0.29) 
      
JT winner dummy – 
JT loser dummy 
-1.17 
(-2.06) 
-0.48 
(-0.92) 
-1.14 
(-2.42) 
 -0.75 
(-1.71) 
52-week high winner dummy – 
52-week high loser dummy 
 -1.39 
(-2.03) 
 -1.87 
(-2.71) 
-1.42 
(-2.28) 
MV ratio winner dummy – 
MV ratio loser dummy 
  -0.08 
(-0.17) 
0.26 
(0.60) 
0.47 
(1.42) 
 
 156
Table 3.5 Comparisons of JT, 52-Week High, and Moving-Average-Ratio Strategies (without Price and Size Screening) 
 
All procedures are same as in Table 2 except that there is no price or size screening in the sample.  
 
 JT JT-52HI-MAR 
 All Months Jan. Excl. Jan. Only All Months Jan. Excl. Jan. Only 
       
Intercept 3.75 
(6.58) 
1.92 
(3.81) 
23.96 
(10.19) 
4.08 
(7.91) 
2.44 
(5.33) 
22.09 
(10.67) 
Rit-1 -6.07 
(-14.46) 
-5.09 
(-14.01) 
-16.80 
(-6.62) 
-6.29 
(-15.81) 
-5.34 
(15.47) 
-16.76 
(-7.09) 
ln(size) -0.21 
(-5.15) 
-0.08 
(-2.23) 
-1.64 
(-9.68) 
-0.24 
(-6.32) 
-0.13 
(-3.67) 
-1.50 
(-9.68) 
JT winner dummy 0.26 
(2.63) 
0.29 
(2.82) 
-0.05 
(-0.12) 
0.08 
(1.05) 
0.09 
(1.25) 
-0.11 
(-0.37) 
JT loser dummy -0.32 
(-2.42) 
-0.64 
(-5.29) 
3.26 
(5.38) 
0.04 
(0.69) 
-0.10 
(-1.82) 
1.59 
(6.76) 
52-week high winner dummy    0.15 
(2.21) 
0.23 
(3.24) 
-0.69 
(-2.55) 
52-week high loser dummy    -0.34 
(-2.82) 
-0.61 
(-5.30) 
2.55 
(4.37) 
MV ratio winner dummy    0.24 
(3.80) 
0.21 
(3.19) 
0.56 
(2.67) 
MV ratio loser dummy    -0.24 
(-4.99) 
-0.30 
(-6.52) 
0.38 
(1.40) 
       
JT winner dummy – 
JT loser dummy 
0.58 
(3.55) 
0.93 
(5.95) 
-3.31 
(-4.83) 
0.04 
(0.34) 
0.19 
(1.81) 
-1.70 
(-4.33) 
52-week high winner dummy – 
52-week high loser dummy 
   0.50 
(2.76) 
0.84 
(4.79) 
-3.24 
(-4.13) 
MA ratio winner dummy – 
MA ratio loser dummy 
   0.48 
(5.63) 
0.51 
(5.83) 
0.17 
(0.48) 
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Table 3.6 Long-Term Reversals (with Price and Size Screening) 
 
All procedures and sample are same as Table 2 except that D = 12, 24, 36, and 48, and that sample period is from June 1968 to December 2004. 
 
 D = 12  D = 24  D = 36  D = 48 
 All Months Jan. Excl.  All Months Jan. Excl.  All Months Jan. Excl.  All Months Jan. Excl. 
Intercept 0.85 
(1.40) 
-0.71 
(-1.32) 
 1.56 
(2.40) 
-0.31 
(-0.56) 
 2.12 
(3.17) 
0.18 
(0.32) 
 2.37 
(3.56) 
0.43 
(0.77) 
Rit-1 -4.86 
(-9.68) 
-3.99 
(-8.42) 
 -5.20 
(-10.47) 
-4.25 
(-9.06) 
 -5.32 
(-10.74) 
-4.34 
(-9.30) 
 -5.56 
(-11.40) 
-4.62 
(-9.96) 
ln(size) 0.03 
(0.67) 
0.14 
(3.85) 
 -0.02 
(-0.56) 
0.11 
(2.90) 
 -0.07 
(-1.46) 
0.07 
(1.85) 
 -0.08 
(-1.85) 
0.05 
(1.41) 
JT winner dummy -0.17 
(-2.48) 
-0.19 
(-2.67) 
 -0.11 
(-1.68) 
-0.14 
(-2.17) 
 -0.01 
(-0.09) 
-0.05 
(-0.79) 
 -0.05 
(-0.78) 
-0.09 
(-1.48) 
JT loser dummy 0.16 
(4.09) 
0.12 
(3.07) 
 0.07 
(1.80) 
0.06 
(1.57) 
 -0.01 
(-0.46) 
-0.01 
(-0.30) 
 -0.05 
(1.86) 
0.05 
(1.70) 
52-week high winner dummy 0.01 
(0.20) 
0.05 
(0.94) 
 -0.03 
(-0.68) 
0.01 
(0.21) 
 -0.03 
(-0.70) 
0.00 
(-0.08) 
 -0.07 
(-1.72) 
-0.06 
(-1.28) 
52-week high loser dummy -0.03 
(-0.32) 
-0.17 
(-1.74) 
 0.07 
(0.73) 
-0.06 
(-0.59) 
 0.07 
(0.74) 
-0.03 
(-0.35) 
 -0.01 
(-0.14) 
-0.08 
(-0.90) 
MV ratio winner dummy -0.07 
(-1.18) 
-0.04 
(-1.46) 
 -0.02 
(-0.34) 
-0.04 
(-0.67) 
 -0.01 
(-0.22) 
-0.04 
(-0.79) 
 0.03 
(0.47) 
-0.01 
(-0.14) 
MV ratio loser dummy -0.01 
(-0.38) 
-0.04 
(-1.46) 
 -0.01 
(-0.28) 
-0.03 
(-1.23) 
 -0.02 
(-0.22) 
-0.01 
(-0.43) 
 -0.01 
(-0.23) 
-0.00 
(-0.14) 
            
JT winner dummy – 
JT loser dummy 
-0.33 
(-3.68) 
-0.31 
(-3.42) 
 -0.18 
(-2.24) 
-0.20 
(-2.37) 
 0.01 
(0.12) 
-0.04 
(-0.51) 
 -0.10 
(-1.39) 
-0.14 
(-1.90) 
52-week high winner dummy – 
52-week high loser dummy 
0.04 
(0.29) 
0.22 
(1.53) 
 -0.10 
(-0.75) 
0.07 
(0.49) 
 -0.10 
(-0.77) 
0.03 
(0.23) 
 -0.06 
(-0.51) 
0.02 
(0.17) 
MV ratio winner dummy – 
MV ratio loser dummy 
-0.06 
(-0.84) 
-0.04 
(-0.59) 
 -0.01 
(-0.20) 
-0.01 
(-0.16) 
 0.00 
(0.07) 
-0.03 
(-0.52) 
 0.03 
(0.47) 
-0.00 
(-0.06) 
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Table 3.7 Long-Term Reversals (without Price and Size Screening) 
 
All procedures and sample are same as in Table 4 except that there is no price or size screening. 
 
 D = 12  D = 24  D = 36  D = 48 
 All Months Jan. Excl.  All Months Jan. Excl.  All Months Jan. Excl.  All Months Jan. Excl. 
Intercept 2.72
(4.88) 
0.96
(2.00) 
 2.75
(4.72) 
0.88 
(1.78) 
 2.87 
(4.81) 
0.95
(1.91) 
 2.92 
(4.88) 
0.98 
(1.96) 
Rit-1 -6.44 
(-14.49) 
-5.43 
(-14.46) 
 -6.52 
(-14.55) 
-5.47 
(-14.40) 
 -6.52 
(-14.62) 
-5.47 
(-14.20) 
 -6.49 
(-14.46) 
-5.46 
(-13.85) 
ln(size) -0.12 
(-3.01) 
0.00 
(0.07) 
 -0.12 
(-2.91) 
0.01 
(0.28) 
 -0.13 
(-3.06) 
0.01 
(0.14) 
 -0.13 
(-3.09) 
0.01 
(0.16) 
JT winner dummy -0.20 
(-3.33) 
-0.22 
(-3.60) 
 -0.11 
(-1.95) 
-0.13 
(-2.33) 
 -0.05 
(-0.83) 
-0.09 
(-1.58) 
 -0.09 
(-1.80) 
-0.14 
(-2.64) 
JT loser dummy 0.15
(3.46) 
0.06 
(1.50) 
 0.09
(2.16) 
0.03 
(0.81) 
 -0.00 
(-0.10) 
-0.01 
(-0.33) 
 0.08 
(2.71) 
0.08 
(2.61) 
52-week high winner dummy 0.05 
(0.67) 
0.13 
(1.79) 
 -0.01 
(-0.17) 
0.06 
(0.94) 
 0.01 
(0.08) 
0.06 
(0.90) 
 -0.01 
(-0.25) 
0.02 
(0.36) 
52-week high loser dummy 0.07 
(0.59) 
-0.16 
(-1.45) 
 0.05 
(0.46) 
-0.12 
(-1.10) 
 0.03 
(0.33) 
-0.12 
(-1.15) 
 -0.07 
(-0.74) 
-0.20 
(-2.26) 
MV ratio winner dummy -0.09 
(-1.63) 
-0.12 
(-1.99) 
 -0.05 
(-0.93) 
-0.08 
(-1.46) 
 -0.03 
(-0.70) 
-0.08 
(-1.46) 
 -0.00 
(-0.04) 
-0.05 
(-0.96) 
MV ratio loser dummy 0.00 
(0.12) 
-0.04 
(-1.23) 
 0.01 
(0.42) 
-0.02 
(-0.64) 
 -0.01 
(-0.27) 
-0.01 
(-0.55) 
 0.03 
(1.35) 
0.04 
(1.82) 
            
JT winner dummy – 
JT loser dummy 
-0.35 
(-4.55) 
-0.28 
(-3.70) 
 -0.19 
(-2.79) 
-0.17 
(-2.33) 
 -0.04 
(-0.67) 
-0.08 
(-1.19) 
 -0.17 
(-2.95) 
-0.21 
(-3.68) 
52-week high winner dummy – 
52-week high loser dummy 
-0.02 
(-0.12) 
0.29 
(1.66) 
 -0.06 
(-0.37) 
0.18 
(1.09) 
 -0.03 
(-0.19) 
0.18 
(1.12) 
 0.05 
(0.39) 
0.23 
(1.58) 
MV ratio winner dummy – 
MV ratio loser dummy 
-0.10 
(-1.57) 
-0.08 
(-1.30) 
 -0.06 
(-1.02) 
-0.07 
(-1.08) 
 -0.03 
(-0.52) 
-0.06 
(-1.10) 
 -0.03 
(-0.54) 
-0.10 
(-1.52) 
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